Toward a Cosmopolitical Democracy: Process over Ends

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Abstract

“Towards a Cosmopolitical Democracy” argues that in order for cosmopolitanism to effectively challenge destructive forms of nationalism, misguided universalism, and economic globalism, it must be rearticulated conceptually and philosophically for today’s world as a cosmopolitical process rather than a set ideal or vision. This cosmopolitical process is best promoted in the realm of rhetoric and praxis, where everyday practices and values between self and collective interest are navigated using a Bakhtinian understanding of the dialogic imagination, as well as a “double process” of negotiation between the universal and the particular, both cognitively (Burke, 1970) and across cultures (Tarrow, 2005).
Introduction

Nor that we should avoid the problems of “global” order. On the contrary, we must turn precisely in the direction of a neo-Stoic cosmopolitanism, with ideals of tolerance and resignation to the bureaucratic requirements implicit in the structure of modern industry and commerce. The other alternatives are fanaticism and dissipation.

--Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 318

In an Op-Ed column for the Washington Post, George F. Will (2008) critically questioned Barack Obama’s call for cosmopolitanism—a call that was prominent in Obama’s July 2008 speech given in Berlin, Germany. Viewing cosmopolitanism as little more than empty “rhetoric,” concepts such as “citizen of the world” and “global citizenship” belong to, according to Will, the “Leave No Metaphor Behind” . . . world of rhetorical “nonsense”: “Citizenship is defined by legal and loyalty attachments to a particular political entity with a distinctive regime and culture. Neither the world nor the globe is such an entity” (para. 8-9). For critics of cosmopolitanism such as Will, there is and can be globalization (economic and political), but there can be no such thing as cosmopolitanism because it is simply a word born of empty rhetoric and utopian dreams, presenting a single aim: that of obtaining “card carrying” global citizenship. Problematically, however, Will’s argument presumes a false dichotomy between cosmopolitanism and nationalism and, as such, denies the potential and opportunity for individuals to be both globally and culturally connected; this dichotomy implies that any so-called non-cosmopolitan individual is, necessarily, nationally bound, with a consciousness that begins and ends at his or her national borders. Will commented on this apparent false dichotomy while contemplating the Egyptian protest and public action to overthrow the Egyptian Regime of President Mubarak in February of 2011: “Western Intellectuals, who tend toward cosmopolitanism, tend to disdain the nation-state and nationalism as aspects of humanity’s infancy, things to be outgrown. But the nation gives substance and structure to the secular pride and yearnings of the Egyptian people …” (2011, para. 10).

This false dichotomy (nationalism versus cosmopolitanism) is itself not only misleading but also structurally and politically dangerous for a globally connected world. Indeed, Kenneth Burke (1969), as quoted above, was quite right when he insisted that we need to embrace a neo-Stoic form of cosmopolitanism in order to temper the bureaucratic structure of economic globalization. However, Burke stops short of telling his reader what his vision might entail, leaving the reader with the larger question of what exactly such a form of cosmopolitanism should look like. Of additional concern when conceptualizing cosmopolitanism is how we can avoid reforming it into a generalized, deadly form of pseudo-universalism that can easily be usurped by national, religious, and/or particular interests in the name of the general and the universal. The answer to these questions can be found in how we view the idea of cosmopolitanism, philosophically and structurally, by shifting the notion away from a predetermined bureaucratized end (global citizenship, Kantian universal ethics, or simple universalism), to a process of becoming.
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Defining Cosmopolitical Democracy as a Rhetorical Process

What George Will and other critics of cosmopolitanism do not realize is that the promise of a cosmolpolitism ideal lies not in its end but in its journey. Cosmopolitanism when understood simply as the promotion of universal values or global citizenship is not the reason for this journey, but a false end. The journey is better understood, and philosophically rearticulated, as a “cosmopolitical” process—defined here as a political, philosophical, and rhetorical practice in which the relationship between our local, cultural, and global values and perceived norms are continually recognized, negotiated, defined, and redefined. We become rooted cosmopolitical citizens in this process: beings that are nationally bound, globally connected, and actively aware of this dual sense of contingent belonging. In this focus, a new formula is established between the individualist and the collectivist cultural sensibilities. As individuals, we see and view ourselves within our local homes and spaces, attending to critical self-interests. However, we are concurrently and actively aware of both our collective (local to global) realities and the interests and needs of the collective. As such, this definition of cosmopolitanism is an extension and refinement of sociologist Daniele Archibugi’s presentation of cosmopolitan democracy, which he “based on the assumption that important objectives—control of the use of force, respect for human rights, self-determination—will be obtained only through the extension and development of democracy” (2000, p. 143). As a term, *cosmopolitical* is preferred over cosmopolitan since it bluntly represents the proposed process as a political course, rather than the more traditional understanding of “the cosmopolitan” or the “global citizen.” As Pheng Cheah (1998) aptly observes, as a term, *cosmopolitical* best represents the “mutating global field of political, economic, and cultural forces in which nationalism and cosmopolitanism are invoked as practical discourses” (p. 31).

The concept of a rhetorical democracy is also promoted within this notion of the cosmopolitical, and it is helpful to introduce the concept of rhetorical democracy here by dissecting the term briefly, starting with the idea of rhetoric. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines rhetoric as an offshoot of dialectic and ethical studies, as well as the “counterpart of dialectic” which involves “…the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (2010, p. 6). One of the most important aspects is that rhetoric is not entirely divorced from philosophy or ethics, and it is not simple “persuasion” but the process of discovering the best form of persuasion for the each individual situation. Historically, rhetoric has been seen from many different perspectives, as M. Lane Bruner (2003) points out in his article “The Rhetorical Phronimos: Political Wisdom in Postmodernity”: “Rhetoric, as a term, [can be seen] as a product (persuasive public speech), a process (the ongoing transformation of identities through discourse), and a critical practice (a critical analysis of identification practices and the system of governance that result from those practices)” (p. 87). Reflecting on this critical practice, Kenneth Burke (1951) relates rhetoric to identification. Like Aristotle, Burke suggests that there is a technical aspect of finding the best way to create consensus with one’s audience; more specifically, Burke says, this attempt at identification through rhetoric also requires the rhetor to identify his or her needs with that of the audience’s. Identification then, includes the careful management of humans’ important yet often unconscious need to identify with others (p. 203b).

