George Caleb Bingham, Watching the Cargo, 1849. While some considered Bingham’s paintings of antebellum Missouri to be sentimental, they represented a meaning far deeper, as Joan Stack argues in “Manifesting Anti-Expansionist Anxiety at New York’s American Art-Union: A Sociopolitical Interpretation of George Caleb Bingham’s 1845 Paintings, The Concealed Enemy and Fur Traders Descending the Missouri. (Image: State Historical Society of Missouri)
4 Manifesting Anti-Expansionist Anxiety at New York’s American Art Union: A Sociopolitical Interpretation of George Caleb Bingham’s 1845 Paintings, The Concealed Enemy and Fur Traders Descending the Missouri
By Joan Stack
George Caleb Bingham was one of the few artists with a political career as well, serving in the Missouri legislature. In this article, Joan Stack interrogates a body of Bingham’s work in the context of the social and political atmosphere of antebellum Missouri.

34 “Our women and children cry for food, and we have no food to give them”: The Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Shoshone Dispossession
By Adam Hodge
The fur trade had a profound environmental impact on the West, Adam Hodge argues, as that impact was intentionally facilitated by the fur trade itself.

46 Consequences of Peaceful Actions: Political Decisions of the Illinois Indians, 1778–1832
By Gerald Rogers
A series of political decisions led to the decimation of the Native American population in Illinois during its territorial and early statehood periods leading up to the final removal of tribes after Black Hawk’s War.

56 A New Era in Their History: Isaac McCoy’s Indian Canaan and the Baptist Triennial Convention
By Daniel Williams
One aspect of efforts to “civilize” Native Americans involved the role of missionaries. In this essay, Daniel Williams investigates the role of the Baptists and their objectives in preaching to native tribes.
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In October 2015, the History and Geography Department at Lindenwood University hosted a conference to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the treaties ending the War of 1812. Great Britain allied with a number of western tribes (since it had its hands full in Europe in the Napoleonic wars), so when Britain signed a peace accord with the United States in late 1814, the Americans had to reach peace agreements with Britain’s Native American allies as well.

James Monroe, who was Secretary of both War and State in March of 1815, appointed a three-member commission to sign those treaties. It was headed by former explorer William Clark, now Indian Agent and Governor of the Missouri Territory, who had perhaps the best relationship with those tribal leaders of any American official. Fur trader Auguste Chouteau and Illinois territorial governor Ninian Edwards completed the team. Clark summoned tribal leaders to a council that summer in Portage des Sioux, along the Mississippi River in present-day St. Charles County.

Monroe told Clark that these treaties were strictly political, ending warfare but were separate from any commercial agreements; those would come later. By the end of the summer, Clark signed treaties with 11 different tribes; by the end of his career he had signed more treaties with tribes than any other American official in history. These treaties formed the legal foundation for later removal of tribes farther west.

At the conference, scholars from across the country gathered to hear and present papers on a wide array of topics surrounding the legacies of the Portage des Sioux treaties. Four of those papers with particular relevance to this region appear in this issue.

I would be remiss without thanking the faculty in the History and Geography Department for its hard work in organizing this conference, and especially Dr. Steven Gietschier for taking on the mantle of organizing it. The conference was filled with interesting and insightful papers, and was executed beautifully, thanks to the efforts of Dr. Gietschier and the department.

Jeffrey Smith, PhD
Editor
Manifesting Anti-Expansionist Anxiety at New York’s American Art-Union: A Sociopolitical Interpretation of George Caleb Bingham’s 1845 Paintings, The Concealed Enemy and Fur Traders Descending the Missouri

By Joan Stack
On December 8, 1845, Missouri painter George Caleb Bingham sold *The Concealed Enemy* and *Fur Traders Descending the Missouri* (originally titled *French Trader and Half-breed Son*) to the American Art-Union in New York. Both pictures represented native peoples in the contested space of the American West. Thousands viewed these paintings at the Art-Union’s free gallery during their brief exhibition period in New York, which ended on December 19, 1845. On that day, the paintings were distributed by lottery to AA-U members during a gala event.¹

