Islam, Cultural Hybridity and Cosmopolitanism: New Muslim Intellectuals on Globalization

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Abstract

This essay explores those Muslim discourses on the phenomenon of globalization which distinguish themselves by not succumbing to the antagonism guiding Huntington’s ‘clash of civilization’ thesis (1996) or Benjamin Barber's account of ‘Jihad vs. McWorld’ (1995), either through the ‘blind imitation’ (taqlid) characterising the unquestioned preservation of the classical Islamic heritage by traditionalist Muslims or through the atavistic return to the supposed pristine Islam of the ‘Pious Ancestors’ (salaf) of revivalist (fundamentalist) respondents. Combining an intimate familiarity with the heritage of Muslim civilization with a solid knowledge of recent achievements of the Western academe in the human sciences, the ‘new Muslim intellectuals’ disseminating these alternative discourses exhibit a cultural hybridity which enables them to develop a cosmopolitan attitude and competence necessary to transform binary positions into a new synthesis. To illustrate that this new Muslim intellectualism is itself a global phenomenon, the present essay traces these qualities in the work of scholars and thinkers from various parts of the Muslim world, with particular focus on Indonesia.
Introduction: New Muslim intellectuals

Since the late 1960s, the cultural-religious heritage of the Islamic world has witnessed a growing re-appreciation among its inhabitants. Rapidly spreading disenchantment with secular political ideologies in the wake of dramatic events such as the disastrous outcome of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the atrocities against alleged communists in Indonesia in the wake of the 1965 military coup against Soekarno, and clashes between Malays and Chinese in Malaysia drove many Muslims back to their own religious tradition for comfort and inspiration. The most vocal proponents of this trend advocate a return to the perceived pristine Islam of the first generations of Muslims, the so-called „pious ancestors“ or al-salaf al-salih – hence the designation „Salafi“ Islam. Their often very literalist interpretation of the primary sources of the Islamic heritage, the Qur’an and so-called Sunna or „Traditions of the Prophet“, is not only intended to counter the incursions of Western philosophies and ideologies. It also challenges the system of traditionalist Islamic learning, which had evolved over centuries and, according to the Salafis, had atrophied into what they call taqlid or „blind imitation“.

However, a third alternative has emerged within Muslim discourse which seeks to navigate between outright secularism, bland traditionalism, and uncompromisingly literalist reinterpretations of the Islamic teachings. Exponents of this strand of thought conceive of Islam as a civilization, an inclusivist concept encompassing a much broader, religious, cultural, and intellectual legacy. Using the concept of „heritage“ or turath, they are referred to as the turathiyun judud or „new partisans of the heritage“ (Flores, 1988). Combining an intimate familiarity with the Islamic tradition with an equally solid knowledge of recent achievements of the Western academe in the human sciences, this new Muslim intelligentsia has been producing a rich and varied „turath literature“ (Binder, 1988, p. 298). Since this new Muslim intellectualism has representatives throughout the Muslim world, it can be considered a global phenomenon in its own right. At the same time, their position is still liminal or marginal in the sense that such innovative and progressive reinterpretations of the Islamic heritage are only possible in the interstices of society harboring an „avant-garde“ of progressive thinkers, more often than not not concentrated at academic institutions. Consequently the audiences of these new Muslim intellectuals also tend to be confined to those in the highest-educated echelons of Muslim societies, who are equipped to engage in what I suggest calling the cosmopolitan vision(s) exhibited in these alternative discourses (Bagader, 1994, pp. 119-20). With demographic trends such as the expansion of urban middle classes in the Muslim world and the concomitant increase in numbers of students attending higher education, this particular discourse should be expected to grow in significance.

‘Good to think with’: cosmopolitanism and cultural hybridity

In the last decade and a half, the notion of cosmopolitanism has been used with increasing frequency in the Western human sciences. „Embodying middle-path alternatives between ethnocentric nationalism and particularistic multiculturalism“ (Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p. 1), it has been employed by political scientists, legal scholars, anthropologists, historians, theorists of postcolonial studies, philosophers, and literary critics. Two sociologists, Ulrich Beck and Pascal Bruckner, have even launched „ringing cosmopolitan manifestos“ (Hollinger, 2002, p. 227). It is important to clarify from the outset that this „new cosmopolitanism“ (ibid) has expanded into an exploration of other possibilities than those of classical cosmopolitanism, the modern
variant of which is generally associated with Kant (Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p. 10) but which actually draws on the ancient Hellenic legacy. In applying the concept to the current investigation, I take my cue from two perspectives identified by Vertovec and Cohen, presenting cosmopolitanism as an “attitude or disposition” and as a “practice or competence” (13), which are in turn informed by Ulf Hannerz’s seminal text on this resurgent cosmopolitanism (1990). Aside from underscoring the individual agency underlying this particular understanding of the concept, reflecting both a “state of readiness” and “built-up skill” (239), Hannerz’s essay has the additional attraction of singling out intellectuals as an apt illustration of what it means to be cosmopolitan. The stress on the role of the individual in conceiving this more open attitude and versatile competence is also reflected in Chan Kwok-Bun’s dialectics of cultural contact. He argues that cosmopolitanism’s hybridizing and innovating aspects enable people to be less tenaciously attached to their “cultures of origin” and explore instead the new possibilities cosmopolitanism opens up (Chan, 2002, p. 194).

These aspects connect the new thinking about cosmopolitanism not only with the recent theorizing of cultural hybridity but also with its role in managing or producing meaning (Chan, 2002, p. 207; Hannerz 1990, p. 238; Tomlinson, 2002, p. 252). In my view, the new cosmopolitanism can be regarded as a further sophistication of the “processual theory of hybridity” (Werbner, 1997, p. 21), which moves beyond the inadequacy of modernist insights associating cultural hybridity with liminality, marginality, and the interstitial – allocations of space that renders such modernist understanding of hybridity static. Instead, Werbner’s theory provides broader postmodernist and postcolonial contours along the lines of Stuart Hall’s “constant process of differentiation and exchange” between the centre and the periphery and between different peripheries as suggested by Papstergiadis (1997, p. 274), rather than Homi Bhabha’s “third space” (279) while at the same time avoiding throwing away the baby of modernity with the bathwater.