For this project, rhetoric is presented as both a process and a critical practice of identification that refines and redefines individual and collective values. Within the realm of democracy, rhetoric is what allows for the process of democratic deliberation. In this light, rhetorical democracy is an active form of act-utilitarianism, within which the power for change
and law-making lies with a body of people who examine individual situations in order to maximize the good for the majority. The ability to agree upon the “good” is based within the rhetorical act of deliberation, dialogism, and rhetoric. Finally, because this political process is promoted within the paradigm of democracy, the promotion of a cosmopolitical democracy is simultaneously the promotion of a rhetorical mode of argumentation and deliberation in which philosophical, ethical, linguistic, and structural values are actively and consciously negotiated and redefined among, one hopes, a global audience.

This paper will explore and promote cosmopolitical democracy as a rhetorical and praxis-oriented process. However, first, it is important to offer a brief overview of the roots of cosmopolitanism and how this concept has been historically and philosophically articulated as a narrow presentation of universalism, promoting universal ethics as well as citizenship within the false dichotomy of nationalism versus cosmopolitanism. What will be demonstrated is that this universal emphasis bureaucratizes cosmopolitanism and is, subsequently, a dangerous and misleading frame that can lead to empire building and narrow concepts of “universal” values and ethics. Following the historical overview of cosmopolitanism as a bureaucratized end, this paper will propose a rearticulation of cosmopolitanism as a rhetorical cosmopolitical democratic process. In order to shift our attention away from narrow articulations of the cosmopolitical, a three-tiered process is proposed: the cognitive and metaphoric understanding of “rooted citizens of the world,” promoted through dialogic imagination; rhetorical democratic practices; and the use of pragmatic idealism, which relies on a dialogical double process that helps negotiate local and global values and practices.

The Ancient Greek and Roman Roots of Cosmopolitanism

As might be expected, the roots of cosmopolitanism are found in ancient Greek culture and can be understood culturally, politically, and economically. The etymology of the word entails two Greek root words: κόσμος (kosmo) meaning world, and πολις (polis) meaning city. Traditionally, the concept of “citizen of the world” (kosmopolitês) is attributed to Diogenes the Cynic (Laërtius, 1895, pp. 240-241), also known as Diogenes of Sinope (c. 412-323 B.C.E). A contemporary of Socrates and Plato, Diogenes was said to have held disdain for Plato (pp. 225-226) and for civilization in general, preferring a back-to-nature philosophy (Durant, 1966, p. 509). Consequently, he felt, our first allegiance is not to the state, but to a world of humans. In this sense, Diogenes’ philosophy was in direct contrast to that of Plato and Socrates, philosophers who highly valued the nation-state and citizens’ responsibility towards the nation-state. This view is particularly evident in Plato’s Crito (2006), in which Socrates’ allegiance and responsibility to the state of Athens requires him to obediently take his own life as the state has ruled and deemed.

This contrast between Diogenes’ declaration of kosmopolitês and Socrates/Plato’s emphasis on the State (with a capital “S”), demonstrates a tension in social/political worldviews. These social/political worldviews would meet in matters of economics, since the polis could not survive without an economic infrastructure that included trade and commerce. Thus, a form of economic cosmopolitanism (what will later be termed globalization) existed in Ancient Greece. Tom Palmer (2003) suggests that fundamental to the Greek world of the fifth century’s cosmo-polis was trade (p. 3) and, citing Book Nine of Homer’s Odyssey, Palmer links Greek civilization with commercial trade: “For the Cyclops have no ships with crimson prows,
no shipwright there to build them good trim craft that could sail them out of foreign ports of call as most men risk the seas to trade with other men” (Homer as quoted in Palmer, p. 3). Trade was seen as an essential part of civilization, and “those who refused or failed to engage in trade were portrayed as savages” (p. 3). Since Palmer is promoting and historically justifying neoliberal globalization, linking economic free-trade and the deregulation of markets with a so-called natural evolution of globalization (p. 1), it is not surprising that he frames the idea of cosmopolitanism tightly with trade and economy, on a Greek Homeric precedent, as basis for the contemporary beginnings of such a project. Indeed, what Palmer and others who promote an economic cosmopolitanism seek is not cosmopolitanism; rather, they seek what Aihwa Ona (1998) identifies as flexible citizenship, which benefits the “strategies and effects of mobile managers, technocrats, and professionals who seek to both circumvent and benefit from different nation-state regimes by selecting different sites for investments, work, and family relocation” (136).

Regardless, it is argued that economic cosmopolitanism as realized through active trade routes worked to spread “cosmopolitan” culture by allowing distant cultures to meet, intermingle, trade, and influence each other. The process of empire building, ancient colonialism, and war also influenced the societies it touched, spreading not only destruction, but culture and philosophy, including a Stoic insistence on cosmopolitan values. Appiah (2006) points out that the Stoics start to refine the cosmopolitan “creed” in the beginning of the third century B.C.E. (p. xiv). Stoicism, influenced by teachings of the Cynics and originated with the philosopher Zeno of Citium, emphasized the idea that humanity was a part of nature and that goodness could be found by cooperating with nature or “the Law of the World.” This pure view of man in nature offered by Zeno was later transformed by the Roman Stoics such as Seneca, Plutarch, and Marcus Aurelius as a result of the “pragmatic” concerns of life and living in societies. So it was that the Roman/Stoic cosmopolitanism sought to contemplate man in society, as Burke (1959) aptly points out: “Stoic Cosmopolitanism was developed by those who were most concerned with the communicative aspects of the Roman economic integer. In other words, it was a state philosophy, both humane and humanistic in its emphasis upon man in society” (rather than upon man in nature, or man as a future citizen of heaven)” (p. 118).

In Martha Nussbaum’s (2002) influential and controversial essay “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” she states that the Stoics believed humans lived in two communities: the local and the cosmo or universal. This latter community, to Seneca, is “truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun” (as cited in Nussbaum, p. 7). To this end, as Plutarch states in On the Fortunes of Alexander, “We should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors” (as cited in Nussbaum, p. 7). However, this does not mean that the Stoics rejected the concept of the local or that they recognized only a vague “universal.” As Nussbaum adds while drawing on the Stoic philosopher Hierocles (1st-2nd B.C.E), the Stoics suggested that we view ourselves within a series of concentric circles:

The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family, then follows the extended family, then, in order, neighbors or local groups, fellow city-dwellers, and fellow countrymen . . . Our task as citizens of the world will be to ‘draw the circles somehow toward the center’ making all human beings more like our fellow city-dwellers, and so on. (p. 9)
However, Hierocles’ formulation, as presented by Nussbaum, suggests a kind of pseudo-universal, in which the pluralities of the world’s cultures are transformed to resemble the “local,” or “making all human beings more like our fellow city-dwellers” (p. 9). This “local universalism” suggests that a certain local society (its culture, economics, ideals and so on) should be viewed as universally good, and, therefore, good for the world over. Here is where the rhetoric of pseudo-universalism creates an opening for empire building. Further, by presenting cosmopolitanism as a “local,” pseudo-universalism, the concept and ideal itself is bureaucratized, distorting all potential for true global recognition and thereby perverting and limiting the ideal. In *Attitudes Toward History*, Kenneth Burke describes the “bureaucratization of the imaginative” as the “process of processes” that occurs when humanity tries to “translate some pure aim or vision into terms of its corresponding material embodiment, thus necessarily involving elements alien to the original, ‘spiritual’ (‘imaginative’) motive” (1959, p. xiii). In essence, we limit the ideal by defining it as an unmoving and unbending end. As consequence, once the ideal (cosmopolitanism) has been translated into the material (a pseudo-universalism), we have the makings or the potential for tragedy (empire building, global capitalism in the name of the universal good, universal spirituality realized through extreme terrorist acts, and so on). One of the first realizations of this pseudo-universalist frame as projected cosmopolitanism can be seen with Marcus Aurelius’ Roman Empire.

As a Stoic philosopher and emperor, Marcus Aurelius (161-180 CE) strove to create a cosmopolitan space in which different localities and cultures could exist and unify under the singularity of the Empire. In his famous *Meditations* (2005), Aurelius reflects on this process which, he noticed, reflected the nature of language itself:

> In a system comprising diverse elements, those which possess reason have the same part to play as the bodily limbs in an organism that is unity. . . . This reflection will impress you more forcibly if you constantly tell yourself, ‘I am a ‘limb’ (melos) of the whole complex of rational things.’ If you think of yourself as a ‘part’ (meros) only, you have as yet no love from the heart for mankind . . . (7:13)

Nussbaum reminds us, Marcus Aurelius was faced with the task of assimilating various civilizations into the Roman Empire, and so he needed to remember that each part was a limb upon which the whole depended (p. 10). This is not to say that the Roman Empire, with Marcus Aurelius at its head, succeeded in creating a just cosmopolitan space, since many people including slaves, women, and men who could not afford to buy their freedom or citizenship were excluded from citizenship and the rights that are granted therein. This is one reason Sissela Bok (2002) questions Marcus Aurelius’ cosmopolitan virtues (p. 40). Not only were such values offered for a small and select portion of the population, but the Empire promoted cosmopolitanism through the narrow frame of Roman “universal” values. Furthermore, groups such as the rising Christian sect were rigorously suppressed and excluded by Marcus Aurelius’ Rome. It is thus ironic that early Christianity was influenced not only by Marcus Aurelius’ *Meditations* but also by the Stoic sense of cosmopolitanism (Appiah, 2006, p. xiv). However, in the Catholic Church’s effort to create a new Christian cosmopolitanism, the cosmopolitan ideal
of universality plus difference (p. 151) was transformed into a pseudo-universal frame within which universalism could be defined only through specific Christian values and beliefs and difference from such values equated to exclusion from the so-called universal frame.

**From Cosmopolitanism to a Spiritual Pseudo-Universalism**

The Stoic creed of cosmopolitanism found its place in the emerging consciousness of Christianity, and there it was transformed into a singular truth as founded on an event: the resurrection of Jesus Christ. As Alian Badiou (2003) argues beautifully in *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, Saint Paul’s aim was to create a universal Christian truth, a singularity, which transcended the material particulars of nationalism (Roman Empire), law (the rule-of-law), and cultural discourse (Greek and Jewish). For Paul, this universal truth is only found in Jesus’ resurrection (p. 63). This event creates not only a universal truth but also a truth procedure, formed through four main positions. First, no “Christian subject” or discourse existed before the resurrection. Therefore, the Christian subject cannot be constructed solely through a particular Greek, Roman, or Jewish discourse (p. 14). Second, truth is subjective, and “it is the order of a declaration that testifies to a conviction relative to the event” (p. 14). Therefore, Christian truth cannot be realized under a rule-of-law, and it must be kept from becoming a particularity under law (pp. 14-15). Third, because truth is a process, there must be a “fidelity to the declaration,” which requires three concepts: Faith/conviction, charity/love, and hope/certainty (p. 15). Finally, “a truth is of itself indifferent to the state of the situation” (p. 15). Thus, there is a difference and distance from a state (such as Rome), as well as from the “state in people’s consciousness: the apparatus of opinion,” as truth “must never enter into competition with established opinions” (p. 15). Nor may truth enter into a world of particulars and contingencies. However, although universal religions may project the universal, they attract followers who bring their own particulars to that universal. As such, even early Christianity could not escape the trap of particular definitions of the universal proclamation: “For the believer in such a universal scheme of motives may go to many different scenes, each with its own peculiar motivational texture, without losing his ‘hypostasis,’ the sense of his personal identity and of one ‘real’ motivational substratum underlying it” (Burke, 1969, p. 44).

Regardless, Badiou (2003) proclaims that by declaring the truth stemming from an event, Paul displaces the truth from a particular, a geographic location, a center, and also from established discourses, which require the particular and the material contingencies. So it is that the new Christian discourse, the discourse of the *son*, has universal potential, a potentiality that is lacking in Greek and Jewish discourses (p. 42). Further, by distancing the Christian universal truth from a material center, it can also be distinct from a material concept of rule-of-law: “For you are not under law, but under grace (Rom. 6.14)” (Paul as cited in Badiou, p. 63). Because of this distancing, Paul can declare that faith, not truth or rule-of-law, is what redeems and unites us.