Scholars have traditionally interpreted these pictures as nostalgic, idealized visions of Missouri’s bygone wilderness and/or pendant images contrasting doomed native savagery with the civilizing force of Euro-American settlement. By extension, proponents of the second interpretation often associate the paintings with Manifest Destiny and President James K. Polk’s ambitious expansion of U.S. territory in the 1840s.² I propose an alternate reading that, by contrast, connects the pictures with wariness of Polk’s expansionist policies. An anti-expansionist reading better applies to the temporal circumstances of the paintings’ earliest exhibition and more accurately reflects the attitudes of both Bingham and many members of his New York audience.

*The Concealed Enemy* and *Fur Traders Descending the Missouri* were exhibited for only a few days in 1845. After the Art-Union’s lottery, both disappeared into private hands for almost a century.³ Since there are no records of AA-U visitor responses to the images, any understanding of their short-lived public reception at the Art-Union depends upon a study of culturally constructed habits of interpretation. Art historian Michael Baxandall called such inquiries the study of the “Period Eye.”⁴ My examination of the forces that shaped the 1845 “Period Eye” borrows freely from spectatorship theory, traditional Panofskian iconography, and Barthian semiotics to explore politically charged associations viewers might have made between Bingham’s paintings and popular rhetoric, canonical artworks, and political cartoons. Since such associations are related to reception rather than creation, this study of potential audience responses is not necessarily tied to the artist’s intentions.⁵

This reception-based approach aligns with popular nineteenth-century “associativist” theories of taste. Archibald Alison and others argued that aesthetic pleasure came from creative mental “associations” that artworks inspired in viewers. Most believed in a hierarchy of taste whereby cultivated associations (with classical antiquity, for example) were superior to “casual” connections related to personal experience or current events. The theoretical writings of associativists were very popular in the U.S. in the 1840s. For many Art-Union visitors, creative engagement was itself a “habit of interpretation.”⁶
In 1845 the geopolitical fate of the United States was in doubt. That spring the newly installed Democratic President, James K. Polk, had made good on his campaign promise to push forward legislation annexing the Republic of Texas into the United States. Mexico, however, had never recognized Texas’s independence. The Mexican government believed that the annexation of Texas constituted an act of war.

Polk’s expansionist designs extended beyond Texas. The president hoped to usurp adjacent southwestern land controlled by Mexico, as well as northwestern territory occupied by Britain. During his March 4, 1845, inaugural address, Polk reiterated his campaign promise to fight for a 54° 40’ border in the northwest, maintaining that Britain had no rights to the Oregon Territory despite earlier agreements allowing joint occupancy. Diplomatic negotiations throughout 1845 faltered, and Polk made particularly militant claims regarding Oregon in his first address to Congress on December 2, 1845. When Bingham’s paintings were on display in New York, U.S. citizens were bracing themselves for war on two fronts.

Polk’s supporters justified territorial wars by arguing that Euro-Americans were a divinely chosen people destined to control the North American continent. In their view, Americans not only had the right to territory claimed by Great Britain and Mexico, but they were also entitled to land occupied by native peoples. This idea, often referred to as “Manifest Destiny,” was popularly attached to Polk’s expansionist agenda by Democratic journalist John O’Sullivan. In February 1845, O’Sullivan described Polkian expansion as “the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty.”

O’Sullivan’s rhetoric influenced many apologists for Polk’s aggressive expansionist agenda, but it was not generally embraced by the opposition Whig Party. Indeed, the New York Whig journal, The American Review, mocked the concept, sarcastically describing Polk’s attitude as follows: “As soon as [Polk] was fairly settled in his seat his policy was fixed. . . . We were Anglo Saxon Americans; it was our ‘destiny’ to possess and to rule this continent—we were bound to do it! . . . [The American Review] would pray the Administration, for humanity’s sake to make peace with Mexico . . . peace without conquest or the wanton desire of spoiling the enemy of his goods, his possessions and his heritage.”