Symptomatic of these developments is the reassessment of the connection between modernity and secularization argued by political and social theorists in the 1960s. In the face of overwhelming empirical evidence to the contrary, the resulting modernization-secularization thesis has been seriously called into question – even by some of its early advocates – from the 1990s onwards. Instead, there is a more acute need to explain this Western European phenomenon of secularization, which increasingly appears as an exception rather than the rule. When considered from a world-historical and long durée perspective, the case could be made that the anomaly even extends to the entire western notion of modernity – something that has hitherto escaped the myopic gaze of hegemonic western intellectual and political discourses.
This confirms the plausibility of what Ulrich Beck has characterised as the second age of modernity, the most important characteristic of which -- for the present account -- is that „the guiding ideas, the foundations, and ultimately, the claim to a monopoly on modernity by an originally western European modernism is shattered” (Beck, 2002, p. 70).

This paradigmatic shift in the understanding of modernity emerging in the post-cold world order, breaking down „boundaries and assumed dichotomies” (Taiji-Farouki, 2004, p. 3), including the „binary opposition of tradition versus modernity” (Feener, 2007, p. 273), also gained momentum in the Muslim world thanks to the efforts of the new Muslim intellectuals (Sharify-Funk, 2006).

I submit that cosmopolitanism and cultural hybridity are therefore useful heuristic tools for analyzing the ways in which contemporary Muslim intellectuals are trying to come to terms with globalization. Borrowing eclectically from the Western human sciences, representatives of new cosmopolitanism in the Muslim world appropriate, decontextualize, and reconstitute hybrid forms of an array of concepts and notions in their own constituencies. As exercises of individual agency, these intentional hybridities also preserve a degree of „rootedness” in -- at one and the same time -- the global ecumene of the Muslim Umma and regional cultural specificities. This acute awareness that „culture is always sited and negotiated” (Werbner, 1997, p. 16) sets these cosmopolitan Muslims apart from postcolonial theorists such as, for example, Homi Bhabha and Stuart Hall (12).

I will show how elements from Papastergiadis’ condensed account of the theories of hybridity (1997) recur in the work of the earlier identified new Muslim intellectuals. Thus the Lusotropicology developed by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, reached the Algerian-French historian of Islam Mohammed Arkoun via the works of Roger Bastide. Its „baroque inclusiveness” (Patell, 1999) represents a departure from the „shadowy status of the hybrid” (Papastergiadis, 1997, p. 260) towards a „new social order through the principle of synthesis and combination of differences” (261). A key figure in Brazilian modernism, Freyre in turn owed a „methodological debt to Picasso” (262):

By privileging the role of mixture, Freyre’s account of cultural development clearly distances itself from the nineteenth-century theories of natural law, evolution and racial purity that dominated the Romantic constructions of nationhood. Hybridity succeeds not in its blind conformity to the European model but in the application of European systems and ideals in a „New World”. Progress in the „New World” is marked by the dialectic of adaptation and transformation (Papastergiadis, 1997, p. 262).

Others, such as the Egyptian philosopher Hasan Hanafi, can be said to have problematized the hybrid as „a sign for the extension of the European spirit” (Papastergiadis, 1997, p. 261). Recalling Don Miller’s rejection of „simple modernity” as „a blatant contradiction” and Max Raphael”’s observation that the West”’s material successes came at „the expense of hollowing out Western spiritual values” (263-4), Hanafi”’s critique foreshadows Papastergiadis”’ acute awareness of unresolved paradoxes, dualities, centrifugal, and centripetal forces underlying the synergies that produce cultural hybridity and cosmopolitanism. His writings reflect what Papastergiadis says about modern art in that they foreground that „non-European forms were assimilated back into the European tradition through the mediation of historically prior traditions” (Papastergiadis, 1997, p. 263). However, this new Muslim intelligentsia is also symptomatic of the shadowy side to this cultural
hybridism, namely that: “if the non-Western is to enter the West, it must do so in the guise of the cultural hybrid: the non-western-Westerner” (264).

The remarkable parallels between theories of hybridity and Muslim cosmopolitanism do not end here. One of Hanafi’s students, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, took up his teacher’s suggestion to embark on a hermeneutical analysis of Scripture (Abu Zayd 2002, p. 100) moving from Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur to the structural linguists and semioticians like Yuri Lotman, whose identification of a five-stage interaction between interpreter, text, and context is used by Papastergiadis to come to a semiotic reading of cultural hybridity (1997, pp. 268-71).

Aside from the fact that notions like cosmopolitanism and cultural hybridity are – to borrow Lévi-Strauss’ canonical formulation – “good to think with” (Knecht and Feuchter 2008: 11), another reason for using them here is that these terms, as well as the adjective “cosmopolitan”, also have made their entry in contemporary Muslim discourses, most notably in Indonesia (Abegebriel, 2007; Madjid, 2003, 2005; Salim & Ridwan, 1999; Wahid, 2007a; Wahid, 2007b), but also in Iranian and Turkish settings (Masaeli 2008, Yılmaz 2008). The fact that they appear to be in conversation with each other further affirms the global character of this discourse.

Learning from the Periphery: Southeast Asia as a site of cosmopolitan Islam

Within the Muslim world, some of the most original attempts of cosmopolitan non-binary ways of rethinking modernity are not taking place at the center but on the geographical periphery. Since the beginning of the twentieth-first century, there is evidence of an unabashed assertiveness on the part of Southeast Asian Muslims. In a 2002 interview with Newsweek editor Fareed Zakaria, Surin Pitsuwan, the current secretary-general of ASEAN, at the time serving as foreign minister of Thailand, confidently stated that: “For all Islam’s history, Southeast Asia was considered a backwater. But the flows of globalization now need to be reversed. Islam must learn not from the center but rather the periphery” (Zakariya, 2002). Two years later, the Malaysian Arts, Culture, and Heritage Minister, Datu Seri Rais Yatim, came out against the “Arabisation” of Malay culture, encouraging his countrymen to “challenge those who condemn deep-rooted practices of the Malay community as unIslamic [sic]” (Wong, 2004).