However, Paul’s formulation of Christianity offers a particular form of universalism that grants room for cosmopolitanism only if differences are dissolved into a Christian universal, thus creating another pseudo-universal frame after the Roman one (p. 106). In the end, even though truth in this equation is, originally, free from a “rule-of-law,” the declaration becomes a “spiritual-rule-of-law,” in which faith in the event is a requirement, a law for membership within the universality. So it is that this so-called universality is plummeted back into the world of particulars and contingency. It is, as Burke (1959) would suggest, “bureaucratized” in an
This Christian pseudo-universal frame, however, is not a true cosmopolitan frame insofar as difference must either surrender itself or be ritually sacrificed. We could call the universal frame a distorted cosmopolitan frame in which the terms and scene are reduced to the universal at the expense of difference. The erroneous equating of universalism with cosmopolitanism, as if they were interchangeable terms, is common in both past and current scholarship. For example, Antonio Gramsci (2005) observes that the later “‘Italian’ culture is the continuation of the mediaeval cosmopolitanism [and is] linked to the tradition of the Empire and the Church, both of which are universal concepts with ‘geographical’ seats in Italy” (p. 117). Immanuel Kant seems to straddle his cosmopolitan visions between a Hegelian process towards universal perfection (in his “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View”) and a universalist empiric image of global brotherhood (“Eternal Peace”). A more contemporary example can be seen in Tom Palmer’s (2003) conception of cosmopolitanism. The universal as cosmopolitanism can be understood, Palmer argues, in Aristotle’s articulation of justice, in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, within which justice exists in two spheres—the natural (universal/cosmopolitan) and the conventional (man-made and particular) (p. 4). In the end, Palmer offers his endorsement of cosmopolitanism by literally renaming the concept to read “universalist cosmopolitanism” (p. 6). By making cosmopolitan-universal, Palmer, Will, and others rhetorically create a pseudo, indeed a perverted cosmopolitanism frame within which universal values become bureaucratized. As such, there is no room for real difference in this limited view of cosmopolitanism because global difference must be absorbed into a *particular* universal.

When cosmopolitanism is articulated as a simple, generalized form of universalism, we often find critics opposing it with the argument that this philosophy is nothing more than an attractive argument for empire and/or imperialism. Timothy Brennan (2003), in “Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism,” believes that internationalism is not theoretically compatible with cosmopolitanism because, whereas internationalism accepts “differences in polity as well as culture,” cosmopolitanism works to universalize both culture and polity (p. 41). In his formation, as in others that deem cosmopolitanism a type of universalism, difference gets lost. Further, besides supporting a unified, universal culture, Brennan states that a “universalist” cosmopolitanism also suggests a world-ruling institution (pp. 41-42). Benjamin Barber (2002) also objects to a cosmopolitan project since it is a call to “abstract universalism” (p. 31), that can become its “own antiseptic version of imperialism” (p. 33). Brennan, Barber, and Will’s concept of cosmopolitanism, outlined at the top of this essay, are based upon conceptualizing cosmopolitanism as a form of ambiguous universalism, and they are reacting, in many ways, to theorists who champion a type of democratic cosmopolitanism (but do so within an ambiguous universalist vocabulary). This is the case with Barry K. Gills’ (2005) essay “‘Empire’ versus ‘Cosmopolis’: The Clash of Globalizations,” in which Gills equates Cosmopolis aspirations with
an abstract universalism: “The impetus to Cosmopolis has made itself felt in repeated aspirations for a universal state, universal peace, a universal church or faith, and a perfect justice and social order. . .” (p. 6). Although Gills is arguing for a type of democratic cosmopolitanism (p. 10), his conception of the Cosmopolis is constantly equated not only with a vague pseudo-universalism, but, importantly, it becomes bureaucratized into a utopic empire. In his choice of the word “Cosmopolis,” we are given the image of a world city, a world rule, rather than a process. The vision of Cosmopolis as utopic empire is evident in phrases equating the Cosmopolis with “perfection in the social universe” (p. 6) or with “a new world order, one that transcends the unequal structures and gross injustices inherited from the previous imperial order” (p. 10). As such, although Gills is arguing against the concept of empire, which he says can never “truly be good” (p. 9), his discourse on the Cosmopolis begins to assume the form of an imperial utopia composed of pseudo-universal (both ethical and material) determinants.

Towards Process: Proposing a Rhetorical Cosmopolitical Democracy

If cosmopolitanism can quickly be perverted, why even retain this flawed concept and apply it to the world of democratic cosmopolitical potential? Indeed, if in trying to actualize any ideal, such as universality or cosmopolitanism, we immediately bureaucratize it, what is the point? Why not simply stick with the particular (the national) because it is only the local that can be realized? The reason, simply put, is that we do not live in a vacuum. Each person may be rooted in his or her local space, but the locality is actively affected by global concerns and realities: economic, environmental, and social. As such, a strong cosmopolitical frame is needed; however, this frame must not bureaucratize the ideal, actively shunning difference, but rather it must provide an avenue for the process of cosmopolitical democracy. As presented here, a rhetorical cosmopolitical democracy contains three main ideas as planks of an agenda:

1. Rooted Citizens of the World. Echoing the Stoics, Kenneth Burke (1969), in his Grammar, Nussbaum (2002), and Appiah (2006) believe we should consider ourselves citizens of the world. However, this phrase should not be taken literally to mean that ‘I’ am an official card-carrying member of a world-nation. Rather, it is a guiding metaphor, which suggests that we have an obligation to think about and consider our fellow human beings even if we have never actually associated with most of them. It is a reminder that how I live affects not only me but also those close to me, as well as other people in the world. Thus, the concept of rooted cosmopolitanism or, as Appiah (2002) phrases it, “cosmopolitan patriots,” is helpful in conjunction with the idea that we are world citizens. Rooted cosmopolitans are those who are aware of the wider world around them, including the joys and problems that exist, but are still rooted to their local space (p. 22). This dialectical process of awareness can be activated through our imaginations. As Tarrow (2005) explains, “cosmopolitans move physically and cognitively outside their origins; they continue to be linked to place, to the social networks that inhabit that space, and to the resources, experiences, and opportunities that place provides them with” (p. 42).

2. A Rhetorical Democracy. As many current supporters of cosmopolitanism suggest, we must actively discard an either/or worldview (Falk, 2002, 53; Falk and Strauss, 2003, 203; H. Putnam, 2002, 9; Taylor, 2002, 119). A rhetorical cosmopolitical democracy should reject an either/or articulation between a simple nationalism and a pseudo-universalism. It should thereby promote Appiah’s (2006) slogan of universality plus difference (p. 151), through a Bakhtinian dialogic process that also reflects Burian compromise as realized through the “double process”
Rhetorical democracy calls for continuous negotiation and translation of universal values into particular international laws that also work to respect difference. This continual negotiation process is best served by a democratic frame (Held, 2003; Archibugi, 2003; and Falk, 2002). Thus, a cosmopolitical democracy, as presented here, supports a rhetorical democratic frame that promotes popular, state, and international deliberations.