An ardent Whig, Bingham likely shared The American Review’s suspicion of Polkian policy; Whigs largely supported expansion and development in existing American territories, but not the addition of new domains. In 1849, while serving in the Missouri House of Representatives, the artist condemned an amendment to a bill asserting that the expansionist Mexican War had been “just and necessary.” Whigs generally balked at the idea that wars with Mexico and/or Oregon benefited the United States. Henry Clay, Polk’s Whig opponent in the 1844 election, had argued against annexation and expansion for a variety of reasons, including concerns about sectional

Opponents to Andrew Jackson’s re-election in 1832 used this broadside to lambast him over his veto of the renewal of the Second Bank of the United States, orchestrated by his opponent, Henry Clay. (Image: Library of Congress)
crisis and the extension of slavery. In his widely reprinted “Raleigh Letter” (first published in the Washington, D.C., National Intelligencer on April 27, 1844), Clay explained his position, declaring, “I think it far more wise and important to compose and harmonize the present Confederacy, as it now exists, than to introduce a new element of discord and distraction into it.”

Clay lost the 1844 election by a popular vote margin of less than 1.5 percent, and resistance to Polk’s expansionist plans remained intense throughout 1845. Despite this opposition, Congress passed a Texas annexation bill in July of that year. For the next five months a divided America waited for Texas to agree to the terms (after Texas’s acceptance, Polk signed the bill into law on December 29, 1845). In the meantime, relations with Great Britain over the Oregon question remained tense. War seemed inevitable as the public prepared for “the other shoe to drop.”

The Concealed Enemy and Fur Traders Descending the Missouri were displayed within this anxious cultural context. For many Americans, these visions of the West on the walls of the Art-Union’s galleries may have been reminders of the still uncertain political, military, and social ramifications of Polk’s western policies.

Whig Artists and the Jacksonian Legacy

To understand the particular politicized lens through which some viewers may have seen Bingham’s paintings in 1845, one must understand the polarization of political parties in the Jacksonian era. Throughout his eight years as president, Democrat Andrew Jackson worked to expand citizen suffrage, abolish the national bank, limit federal involvement in the economic affairs of states, and expand American influence and control over native tribal lands. To further this agenda, Jackson increased executive power and weakened the power of Congress and the courts.

In 1832, Kentucky Congressman Henry Clay founded the anti-Jacksonian Whig Party. Whigs argued for federal legislation to regulate and protect the national economy with tariffs, internal improvements, and a national bank. Clay and his cohorts feared Jackson had weakened Congress and the courts so much that he had become an “imperial” president whose authoritarian impulses and territorial ambitions more closely reflected the attitudes of European monarchs than those of the Founding Fathers. The anti-Jackson cartoon King Andrew, Born to Command (ca. 1832) reflects Whig distrust of Jackson, asking readers, “Shall he reign over us, or shall the people rule?”

In the 1830s certain artists may have reflected Whig fears of Jackson’s imperialistic tendencies in their pictures. Art historian Angela Miller and others have argued that the most famous American painter of the period, Thomas Cole, imbedded anti-Jacksonian political messages into his landscape series, The Course of Empire, now in the galleries of the New-York Historical Society. This five-canvas series begins with the painting The Savage State...
of America implies that the U.S. might also succumb to imperialism and its attendant fate.