In the case of Indonesia (incidentally, the largest Muslim nation in the world), the beginnings of this discourse can be traced back to the late 1960s, when Soeharto’s Orde Baru or “New Order” regime effectively continued the policy of its predecessor by keeping Islamic parties out of active politics. However, on closer inspection, it becomes clear it is also firmly rooted in the country’s centuries-old Javanese and Malay-Muslim heritage. When taking power in 1965, the new government’s first priority was to improve Indonesia’s economic situation, and this required the involvement of a “new type of intellectual who could be expected to participate in government-directed development efforts” (Abdullah, 1996, p. 49, cf. also Federspiel 1992). This policy appeared to allow a certain space for the development of what was later dubbed Islam Kultural (cultural Islam), or alternatively, Islam Sipil (civil Islam).

Two elements were instrumental in the development of this discourse. First of the two elements is Indonesia’s rather unique system of state-run higher Islamic education and the overhaul of that system by progressive Muslim intellectuals taking up leading positions in academia and the administration of religious affairs under the new government. The other one is the rethinking of the role of Islam in contemporary
Muslim societies, suggested by an upcoming generation of young scholars and technocrats.

Although during the Soekarno years Muslim political parties had failed in realizing their political objectives, their leaders had been more successful in developing an Islamic education system for the young republican government. As early as the summer of 1945, Vice President-designate Hatta, Masyumi party leader Natsir, and Wahid Hasjim of the traditionalist mass organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) had launched the initiative for a „Higher Islam School” or Sekolah Islam Tinggi (SIT), renamed in 1948 as Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII). Following the elevation of Yogyakarta’s secular Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) to state university level, the Islamic bloc was appeased with the establishment of a „State Islamic Higher Learning Institute” or Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (PTAIN). In 1960, PTAIN merged with the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ own „State Academy for Religious Officials” or Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama (ADIA) into the first two State Institutes for Islamic Studies or Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN), located in Jakarta and Yogyakarta (Saeed, 1999, pp. 182-3). Reflecting the influence of what Fazlur Rahman calls „classical Islamic modernism” (Fazlur Rahman, 1982, p. 85) three of its five faculties were modeled after the reformed al-Azhar University in Cairo (Meuleman, 2002, p. 284).

With the new government policies requiring a different type of Muslim intellectual, by the early 1970s, the IAIN curriculum was in urgent need of major updating. The initiative for this overhaul was the brainchild of the incoming minister or religious affairs, Mukti Ali, whose personal profile already foreshadowed the emergence of a new type of Muslim intellectual. Before independence, Mukti Ali had received a combined Dutch-language secular and traditionalist Islamic education. In the 1950s, he expanded his horizons with studies in Pakistan and Canada, where he obtained a PhD in the comparative study of religion at the Institute of Islamic Studies (IIS) at McGill University (Munhanif, 1996).

After his return in Indonesia, Mukti Ali was charged with introducing comparative religious studies at the IAINs, a measure envisaged to give Muslim students not just a better understanding of the study of religion as an academic field, but also instill a greater tolerance towards other traditions (Munhanif, 1996, p. 97, 99, Steenbrink, 1999, pp. 284-5), thereby setting a first step towards the cosmopolitanization of Indonesia’s intellectual elite. To counter the negative effects of the dualism caused by Dutch colonial educational policies, leading either to a wholesale adoption or outright rejection of Western learning, he advocated the development of a new discipline called „Occidentalism” or „Western studies” to better prepare Indonesian Muslims for engaging in a dialogue with the West (Boland 1971, p. 208). Aside from his academic work, between 1967 and 1971, Mukti Ali hosted a special study circle at his home in Yogyakarta, called „The Limited Group” (Lingkaran Diskusi). Two core participants, Djohan Effendi and Dawam Rahardjo would rise to become leading Muslim intellectuals and activists (Munhanif, 1996, p. 100).

As minister (1971-78), Mukti Ali began defining a „Weberian” religious policy in which all religions would become involved in socioeconomic development (Steenbrink, 1999, p. 285). In the face of a spectacular growth in conversions to Christianity during the 1950s and 1960s, he also initiated an interfaith dialogue by establishing a Musyawarah Antar-Umat-Beragama or „Forum for Inter-Religious Consultation” in 1972 (Munhanif, 1996, pp. 106-7). His educational reform policy, meanwhile, foresaw in a revamping of the values underlying the traditional Islamic boarding schools or pesantren. This way these schools too could become agents of
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social change in Indonesia (Effendy, 2003, pp. 89-90). This reformed traditionalist Islamic education system has indeed proved to be a seedbed for a new „hybrid” Muslim intelligentsia (Baso, 2006; Rahardjo, 1985; Rumadi 2008).

Mukti Ali delegated the hands-on implementation of reforming Islamic higher education to the newly appointed rector of IAIN Jakarta, Harun Nasution. After his education in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, Nasution had served as a diplomat but returned to academia when his career fell victim to the increased antagonism between Soekarno and Muslim politicians. After a brief exile in Egypt, Nasution too went to McGill, obtaining an MA with a thesis on the place of the Islamic Masyumi party in Indonesian politics and a PhD on the theology of the great Islamic reformer Muhammad Abduh, in which Nasution claims that he should be considered a neo-Mu'tazila or Islamic rationalist (Nasution, 1987).

In redrafting the IAIN curriculum, Nasution worked from an integral concept of Islam as a culture and civilization. His historicist and ethical approach stressed the importance of distinguishing between absolute and relative Islam (Nasution, 2002, 2005, 2006). The new programme comprised not only the study of the core sources of Quran and Hadith, or „Traditions of the Prophet” (representing absolute Islam), the various legal and theological schools but also philosophy and Sufism, including the „deviant” works of the Mu'tazila and Ibn al-'Arabi (Muzani 1994; Saeed 1999). IAIN’s home-grown and Middle Eastern modes of Islamic education were further augmented with aspects of Western learning, affecting both the contents and the ways of instruction (Meuleman, 2002, pp. 285-6). These included new reading lists containing the works of Western philosophers, Orientalists, and Muslim scholars of Islam drawing on Western scholarship in the human sciences, such as the Pakistani-American Islamicist Fazlur Rahman, the French-Algerian historian Mohammed Arkoun, and philosophers like the Egyptian Hasan Hanafi, and Morocco’s Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri (Saeed, 1999, p. 185).