(3) Pragmatic Idealism and the Double Process. Agreeing with Kant (1798) that ideas and ideals motivate us, the idea for a cosmopolitical democracy is vital (pp. 249-432). However, contrary to Kant’s vision, a cosmopolitan vision cannot be viewed as an absolute end in itself, with preset perimeters determining how such a cosmopolitical democracy will specifically look or function. Rather, achieving cosmopolitical democracy is the result of a process, the continual translation, negotiation, and articulation across cultures and between the universal and the particular. To predetermine an absolute end-product is to presuppose a truth, which calls for a form of absolutism. Temporality, on the other hand, shuns absolutism for potential, creativity, and what Biesecker (1997) correctly identifies as a “resource of social change” (p. 101). There may be an end-product, but it is the process that must prevail. By focusing on the process rather than a pre-determined product, we will better be able to adjust to difference, the contingent, while working to reconcile general universal values to particular material laws that govern such values.

Rooted Citizens of the World

One of the fundamental criticisms regarding Nussbaum’s (2002) and, later, Barack Obama’s vision of cosmopolitanism is their support for the concept of world citizens. Central to such criticisms are questions such as: What constitutes world citizenship? How can world citizenship be created and supported as an independent entity outside states yet still have the support from states? Thus, Walzer (2002) humorously declares: “No one has ever offered me citizenship, or described the naturalization process, or enlisted me in the world’s institutional structures, or given me an account of its decision procedures (I hope they are democratic)” (p. 125). Critics such as Walzer have a point—namely, how can we endorse world citizenship without first knowing the institutions that this ‘citizenship’ will be associated with and negotiated through (Calhoun, 2003, p. 90)? Next, what type of institution(s) should the world endorse, and how can we create a global governmental space in which states agree to lose some of their governing rights, while adhering, consistently not selectively, to an international rule-of-law? Much of democratic cosmopolitical theory relies on the European Union (EU) model for its delineation of world citizenship, as well as institutional organization (Urbinate, 2003, p. 70). However inspirational the EU paradigm is, we must keep in mind that it is a work in progress, which does not always receive popular support. For example, in the effort to establish a constitution for the EU, ratification occurred mostly by parliamentary action, a from-above approach. When subjected to popular vote in France and the Netherlands in 2005, the constitution was rejected. This outcome suggests that even in the EU, there is still a need for extensive discussion and negotiation regarding a rhetorical cosmopolitical process. As world citizenship at this point in time seems presumptive and unlikely, it is important to acknowledge Nussbaum’s argument that what is needed is an educational effort that will help reorient a population’s thinking and discourse from a narrow local/nationalistic frame to a rooted cosmopolitical frame through which individuals can learn how to relate local concerns and issues
to international ones and back again. In this frame, “rooted citizens of the world” becomes a metaphor that guides our material and cognitive processes, allowing us to understand those issues and practices that bind us globally and affect us locally.

Nussbaum (2002) states: “By looking at ourselves through the lens of the other, we come to see what in our practices is local and nonessential, what is more broadly or deeply shared” (p. 11). Such an educational process cannot occur overnight, nor should it be a forced process where patriotism is immediately squashed in order to make room for cosmopolitical democracy. Rather, such ideas should be encouraged in everyday life, with everyday conversations around the dinner table, in front of the TV, or the workplace water-cooler. Theoretically, this reeducation process works to combine the individualistic with the collective sensibility in a practical way. The larger question becomes: how can we attend to self-interests and, at the same time, attend to and be aware of collective self-interests? Fundamental to this approach will be cultivating the ability to imagine the self “through the lens of the other” (Nussbaum, p. 11).

One fundamental objection to cosmopolitanism is that it is impossible to imagine the “other.” Richard Rorty (1998) addresses this problem while examining loyalty and justice, first from within the intimate realm of our lives (our family) and then from the larger realm of our loyalty to our fellow humans (both locally and then globally). Rorty observes that although loyalty to our immediate loved ones will hold strong, when we extend ourselves out to larger groups, familial loyalty tends to decrease. If this is true, when promoting a cosmopolitical democracy, how can we successfully “expand and contract” our loyalties (p. 45)? A related concern regarding cosmopolitanism is that when we do attempt to expand our loyalty and to imagine the “other,” we invariably impose our voice on the “other”—thereby speaking for the other (Elaine Scarry, 2002, p.106). It is implied here that I, as the imaginer, assume that I and the Other are one and the same, and speak from the same voice and experience. But it is impossible for Me to be You and You to be Me since we are distinct individuals whose experiences have made us thus. This is also the argument that Jay McInerney (1984) presents in his well known novel *Bright Lights, Big City*. McInerney writes in the second person, suggesting that the reader is the main protagonist of the story. In this way, the author acts as a guide directing a story wherein the reader (You) experiences and imagine the events described. Halfway through the story, we realize that McInerney does not intend this second-person device as a strategy for our imagining the other, but rather as a demonstration that it is impossible to imagine the other: “They’re trying to imagine themselves in your shoes, but it would be a tough thing to do. . Meg can’t imagine what it’s like for you to be you, she can only imagine herself being you” (p. 101). McInerney suggests that even through guided imagination, you cannot imagine yourself as the other, but only the other as an aspect of yourself. If this is correct, then to imagine yourself as another is to impose your voice on the other’s voice, and, thus, to assume a “from-the-top” position from which you force yourself, your ideas, experiences, thoughts, and emotions, on another. This process would then be contrary to democratic relations and also contrary to a rhetorical cosmopolitical insistence of universalism plus difference.

However, imagining another person is not the same as speaking for, or assuming a public voice for that person. As Reynolds (1989) states in “Imagining Oneself To Be Another,” when I imagine myself as another, I do not imagine that the other is me, “but in imagining Napoleon from the inside, I do not imagine that I am experiencing Napoleon’s conscious state; I merely imagine Napoleon having those states by representing them to myself in a certain way” (p. 627). The process then must start from the self and extend outward to the other but not replace the other. This is the argument that Phenomenologist Alfred Schütz (1970) offered while promoting
a pathway to a “Genuine Subjective Understanding” of another person (p. 175). Starting from the self, we need to see the “other” as a human being without fetishizing her or him as a thing, label, or a category such as a worker, bus driver, or employer. This process allows us to gain an understanding of another person and not simply an understanding of our self. As Schütz argues, this process actually avoids the “projective” theory of empathy, in that “we know with certainty that the other person’s subjective experience of his own action is in principle different from our own imagined picture of what we would do in the same situation” (p. 176). Thus, we are promoting dialectic rather than monologic processes of imagination.