*The Course of Empire* was exhibited in the fall of 1836 in the semipublic New York picture gallery of Cole’s Whig patron, Luman Reed. The exhibition took place on the eve of a presidential election that Whigs feared might lead to a victory for Jackson’s vice president and protégé, Martin Van Buren. Miller argues that the display of *The Course of Empire* may have functioned as a pre-election Whig warning of the dangers of a Van Buren “Imperial” presidency.18

To the Whigs’ dismay, Martin Van Buren won the 1836 election, and during his first year in office, the American economy collapsed with the financial Panic of 1837. Many blamed the failure of local and state banks on decentralized Jacksonian monetary policies. Once again Whigs hoped voter remorse would lead to a change of leadership in the 1838 midterm elections and the upcoming 1840 presidential election.19 Whig patrons continued to commission politicized imagery promoting their cause. As art historian Elizabeth Johns has shown, Whig commissions like William Sydney Mount’s *Catching Rabbits* (1837) and *Cider Making* (1840) can be read simultaneously as genre scenes and political allegories. Whigs associated trapping game with attracting voters, and cider was a common Whig symbol in the 1840 campaign.20

George Caleb Bingham was familiar with such popular political imagery. The artist campaigned for the Whigs and painted banners in support of the party in 1840 and 1844.21 As Nancy Rash has shown, newspaper reports indicate that Bingham based much of his banner imagery on popular Whig propaganda, which in 1840 transformed the sophisticated William Henry Harrison into an emblem of the western middle class by associating the candidate with log cabins and hard cider.22

Harrison won the election, but the Whig dream was short-lived. Harrison died soon after his inauguration, and in 1841 Vice President John Tyler ascended to office. Tyler, a former Democrat, refused to work with the Whigs to promote Henry Clay’s banking reform bills, tariffs, and plans for internal improvements. The new president eventually was expelled from the party, and toward the end of his term further alienated many Whigs by proposing the annexation of Texas.23

By 1844 Whig leader Henry Clay was the leading candidate to replace Tyler. Bingham was an enthusiastic Clay supporter, campaigning and painting banners in support of the candidate.24 After Clay’s nomination, the Democrats surprised many Americans by rejecting the moderate anti-annexation ex-president, Martin Van Buren, and nominating the relatively unknown Tennessee congressman James K. Polk. Polk campaigned on an aggressive agenda of expansion in Texas and Oregon, and the Democrats’ popularity grew in the spring and summer of 1844. Clay supporters began to fear that Polk might become president and take the country to war.

New Yorker Philip Hone, a former Whig mayor of the city, expressed these fears in a May 14 entry in his diary: “The Southern States desire the annexation of Texas to strengthen their position geographically and politically by the prospective addition of four or five slaveholding states. . . . We of the North and East say we have already more territory than we know what to do with, and more slavery within our borders than we choose to be answerable for before God and man.”25

Despite such objections, the Democrats prevailed in the 1844 election. Nicknamed “Young Hickory,” Polk ran as the successor to Andrew Jackson, and his expansionist agenda was marketed as patriotic. The Tennessean was promoted as a tough, no-nonsense Democrat willing to take on foreign governments and expand America’s international influence. Clay, a slave owner against the expansion of slavery, was branded a Machiavellian hypocrite. The Whigs lost votes to both Polk and the antislavery Liberty Party’s candidate, James G. Birney.26

**The Specter of War after the Presidential Election of 1844**

After the 1844 election, many of the 51 percent of the electorate who voted against Polk (48.5 percent for Clay and 2.5 percent for James Birney) continued to oppose expansionist policies.27 Anti-annexation feeling was particularly strong in New York, where even Democrats were ambivalent on the subject. The newly elected Democratic governor of New York, Silas Wright, was a Van Buren man who had voted against the annexation of Texas as a senator in 1844.28

Phillip Hone likely reflected the sentiments of many New Yorkers when he wrote in his diary that he feared Polk’s supporters in Congress would “plunge this country into a disastrous war.” Hone was a wealthy banker, friend of Thomas Cole, and a founding member of the Apollo Association, which later became the American Art-Union. Hone likely visited the AA-U gallery in 1845, and as a politically astute art lover, he would have been predisposed to see political concepts embodied in Art-Union pictures.29

Indeed, Hone’s aesthetic sensibilities led him to use a landscape metaphor in his diary to describe his fear of upcoming expansionist wars. On January 1, 1846, he wrote: “The bright star of hope would shine on the future if the madness of the people did not interpose this pestiferous cloud of war to interrupt its rays.”30