The other factor in the genesis of Indonesian cultural or civil Islam was the budding Muslim intellectuals of the first generation to reach maturity in the postcolonial age associated with the Gerakan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam or „Renewal of Islamic Thinking Movement”. The central figure of this group was the chairman of the leading Muslim student organization (HMI) during the early years of „New Order” (1967-71), Nurcholish Majid – also known by the nickname Cak Nur.

In his first publication, entitled „Modernization is Rationalization not Westernization” (1968), Cak Nur argued that the rational methodology needed to modernize Indonesian society was not incompatible with Islam because it did not necessarily mean traversing the same intellectual trajectories as the West. However, many Muslims were alienated by his so-called „paradigmatic speeches” (Kull, 2005, p. 106), which Cak Nur gave in 1970 and 1972, following two trips to America and the Middle East. Aside from launching the provocative slogan, http://www.lindenwood.edu/humanities/cigsSubmitting.cfm „Islam Yes! Islamic Party No!” (Majid, 1970, p. 2), during his travels he also become acquainted with the writings of Western sociologists of religion and revisionist theologians and followed their example in employing controversial terms like „secularization” and „desacralization”.

Taking as its cue Harvey Cox’s distinction between „secularization” as a process separating transcendental from temporal values, which effectuates the full consummation of humankind’s role as God’s Vicegerent (khalifah) on earth, and
“secularism” as “the name for an ideology, a new, closed world view that functions very much like a new religion”, Cak Nur thought it possible to safeguard the integrity of the core tenet of tawhid: the belief in the One God as absolutely transcendent. At the same time, this imposes an inescapable need for the desacralization of this-worldly existence, divesting it from all divine connotations, because failing to do so would constitute a violation of tawhid (Madjid, 1970, pp. 4-5). In a clever inversion of the argument used by his opponents to condemn secularization, Cak Nur retorted that sacralizing the Islamic state is not only a „distortion of the proportional relationship between state and religion”, but such preoccupation with the political also leads to „fiqhisn” or a conception of Islam as merely „a structure and collection of laws” (Madjid, 1987, pp. 255-6).

Critics dismissed this argumentation in favor of the secularization and desacralization of politics as sophistry, ignoring the fact that what was now known as a plea for a drastic „Renewal of Islamic Thinking” consisting of a subtle framework in which political and theological ideas were grounded in a new epistemology (Rasjidi, 1972; Anshari, 1973). Cak Nur made a distinction between a human’s „transcendental life” (kehidupan uchrawi), represented by the vertical axis of an individual connection with God and the horizontal relations maintained with nature and fellow human beings in his or her this-worldly existence (kehidupan duniawi). Notwithstanding the fact that these two aspects of human existence merge in individual lives, they require different epistemological approaches (Madjid, 1987, pp. 245-8). The horizontal domain of temporal matters or the realm of the secular (duniawi) is namely inaccessible to the spiritual methods drawing on revealed knowledge, while the eschatological law (hukum uchrawi) governing the vertical spiritual dimension of humankind’s relation with God cannot be comprehended in a rational manner (Madjid, 1972, pp. 40-42). Moreover, if the „absolutely transcendent” were not beyond „this worldly” (rational) human comprehension, but could be brought into the realm of human understanding, it would imply that God can be relativized, which contradicts tawhid (Madjid, 1987, pp. 242-3).

After his days as student leader, Nurcholish Madjid again went to America to pursue a postgraduate degree at the University of Chicago, writing a PhD thesis on the medieval reformist thinker Ibn Taymiyya (Madjid, 1984a). Influenced by the ideas of his supervisor Fazlur Rahman on the importance of a thematic engagement with the Qur’an and developing a contextualized understanding of the Islamic teachings, Cak Nur also gained a more sophisticated appreciation for the Islamic tradition as a whole. He also admitted having second thoughts about his use of provocative terminology, regretting not having employed a „technically more correct and neutral terminology” (Madjid, 1987, p. 160). Elsewhere, he even stated: „If I were able to go back in time, I would follow my previous method, i.e., pénétration pacifique, the “smuggling method” of introducing new ideas” (Madjid, 1979, p.152).

During Cak Nur’s absence, vast changes were set in motion in Indonesian society, which were partly the „fruits” of his own Renewal Thinking. In contrast with the political turmoil which began to affect the wider Muslim world between 1978 and 1988, Indonesia witnessed a „retreat of Islamic political parties, combined with a „great leap forward in the social and intellectual vitality of the community” (Hefner, 1997b, p. 86). Improved socio-economic conditions enabled a energetic new minister of religion, Munawir Sjadzali (1983-1993), to drive what he called a „reactualization agenda”, giving the country’s development policies a new theological underpinning by emphasizing „the holistic nature of Islam” and the „dynamism and vitality of
Islamic law", while at the same time taking account of „Indonesia”s own local and temporal particularities” (Effendy, 1995, pp. 110-1).

The policy was also a response to the emergence of a relatively prosperous urban Muslim middle class, which had become uncomfortable with what they regarded as the narrowing or „privatisation” (pribadisasi) of moral concerns in the 1970s. Searching for a new anchoring in religion, they brought about a broad Islamic resurgence in civil society (Hefner, 1997, pp. 90-2; Hefner 2000). It was in these circles that Islam Kultural began to manifest itself most spectacularly. Not surprisingly, a further expansion of the country”s Islamic higher education system formed an important part of the government”s response to that trend. By the late 1980s, the number of young scholars sent overseas to obtain advanced degrees in Islamic or Religious Studies was surging, creating a new Muslim intellectual elite mainly concentrated at the IAINs in Jakarta and Yogyakarta (Hefner 1997, pp. 86-9; Vatikiotis, 1994, p. 127).