In “Discourse and the Novel,” Bakhtin (2004) argues that the dialogic nature of language is the tension not between individual wills but between “social-linguistic points of view” (p. 273). These tensions and points of view live in a space of flux where they are joined, disrupted and rejoined (p. 274). Unlike a monologue (individualism), which “presumes only passive listeners beyond its boundaries,” the style of dialogue (collectivism) is determined by many voices and by the interrelationship with language and the voices as “rejoinders” (p. 274). In this sense, language, words, and relationships between people are being continuously redefined because they mutually participate and interact. This dialogic perspective then recognizes both the self and the other as both an individual and as a reliant being. This is why some anthropologists are applying the dialectic imagining process to ethnographic work. With an awareness that the interviewer is part of the process of interviewing, and recognizing the presence of self-interest in that role, there is an effort to acknowledge all parties involved, while avoiding the pitfall of presenting subjects as homogeneous beings. Some modern ethnographic studies work to acknowledge each subject as dependent and independent. Indeed, Peter Collins (2002) in his article “Both Independent and Interconnected Voices: Bakhtin Among the Quakers,” explores this dialogic imagination process and how the storied self is both independent and interconnected. In “The Ethnographic Self as Resource,” Collins writes: “More recently, anthropologists have attempted to know others as individuals, with unique stories, which can be compared and contrasted with the stores of others – and not only of others but also of ourselves” (p. 235). Nigel Rapport (2010) in “The Ethics of Participant Observation: Personal Reflections of Fieldwork in England,” observes how this process is characterized neither by an authorial transcendence nor by a final authorial synthesis. The text that emerges, it must be accepted, has ambiguities that are ineradicable, and meanings that are infinite and ineffable . . . through a reciprocal probing into two or more life-words, questions can be framed from whose challenge neither side can hope to escape. (p. 79)

We start with our self, and then we juxtapose our story with the stories of others, both consciously and unconsciously, in order to understand the other and imagine the other. For Collins (2010), this process operates using three preconditions: “the practice of reflexivity, the centrality of the narrative self, and finally a commitment to a dialogic methodology” (p. 228).

A fourth precondition should also be argued for, and that is active imagination. What is implied through the act of imagining the other is a general understanding of those particular emotions and experiences of the other. Subsequently, as Warnock (1978) reminds us in Imagination, Hume theorized that it is through our imaginations that we are able to relate a
particular thing to a general category (p. 18) and make the leap from ourselves to the other. Likewise, Burke (1969) also suggested if we rhetorically accept this wider frame of generalized motivation, then we could easily bring our own “peculiar motivational texture, without losing the ‘hypostasis,’ the sense of [our] personal identity . . .” (p. 44). In this sense, imagination allows us to “detach ourselves from our actual situation and envision situations which are non-actual” (Warnock, p. 197). Extending our perception in this way, we can envision a cosmopolitical space by relating our local concerns and habits to the global level. It is partly an active shift in thinking, an active encouragement in imagining, and a shift in values such that both the individual and the collective are touchstones. In other words, when I purchase a shirt from Walmart, I can cultivate a habit whereby I imagine myself as the other, creating the shirt in either good or poor conditions. This act of imagination will help guide me as to whether I should purchase that particular shirt or not—allowing me to make ethical decisions that support a world community.

### Cosmopolitical Democracy

What type of democratic choral framework is pertinent to a rhetorical cosmopolitical democracy? How is democracy defined? And is it possible to have a world democratic framework? Concepts of democracy take many forms, and the term itself has changed over the centuries. Starting from the classical standpoint, Plato (1968), in his *Republic*, saw democracy as a form of government that protected the people from tyranny (p. 338d-e). Athenian democracy was a far cry from being an inclusive form of government since the majority of the population could not participate. Nevertheless, the core idea of democracy emerged out of Athens. Athenian democracy is now considered utopic, as is the general western ideal of democracy, defined as a rhetorical mode of government in which the “citizens are equal, everyone has a say, everyone has a vote, and the decisions are based on the most compelling arguments” (Houser, 2004, p. 1). Part of the ideal here rests on the assumption of citizens as rational beings, where “democratic lawmaking flow[s] from the public, [and] reasonable deliberation [is conducted by] informed citizens” (William Rehg, 2002, p. 18). In effect, these definitions are utopic because in reality, not all citizens are equal, and not all citizens have an equal opportunity to participate, a fact to which critics of participatory democracy often point. Furthermore, citizens are not always reasonable or informed. Regardless, if we view the cosmopolitical process rhetorically (as we do the notion of democracy), we have a focus on process rather than ends. Such a process is one of deliberation and participation, which can be promoted over an inflexible and bureaucratized end. Democracy in this light is an active form of act-utilitarianism, in which the power for change and law-making lies within a body of the people who examine individual situations in such a way as to maximize the good for the majority. The ability to agree upon the “good” is based in the rhetorical act of deliberation, dialectics, and rhetoric.

For their part, theorists who engage in rhetorical and communication studies have examined the concept of democracy extensively, as seen in the work of Eemeren (2002), Rehg (2002), Williams and Young (2002), Hauser (2004), and Murphy (2004), to name but a few. For them, the key phrases and concepts concerning democracy are deliberation, communication, argumentation, dialectic, and rhetoric. If democracy is ideally a governmental form which encourages participation of all its citizens, then democracy must necessarily involve active argumentation and deliberation where competing views within the political process have an opportunity to be expressed, explored, acknowledged, and, importantly, debated until there can
be an agreed upon outcome that, in Burkean terms, transcends differences. Because democracy as promoted here involves argumentation and deliberation, democracy can be understood as “institutionalized uncertainty” (Eemeren, p. 82), sustained by controversy, and organized distrust (Williams and Young, p. 2). Although rhetorical democracy is “uncertain” (since it relies on the process of deliberation and argumentation among members), this view of democracy is decidedly counter to the narrow understanding of democracy offered by neoliberalism or neconservative organizations such as the Koch Industry, supported Tea Party movement, as well as by older movements, as epitomized by the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) or even individuals such as President G.W. Bush. The above examples of political entities prefer a top-down approach to decision-making. In rhetorical democracy, in contrast, members of a community are encouraged to actively participate in public matters (via debate, argumentation, and deliberation) not simply leaving such deliberations up to their representatives in government, and to challenge leaders when they create misguided rules-of-law.