When returning to Indonesia, Cak Nur quickly developed into one of the country”s leading public intellectuals. He not only rejoined the faculty at IAIN Jakarta but also established his own think tank, the Paramadina Foundation (1986), which was later expanded into a private university (1994). As a member of the „Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals” – he also occupied a senior advisory position to the government. He used these platforms to influence the increasingly affluent and well-educated urban Muslim middle classes working as professionals and government technocrats.

Cak Nur”s writings of this period also evinced a growing preoccupation with ways to navigate between the universality of the Islamic message and the cosmopolitanism of Islam”s civilizational outlook, enabling it to accommodate the particularities of the Muslim world”s vastly different cultures (Madjid, 2003, pp. 113-129). Aside from a substantive engagement with aspects of the Islamic heritage, this approach was also informed by the global-historical treatment of the world of Islam developed by Chicago historian Marshall Hodgson (1974), conceiving of „Islamdom” as a geographical domain and oikoumene of complex of social relations, composed of an aggregate of „Islamicate” cultures. This humanist outlook, which Cak Nur shared with Hodgson, was also inspired by the Renaissance thinker Pico della Mirandola, who is frequently mentioned in his post-1984 writings (Madjid, 1997, p. 36; Madjid, 1999, pp. 149-50; Madjid, 2003, p. 108).

It must be stressed that catering to the needs of Indonesia”s increasingly better educated and sophisticated Muslims was no solo exercise by Cak Nur. In the 1980s and 1990, he developed an alliance with the leader of the NU, Abdurrahman Wahid (a.k.a. Gus Dur). The biographies and views of Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid have a number of similarities (Aziz, 1999: Bakri & Mudhofir, 2004). Both had been exposed to a dual Islamic and secular education, and drew inspiration from the Western humanities and social sciences. Aside from sharing a similar humanist outlook, they were both also acutely aware of the need for reviving the spiritual aspects of the religious life of modern Muslims (Ali & Effendy, 1986, p. 171, 185). The parallel also extends to adaptation of the Islamic teachings to the specific Indonesian setting, called „Indonesianization” (keindonesiaan) by Madjid and „indigenization” (pribumisasi) by Wahid. This mode of cultural hybridization, described by Peter Burke as a „double movement of decontextualization and recontextualization” (2009, p. 93) also points to Cak Nur”s mentor Fazlur Rahman, who introduced „double movement” as a method for contemporalizing the
interpretation of the Qur’an (Fazlur Rahman, 1982, pp 5-7). Consequently, the latter’s approach has often been lumped together with those of Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as “neomodernism” (neo-modernism) (Aziz, 1999; Azra, 2006a, p. 184; Barton, 1995). As I argue elsewhere, this designation is not entirely accurate (Kersten, 2009, pp. 124-33).

Aside from a distinct change in accent in Cak Nur’s thought before and after his Chicago experience, there are also differences between Cak Nur and Gus Dur in regards to their intellectual outlook and concerns. In contrast to the urbane Cak Nur, Gus Dur remained much closer to his roots in the East-Javanese district of Jombang, where his family’s Islamic boarding school or pesantren is located, and he was actively involved in the pesantren reforms initiated by Mukti Ali in the 1970s (Barton, 2002, pp. 102-116). This is also reflected in his intellectual outlook; while sharing Cak Nur’s “universal spirit of humankind”, Gus Dur’s concerns are more pragmatic and contemporary than the theoretical and historical interests of Cak Nur. His interpretations have therefore been described as an “intellectual improvisation of traditional doctrine”. And where Nurcholish Madjid had some hesitation in drawing parallels, Abduurrahman Wahid’s concern with issues of poverty and justice were directly influenced by Latin American liberation theology (Ali & Effendy, 1986, pp. 186-7). For that reason, Gus Dur’s eclectic intellectualism and vast erudition in Islamic studies literature, as well as less obvious fields such as French cinema has even been explicitly coined the Mazhab Islam Kosmopolitan Gus Dur (Abegebriel 2007, pp. v-xxxiv). Moreover, as a member of the NU aristocracy -- succeeding his father and grandfather as the organization’s leader in 1984 -- Gus Dur eventually appeared to have a better pedigree than Cak Nur for the highest office in the land, even though both their names had been mentioned as possible candidates for the presidency (Azra, 2006a, p. 34).

The views, ideas, and propositions of cosmopolitan Muslim intellectuals like Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid are not uncontroversial and have been the subject of attacks by “counter-cosmopolitans” (Appiah, 2006, p. 137ff.; Robinson, 2008, p. 124). During the so-called Keterbukaan or “Opening Up” of the later “New Order” period, proponents of Islamic revivalism underwritten by scripturalism or literal interpretations of the Qur’an and Hadith were also jockeying for an advantageous position (Liddle, 1996). In the often chaotic post-Soeharto situation (1998-), Indonesian offshoots of a “global Islamism” originating in the Middle East and embracing a “generic transnational Islamic identity” were able to come back with a vengeance (Robinson, 2008, p. 112).

The area of gender equality constitutes one of the fiercest battlegrounds. A draft revision of the marriage law along the lines of a fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] of a uniquely Indonesian character”Robinson, 2008, p. 121), incorporating universal principles of democracy and equality as well as contemporary Indonesian social practice, issued in 2004 by Siti Musdah Mulia, a former student of Nurcholish Madjid and herself a faculty member at IAIN Jakarta and a senior bureaucrat at the ministry of religious affairs (122) and the measures proposed by Kholifah Indar Parawansa, leader of the women’s branch of the NU and Minister for Women’s Empowerment in Abdurrahman Wahid’s administration, were challenged on grounds that the underlying “cosmopolitan vision of international governance” was nothing more than a “sinister plot” to uphold the existing world order (124). Ridha Salamah, “the highest ranking woman in Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and member of the Commission for Research and Development of the Majelis Ulama Islam (MUI)”(Ibid) ominously announced that “genderism” is being considered, along with “secularism”, “pluralism”, and
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“liberalism” (identified as a complex through the acronym „sipilis“) as the subject of a fatwa by the MUI” (126).

Aside from these intellectual debates, initiatives originating in NU circles to extend the cosmopolitan vision beyond the elite and urban spheres into support for a vernacular Islam in line with Abdurrahman Wahid’s advocacy of a pribumisasi or „indigenization” of Indonesian Islam were also not immune to this kind of criticism. For example, acculturated forms of Islam incorporating local musical traditions were branded as un-Islamic by the Islamist camp, while the proponents considered them just as important to stemming the flow of ideas from the Middle East as the fact that „Indonesian scholars do not all position themselves in textual exegesis as passive recipients of textual interpretations and authoritative positions from the Arab-speaking [sic] Middle East” (Robinson, 2008, p. 128).

Perhaps the most convincing testimony to the role of figures such as Mukti Ali and Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid in creating an academic environment and an intellectual climate that is conducive to breeding the cultural hybridity that seems to be the sine qua non for a cosmopolitan engagement with the Islamic legacy is their multifarious intellectual offspring.

Based in the metropolis of Jakarta, Cak Nur developed a following among a slightly younger cohort of intellectuals also working at IAIN Jakarta, which is referred to as Mazhab Ciputat or „Ciputat School”, named after the district where the IAIN is located. It consists of fourteen „members” -- including two of its rectors: the Columbia-educated historian Azyumardi Azra and the philosopher Komaruddin Hidayat, who obtained his doctorate in Turkey, (Kull, 2005, pp. 210-2). At the beginning of the new millennium, an upcoming generation of young intellectuals born in the 1960s and early 1970s, with profiles not dissimilar to the slightly older Mazhab Ciputat, began organizing themselves in internet-dependent set-ups such as the „Liberal Islam Network” or Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL). This initiative of Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, a former staff member of NU”s human resources development arm (Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia or LAKPESDAM) and now a PhD student at Harvard, and Dr. Luthfi Assyaukani, who teaches at Paramadina University, remains intellectually indebted to Nurcholish Madjid (Kull 2005: 223).17

On the other hand, there are the „Young NU Members” (Anak Muda NU), sometimes also referred to as Postra or „Post-Traditionalists” (Baso, 2006; Salim & Ridwan, 1999; Rumadi, 2008). These are the exponents of the new hybrid culture prevailing among young NU activist-intellectuals; the outcome of a moving back and forth between their often rural NU roots in reformed pesantren, exposure to the academic Islamic education at IAINs in the country’s major cities, and their subsequent employment in NGO’s and think tanks active in the interstices of urban and rural Indonesia. Often originating from smaller towns in rural areas, they readily identify with the eclectic outlook of Gus Dur. Mentored by the scholar and politician Muhammad A.S. Hikam, in these circles, too, one finds astutely cosmopolitan intellectuals „influenced by post-Hegelian and post-Marxian thinkers such as Ernest Gellner, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, David Ost, Andre Arato, Fernando Cardoso, Antonio Gramsci and Alexis de Tocqueville” (Azra, 2006a, p. 39).

For example, Yudian Wahyudi (b. 1960), an Islamicist and legal scholar educated at McGill and former researcher at Harvard and Tufts Universities, has written on Islamic law in Indonesia (2007a, b, c) and made comparative studies of contemporary Muslim thought (2002, 2003), including Shi„ism (1998). The inclusion
of the latter bears further witness to the inclusivist and cosmopolitan interests of Indonesia’s new Muslim intellectuals. Ahmad Baso (b. 1971), has analyzed contemporary Islamic thought inside and outside Indonesia (2005) and has written critical studies of Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid and others (2006). For these critical assessments he has drawn on the work of Muslim intellectuals influenced by poststructuralism and other contemporary intellectual movements, such Mohammed Arkoun, Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (Saleh, 1999, pp. 284-95).

The philosophies of these thinkers from the Arabic-speaking part of the Muslim world have very firm epistemological groundings, providing the aforementioned Indonesian scholars – as well as similar-minded colleagues elsewhere – with the heuristic tools to transform contemporary Muslim thought into productive ideas for the future. However, the preoccupation with authenticity found throughout this turath literature is not unproblematic.

**Insoluble Tensions? Cosmopolitanism versus the search for authenticity**

Joel Kahn’s critical assessment of the ethno-nationalist narrative dominating the consociational system of governance in neighboring Malaysia offers a suitable vehicle for exploring the real tension that exists between the notion of cosmopolitanism and this search for authenticity. As Kahn points out, „this concern seems peculiarly apt in the contemporary Malaysian context, in which the proponents of two competing visions, both of which may be plausibly deemed cosmopolitan in the classical sense”, compete. On the one hand, there are the „self-styled secularists, liberals, modernists or moderates” advocating universal citizenship in a religiously and culturally neutral space. On the other, there are the proponents of what can be called the new Malaysian Islam, whose power and authority have been boosted by almost three decades of Islamic “revival” in the country (Kahn, 2008, p. 264).

In questioning whether the global outlook of the new Malaysian Muslim makes him into a cosmopolitan Muslim and viable alternative to „Western and/or secular forms of cosmopolitan governance” (2008, p. 265), and whether these two competing visions constitute „the only real alternatives to the problem of finding properly cosmopolitan modes” (266), Kahn raises the important issue of the „groundedness” or „rootedness” of cosmopolitanism in particular historical and cultural circumstances and experiences (267ff.). Kahn’s reservations against giving in to what is „by now a truism” are informed by its threat to the „openness to the other” and „culture-transforming aspirations” of the cosmopolitan project (269).

Although in his attempt to detect a „genuine cosmopolitan practice” Kahn focuses on the popular level, his suggestions are also valid for the present examination of new Muslim intellectualism, as becomes evident from this lengthy quote:

[T]o insist that universalism is inevitably embedded or indigenised within particular cultures is to fail to recognised the extent to which the universalistic projects generate change in existing cultural values and assumptions. Projects and movements that aspire to the universal are not always best thought as resulting only in a state of temporal cultural liminality or as short-lived „rituals of rebellion” that will inevitably give way under the re-embedding forces of culture and tradition. If and when universalising tendencies are reabsorbed the result is not necessarily a return to the status quo ante. We need, in other words, to find ways of
recognising that cosmopolitan practices will inevitably be both “essentialising” and “disembedding” at the same time (Kahn 2008: 271).