It is important to recognize, however, when arguing for rhetorical democracy an ethical path of utilitarianism, there is a real concern that citizens will be marginalized, since equal participation or representation is not likely. This same problem can exist when the interests of the self are placed in opposition to that of the collective. Part of the dilemma is the dialectic between low-power distance (LPD), as found with many individualistic cultures, and high-power distance (HPD), as is often found in many collectivist cultures. When we imagine our self-interest in relation to a collective-interest, we are also negotiating active power structures. LPD cultures work to minimize hierarchal power relations, which is in the spirit of democracy. HPD cultures, however, promote those hierarchal relations and so can shun democratic practices. Through the use of Bakhtin understanding of dialogism and a double process of negotiation between positions of power, we can avoid a power-oriented false dichotomy that shuns democratic relations while actively connecting individual self-interest with the interests of the collective. This is encouraged through the application of rhetorical democratic practices. As Rehg (2002) would suggest, public participation within the rhetorical frame will work against installing “unreasonable” policies that would marginalize certain citizens (p. 25). However, realizing a cosmopolitical and rhetorical democracy will not happen overnight, nor will it happen through the use of pseudo-universal laws or by promoting a particular form of Westernized democracy, which is often embedded in Enlightenment liberalism and rationalism (Rorty, 1998, pp. 56-57). Rather, efforts toward a democratic cosmopolitical philosophy should initially be promoted within a local framework and with civic and social organizations and movements, which can then work to spread the process to a wider population. This can occur by creating pragmatic, transcendent frames that allow for the double process of negotiation between the universal and the particular, the individual, and the collective self-interest.

**Pragmatic Idealism—Promoting Process over Ends**

Cosmopolitical democratic aspirations cannot be manifested without the ideal and hope for such a vision. As Kant (1798) rightly suggested about cosmopolitanism, the *idea* behind cosmopolitanism is vital since it is the idea that helps propel humanity toward change. It is very likely that Burke (1970) would also agree, since he reminds us that “ideas can buoy us up, hence the market for tracts on ‘the power of positive thinking’” (p. 17). In fact, grand ideas such as airplanes, the Internet, or cell phones would not exist without the power of an idea.
However, we must be careful not to mistake a projected end (a proposed end inspired by an idea) for an absolute end (a finished end that does not allow for changes or alterations). When working toward an absolute end, like an absolute truth, we often employ terministic screens or purposeful binders (Burke, 1966, p. 44) that limit experience in order to achieve that end because an absolute end must dictate both process and experience in order to remain unbendable and absolute. For this reason, a cosmopolitical democracy is better situated within a pragmatic frame, where material contingencies and issues challenge ends. This process is best promoted by idealism rather than the philosophical modes of rationalism. For the present, it is enough to remember that rationalism assumes we are reasonable creatures who act in our own best interests. However, decisions are more often made through our values and identities rather than rational self-interest. Therefore, decisions we make do not necessarily “coincide” with our self-interest or rationality (Lakoff, 2004, p. 33). This is a lesson that everyday living teaches us, whether we find ourselves eating foods that we know are bad for us or voting for issues that will, in the end, be counter to our self-interest. Rather, pragmatic idealism rests instead on the philosophy that rhetorical articulations and material reality affect our cognitive reality, and our cognitive reality also shapes our perception of the world around us (materially and discursively). Since real life contingencies can challenge and reform our ideals and truths, cognitive ideals and perceived truths are better viewed as projected or proposed ends rather than ends that are “set” or absolute. To conceive an idea or an ideal as a proposed end is to encourage process over product. Indeed, although we can deliberate about “ends,” an end as an unmoving perfection is “unattainable” because when exposed to contingencies and the evolving reality in everyday life, ends are constantly challenged (Rescher, 1994, p. 384). As a consequence, an ideal or a truth as a perfected end means that the ideal or truth can no longer be altered by additional experiences (James, 1981, p. 100). For this reason, ideals or truths, like projected universals, are often challenged once they become immersed in the particulars of life. We must approach our projected ends and ideals with the understanding that in order for them to survive, they must be flexible enough to be reconceived or reformed to meet everyday challenges. Temporality and the possibility of failure must be promoted and accepted: “Temporality . . . is the irreducible and always imperfectly excluded force that, in relentlessly applying pressure upon the movement of the dialectic from within, keeps it forever upon to the possibility of failure” (Biesecher, 1997, p. 101). Therefore, our energies are better spent on the process of realizing the ideal we seek. That is, trusting in the temporality and embracing the potential of failure and uncertainty to bring new insights and knowledge. This is a reflection of rhetorical democracy in the flux of chaotic but productive argumentation. Further, as Tarrow (2005) concluded while examining global civil societies’ efforts to translate the local to the international and back again, there is not a single process, no absolute end-product that leads to a global civil society or, for that matter, a cosmopolitical democracy (p. 9).

Because pragmatic idealism places an emphasis on the process, it insists on a continual negotiation between the ideal (the general and the universal) and the particular (the material and the specific). When people negotiate about the meaning of an ideal (such as cosmopolitanism) and how it can be realized as a particular (such as rules-of-law that govern cosmopolitical relations), they often employ what Burke (1970) terms a “double process,” where words and practices conceived on the general and ideological level are made specific on the material level, but not left as bureaucratized ends. Not unlike Bakhtin’s dialogism, Burke’s double process is a proposal of give-and-take that works to break down false-dichotomies and encourages the reevaluation of ethical values and ideas between self and collective-interest. This flexible
double-process is vital because once philosophies and ideals-as-ends are made specific, they often become too narrow in practice and can functionally exclude members of a population, as we saw in the evolution of St. Paul’s Christianity into a form of universalism. Once this occurs, the ideal must be reevaluated, reformed, and again made general in order to maintain the integrity of the concept. The ideal, though, does not return to the general realm unaffected or unchanged; rather, because of the process of being made specific, and because of the experience of failure, the ideal is reformed in such a way as to better accommodate everyday life. This continual double process of negotiation between the general and the specific helps refine our ideals, constantly working the ideal or the end, like molding a piece of clay, until it can better accommodate the demands of everyday life. As Burke (1970) and Tarrow (2005) demonstrate, this double process of negotiation between the general and the specific occurs in both language and practical social, political, and economic relations.