Not dissimilar to Indonesia’s discursive formations of civil and cultural Islam, in Malaysia politicians such as Anwar Ibrahim and -- more recently -- former prime minister Abdullah Badawi deployed their own variants of a modern, progressive Islam, called Islam Madani and Islam Hadhari respectively (Hoffstaedter, 2009, pp.124-30). Thus:

Islam Hadhari functions “as an in-between space between religiosity and “rootlessness”, Islam Hadhari performs as a discourse of ethics and values for the cosmopolitan Melayu Baru [New Malay CK] who can negotiate different cultures and ethnicities both within and beyond the Malaysian nation” (Hoffstaedter, 2009, p. 130).

However, in the country’s highly competitive and volatile political climate, their attempts were less successful than those of their counterparts in Indonesia, where the „New Order“ regime was more tolerant towards intellectuals creating a setting that nurtured the exploration of philosophical conceptualizations of cosmopolitan Islam, developed by thinkers such as Arkoun, Hanafi, and al-Jabiri.22

Hasan Hanafi’s emancipatory agenda finds its origins in his earlier philosophical studies at the Sorbonne, using the work of Western thinkers such as Spinoza, Fichte, and Husserl to transform the theological focus of the disciplines of traditional Islamic learning into an anthropology suitably adapted to meet the demands of the present-day situation in the Muslim world. Initially inspired by the early literary studies of Sayyid Qutb (before his „revivalist” turn into a leading Islamist writer) and the writings of Ind-Pakistani poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, the young Hanafi wrote penetrating phenomenological-hermeneutical analyses of the traditional Islamic discipline of usul al-fiqh (“foundations of jurisprudence”) and the Gospels under the direction of Paul Ricoeur and Jean Guitton. The acquired expertise in Islamic studies and Christian theology23 became the epistemological basis for the mega-project that would occupy Hanafi for the remainder of his academic career.

„Heritage and Renewal” (al-Turath wa‟l-Tajdid) was presented in terms of a military campaign to be waged on „three fronts”, envisaged as a double critique of the religious and philosophical heritages of the Muslim world and the West in order to prepare the ground for the emancipation of the Muslim world (Hanafi, 1991, pp. 9-15). Partly drawing on liberation theologians such as Camillo Torres, this ideological aspect of his agenda has to date only found a provisional unfolding in a manifesto published in 1981 under the title „Leftist Islam” (Hanafi, 1981a). This proposition for a new hermeneutics, in which theological readings of the religious scriptures are refashioned into anthropology and are accompanied by „bold transmutations” of the original terminology (Kersten, 2007), opening up exciting prospects for new understandings of the Islamic heritage, appears to be inspired by the influence of his mentor Paul Ricoeur, whose capacity for generous” or „charitable” interpretations (Reagan, 1996, p 74; Wallace, 1995, p. 1) enabled him to become one of the foremost „contemporary theorists of appropriation” (Burke, 2009, p. 38).24

Unfortunately, the underlying concern for the restoration of authenticity has infected Hanafi’s critiques of the Islamic and Western civilizations with apologetic
and polemic undertones. Meanwhile, as the sole author of the project, Hanafi has only been able to complete but a fraction of the envisaged massive scope of work. In spite of these drawbacks, with his erudition straddling both Islamic and European thought, he critically assessed classical and modern thinkers from East and West, including Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Zaki Naguib Mahmud, Descartes, Kant, and Feuerbach. He can therefore be considered an emblematic exponent of the new Muslim intellectualism that is by and large at ease with cultural hybridity and with a cosmopolitan vision for the Muslim future.

In my view, the most useful tools for a cosmopolitan reinterpretation of the Islamic heritage are provided by Mohammed Arkoun. Having established his scholarly reputation as a specialist in the intellectual history of medieval Islam (1982a), Arkoun dedicated much of his academic career to the development of alternative approaches to Islamic studies as a field of academic inquiry. The innovative research agenda called „Applied Islamology” was first introduced in 1973 (Arkoun, 1973, p. 9) and then elaborated in the essay „Pour une islamologie appliquée” (Arkoun, 1984, pp. 43-63). While the designation is taken from Roger Bastide’s Applied Anthropology (1973), the envisaged program is based on borrowings from a wide range of achievements in the Western human sciences in the twentieth-century. Arkoun has been very sparse in his attributions to Roger Bastide’s work, but an examination of the latter shows that as an expert specializing in African-Brazilian religions, he was influenced by the imaginative writings of Gilberto Freyre on the plantation society and culture in his native northeastern Brazil, referring to his sociological investigations as „Lusotropiology” (1961). Peter Burke has hailed Freyre as „one of the first scholars anywhere to devote much attention to cultural hybridity” (2009, p. 8), noting that his concepts of métissage and interpenetration were also central in the analyses of African-American religion by the French sociologist Roger Bastide” (2009, p. 49).

A further survey of Arkoun’s oeuvre evinces also the impact of the „new history” developed by the French Annales school, from which he adopted Fernand Braudel’s25 notion of the Mediterranean as a „geohistorical space” (Arkoun, 2002, p. 134ff.) and the hybrid discipline ethnohistoire practiced by the younger Annales generation, including Georges Duby, Jacques Le Goff, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, and alternately referred to as „historical anthropology” (Burke, 1990, p. 80), „anthropology of the past” or „archaeology of the daily life” (Arkoun, 2002, p. 274). This influence was further reinforced by Arkoun’s exposure to the philosophy of Ricoeur, whose meditations in Time and Narrative (1984) and La Mémoire, l”Histoire, l”Oubli (2002) were shaped by Duby and Le Goff’s „historical anthropology of the pre-industrial West” (1984, pp. 106-9).26 I conclude that Arkoun’s desire for an anthropological turn in philosophical thought parallels Hanafi’s effort to transform theology into anthropology, although the former tones down his expectations:

Only modern social and cultural anthropology furnishes the concrete data peculiar to every socio-cultural construction in a precise time and space, while situating every local type in a global context of political, social, cultural and religious facts. It so happens that, as philosophy and anthropology continue to be taught and practised as distinct and specialized disciplines, the many incursions of philosophers into anthropology remain incidental and cursory, while anthropologists are not always able to go beyond the ethnographic stage of their scientific practice (Arkoun 2000, pp. 187-8).
Through Ricoeur, Arkoun was also directed to the work of structural linguists and anthropologists such as Émile Benveniste and Claude Lévi-Strauss, and from there onwards to the use of semiotics in his Qur’anic studies (Arkoun, 1982b). In regards to this latter subject, his eclecticism is further confirmed by his regret of there being no equivalent of Northrope Frye’s *The Great Code* in Islamic studies or any interest in Sayyid Qutb’s literary-critical studies of the Qur’ân, which had also inspired the young Hanafi (Arkoun, 2002, pp. 58-9, 80).

During the last ten years, Arkoun has taken this project to a new level of abstraction by transforming it into an epistemological critique of religious thought in general, which challenges all existent forms of rational thinking or “reason”. Although not denying that his own genealogy or archaeology bears affinities with Derrida’s “archive” and Foucault’s excavation of “pre-existing discursive fields” (Arkoun 2007: 21), Arkoun prefers to avoid the term “post-modernity” (Arkoun, 2000, p. 180). Instead he qualifies his new project of “emerging reason” (Arkoun, 1998b, p. 124), later abbreviated to “E.R.” (Arkoun, 2002, p. 23) a “meta-modern” undertaking (Arkoun, 1995/6, p. 10).

This project challenges not only the “postures of religious, and classical-modern philosophical thinking but also the scientific-teletechnological reason” (Arkoun 1998b: 124-5), or “disposable thought” (Arkoun, 2000, p. 187) dominating the rampant consumerist and homogenizing globalization identified with “McDonaldization” (Burke, 2009, p. 52), and which is sending non-Western (including Muslim) cultures on a collision course with the West. As an illustration of this trend, Arkoun refers to Benjamin Barber’s *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1995).

According to Arkoun, Islamic religious thinking is not equipped to meet the challenges of either Enlightenment philosophy or the instrumentalist thinking associated with globalization. Not unlike Madjid and Hanafi, Arkoun confesses to having “long shared the prevailing opinion which reclaims the elaboration of a “modern theology”, after the manner of what the Catholics and Protestants have continued to do in the Western milieu” (Arkoun, 2000, p. 217). Likewise, he accuses political scientists of remaining locked in the epistemological frame of the reason of the Enlightenment, whereas globalization obliges us to revise the cognitive systems bequeathed by all types of reason (Arkoun, 2000, p. 189). These engagements with globalizing patterns of thought and the accompanying worldviews expounded by Huntington and Barber have turned Mohammed Arkoun into a cultural “border crosser”, whose intellectual appropriations have enabled him to successfully transform his cultural hybridity into a confident cosmopolitanism.

**Conclusion**

Within the Muslim world, in particular Indonesia has developed an intellectual atmosphere that appears to be conducive to a relatively free and progressive engagement with questions affecting contemporary Muslims on a collective level. On the individual level, however, I argue that also elsewhere in the Muslim world, intellectuals are trying to confront the challenges of globalization by developing alternative discourses which can accommodate endogenous modes of intellectual creativity.
Although other terms, such as Islamic revivalism, Muslim fundamentalism, and Wahhabism have attained greater currency


For this restriction to an intellectual avant-garde, cf. Bagader 1994: 119-20

For an excellent discussion of these two strands, cf. Nussbaum (1994).

With a bow to George Konrad’s Antipolitics (1984).

Cf. also the work of sociologists of knowledge such as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman.

To be distinguished from the doubling of consciousness as well as the notion of basic personality examined by Muslim intellectuals such as Arkoun (1989; 2002: 250-73), Djait (1974), and Hanafi (Hanafi 1981b: 119-34; 1991: 25) using the work on basic personality developed by Kardiner (1945) and introduced in France by Dufrenne (1953).

Another indication of the region’s cosmopolitan attitude: where else could a Muslim serve as the top diplomat of a Buddhist kingdom?

Also called Kelompok Pembaruan or „Renewal Group“ (Azra 2006a, p. 183).

Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or „Muslim Students Association”.

Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), chaired by Soeharto’s protégé and later successor, Minister of Technology B.J. Habibie.

During these study years in Chicago (1978-1984), Cak Nur also published a collection of translations and essays on key texts from the Islamic tradition (Madjid 1984b).

In his study of cultural hybridity, Burke has presented him as an advocate of religious syncretism (2009, p. 48).

Although Gus Dur’s maverick approach to academia had resulted in uncompleted studies in Egypt, Iraq, and the Netherlands (Barton 2002, pp. 83-101).


Another indication of the top diplomats of a Buddhist kingdom?

For more extensive coverage cf. Kahn 2006.

In two instances also Kahn acknowledges the role of „critical intellectuals“ as actors (266) and „academic institutions“ (274) as the site for this cosmopolitan practice.

Farish Noor is one of the few Muslim intellectuals whose highly original reinterpretations of Muslim identity in the Malaysian context (2002), underscoring that „the new voices of Islam are products of this “symbiotic” relationship between tradition and modernity, between global and local, between West and East“ (Sharify-Funk 2006, p. 72). It is probably no coincidence that, like Abdullah Badawi and Anwar Ibrahim, Farish Noor too hails from multiethnic and cosmopolitan Penang.

The theologian Guitton, himself the only lay person to address the Second Vatican Council, had arranged for Hanafi to attend the Council as an observer (Hanafi 1989, p. 235-6).


Braudel’s outlook was informed by his ten-year teaching experience in Algeria (Burke 1990, p. 32-3), and his acquaintance with the work of Freyre during his work at the university of São Paolo (101).

Cf. also Burke 1990, pp. 76 and 85.

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