From the process of imagining the other, to the reeducation efforts of viewing self-interest in relation to collective-interest, and to the promotion of a rhetorical democracy within cosmopolitical relations, a consistent procedural theme has been encouraged: that of a double process and dialogic approach to life, living, and communication. This double process takes place at the level of and in-between two spaces: a linguistic and a praxis stage of action. In Burke’s (1970) essay, “On Words and the Word,” he theorized that words used to describe truths or universals are taken from our everyday life and assigned a “supernatural” quality (p. 15). However, once we reintroduce the “supernatural” word back to the particulars of everyday life, the definition of that word is transformed in order to meet the new challenges it encounters. For Burke, this is a “double process,” in which terms, and ideas, experience both an “upward” and “downward” motion that affects meaning—suggesting not an end to meaning, but a process of reestablishing meaning (p. 10). For example, Burke looks at the term “spirit”: “having moved analogically from its natural meaning, as ‘breath,’ to connotations that flowered in its usage as a term for the supernatural, it could then be analogically borrowed back as a secular term for temper, temperament, and the like” (p. 8). In this vein, upward and downward articulation of a term or idea becomes a process of negotiation through which people reinterpret such concepts, reforming the meaning and clarity of terms in order to meet new and evolving challenges in everyday life.

Like Burke, Tarrow (2005), in *The New Transnational Activism*, describes similar “upward” and “downward,” praxis-oriented “scale shifts” experienced by social movements during their course of interacting with other movements or agencies. In his words, *upward shifts* refer to those in which “local actions spread outward from [their] origins,” and *downward shifts* refer to those in which “a generalized practice is adopted at a lower level” (p. 121). However, as Nussbaum (2002) demonstrates, it is tempting to view the upward and downward process, or the double movement, within the visual orientation of concentric circles (as described above), as was originally conceived by the Greek philosopher Hierocles, in which we move from the local (particular) in incremental steps outward toward the international (the general or universal) and then draw back into the local again (p. 9). The problem with this image, as Tarrow (2005) might also suggest (p. 121), is that it offers the illusion of simply reproducing ideas on both the local and cosmopolitical levels. However, as has been argued throughout, the double-movement process endorsed here is not an uncomplicated process of grafting unmoving ideals at different levels; rather, it is a chaotic yet productive method. Additionally, this double-movement process can actively challenge George Will’s fear that cosmopolitical democracy simply seeks to graft a
state-like sovereign model onto the international realm (2008, para. 8-9). As conceived here, the double movement process seeks to negotiate a new model of democracy that can bridge the state-sovereign level with that of the international by encouraging the democratic process to evolve away from the simple act of voting into a more participatory form that nurtures choral spaces of cosmopolitical deliberation.

Conclusion

If George Will’s view of Cosmopolitanism is a three-act play with a predictable ending, then a cosmopolitical democracy is better understood as improvisation in which process and popular participation are promoted and where a set dénouement is discouraged. If we view cosmopolitanism as a predetermined state of being, such as a central world governing power, which functions on a specific level, the hope found in cosmopolitanism is lost. Nor should we confuse cosmopolitanism with universalism, since this is also a doomed project. A purely nationalist project is equally doomed in such a globally connected world. However, by understanding cosmopolitanism as a democratic and rhetorical process that strives to continuously negotiate the relationship between the general and the specific, both in an upward/downward as well as a horizontal or cross-cultural process, then this ideal embodies not only potential, but it also has the potential of regulating and checking economic globalization, while encouraging the “tolerance” Kenneth Burke sought to foster within his call to a neo-Stoic cosmopolitanism.

Right now in our world, there is a deep desire and hunger for democracy and a globalism that goes beyond economic determinists. As popular movements for democracy in the Middle East (such as we are seeing in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere) take root, the question that we all face once again is this: now what? In Commentary No. 300 (2011), Immanuel Wallerstein writes:

There are two lessons we can draw from this. One is that winds of change are very strong and probably impossible to resist. The second is that once the winds sweep away the symbols of tyranny, it is not at all certain what will follow. Once the symbols fall, everyone retrospectively denounces them. But everyone also wants their own interests to be preserved in the new structures that emerge. (Para. 5)

These individualist and even nationalistic self-interests can be maintained, and, at the same time, we can encourage a rearticulating of cosmopolitan self-interest in the midst of these chaotic uprisings. Ironically, this is already happening and can even be seen in the token offering of pizza, as protestors from Egypt and others around the globe have financed and sent hundreds of pizzas to the protestors in Wisconsin, who are fighting to maintain their unions and collective bargaining rights:

Every day for the past week, the two Ian’s Pizza shops in town have fed the hungry masses, delivering hundreds of free pies to the Capitol. The owners of Ian’s boasted that supporters from all 50 states — as well as Bosnia, China, Egypt, France and 20 other...
countries — had donated thousands of dollars each day so they could give protesters the calories they needed to keep going. (Greenhouse, 2011, para. 1)

We have a global opportunity to start the double and dialogic process toward a cosmopolitical democracy, and this small example suggests that much of the world is ready. This effort can be assisted not only through the processes as explained in this paper, including the use of imagination, dialogism, and a double process, but also through the use of social media that can and does connect our local world with a global community. Further, organizations such as the World Social Forum (WTF) can continue to provide a space for the negotiation of process without forcing a specific vision or end of how our cosmopolitical relations will take root. The WTF describes itself as an open meeting space for

reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and are committed to building a planetary society directed towards fruitful relationships among Humankind and between it and the Earth. (Carter of Principles, para. 2).

The encouragement of the WTF, its philosophies, as well as other organizations in similar spirit can help promote the process of cosmopolitical democracy at the social, political, and even economic local and global levels, allowing for a global improvisation of potential: the beginnings of a cosmopolitical democracy.
It should be noted that Burke’s insistence regarding neo-cosmopolitanism was a side note and not a fully developed proposition in his *Grammar of Motives*. 

This Stoic belief might explain why Chrysippus the Stoic did not dedicate any of his reported seven hundred books to a sovereign, an act that was deemed arrogant by the later Roman historian Laërtius (Laërtius, 1895, p. 330). 

Bok is correct in her observation, and it is difficult to reconcile the need to purchase Roman citizenship with Marcus Aurelius' (1964/2005) view of cosmopolitan citizenship: “O Man, citizenship of this great world-city has been yours . . . whatever the law of that city decrees is fair to one and all alike” (12:26). 

This second-person device, rare but not unknown, was also used by Sam Shepard (1979) in his play *Suicide in b Flat* and, as in McInerney, the use of the second person actually works to create a distance from “you” as the reader and the work being imagined. Thus, as Reynolds’ (1989) claims, imagining and beliefs must be in the first person, as it is through the first person perspective that we can see ourselves existing (p. 627). 

On December 18, CNN (2000) posted a transcript of President G.W. Bush’s meeting with congressional leaders on Capitol Hill. The transcript quoted Bush as stating that sometimes there would be disagreement among members; however, “if this were a dictatorship, it’d be a heck of a lot easier, just so long as I’m the dictator” (para. 7).
References