Hone’s private responses to the threat of expansionist wars undoubtedly reflected those of other New York Whigs. The powerful Whig paper, *The New-York Daily Tribune*, edited by Horace Greeley, published numerous antirwar and anti-annexation articles throughout 1845. Some warned of both Mexican and Native American resistance to annexation. On February 12, 1845, for example, the *Tribune* reported, “Nearly or quite all this portion of Texas belongs to the Camanche [sic] and other warlike tribes of Indians, who not merely have a clear right to it, but are abundantly able to maintain it. Every male Camanche [sic] is an expert horseman and trained warrior.
Congressional Whigs also spoke of such dangers. Representative Charles Hudson of Massachusetts declared on January 20, 1845:

[W]hen we consider that this mighty Republic expended some 30 or 40 millions of dollars, wasted some four years, and sacrificed many valuable lives in an ineffectual attempt to subdue a few straggling savages in the swamps of Florida, I think a war with Mexico in that sickly region would prove something more than a pastime. Besides such a war might let loose upon our Southwestern frontier those injured tribes of Indians which our cupidity has driven from the graves of their fathers almost to the confines of Mexico itself. . . .

Missourians like Bingham would have been particularly sensitive to the idea that Indian aggression might attend wars with Mexico and Great Britain. Situated on the western frontier and bordered by Indian nations, Missouri was an important player in America’s relations with indigenous tribes. An 1837 map compiled by the War Department to advance legislation authorizing the occupation of Oregon shows Missouri’s role in early plans for defending the nation from both foreign and native aggressors. The map focuses on the border region, representing the territory of various Indian tribes as well U.S. military posts in many Missouri towns where Bingham had patrons, including the town of Liberty, where the U.S. established an arsenal.

Bingham also knew Santa Fe traders in Arrow Rock and Independence who regularly traveled through Indian lands and established economic and diplomatic relationships with native people. During the 1840s these traders were generally at peace with western Indians. Once the Mexican War commenced, however, several traders were killed in the Taos revolt of 1847 in which an alliance of New Mexicans and Pueblo Indians murdered American soldiers and merchants.

On May 21, 1845, Bingham’s local paper published an article that asked a foreboding question about the human and financial costs of Indian resistance that might accompany annexation: “The Florida war, with only a few miserable Seminoles, unfed, unclothed, without any friendly Power to aid them, held out some seven years, and cost us upwards of $40,000,000. Texas has been at war eight years with Mexico, and a good part of the time with the Camanche [sic] and other Indian tribes; do you suppose it has not cost her five or ten times as much money as the Seminoles have cost us?” Such reports circulated throughout the nation in 1844 and 1845, creating a climate of anxiety and apprehension in relation to expansion. The Concealed Enemy and Fur Traders

Charles Gratiot, Map Illustrating the plan of the defences of the Western & North-Western Frontier, as proposed by Charles Gratiot, in his report of Oct. 31, 1837, Senate doc 65, 25th Cong., 2nd Session. (Image: Courtesy of the Author)
Descending the Missouri were created, displayed, and distributed within this cultural context.

Bingham’s Anxious Indian

Visitors seeing Bingham’s *The Concealed Enemy* on the walls of the AA-U gallery were confronted with the profile of a bare-chested American Indian positioned behind rocks in the left foreground. The Indian’s bronze skin harmonizes with the tawny colors of the topography as he kneels in a tense and active pose. Looking forward into the open landscape with a furrowed brow, he clutches a rifle in both hands.

As in many Bingham paintings, the landscape competes with the figure for attention. The sky occupies roughly half the picture plane, presenting subtle gradations of color, from pale gray to rosy peach and dark purple. A mixture of cloud types suggests uncertain weather. A few patches of blue appear behind violet and purple strato-cumulous formations layered over flat sheets of light gray stratus clouds. Below this ambiguous firmament, weeds and shrubs cover the rocky foreground bluff where the Indian waits. Bushes and immature trees sprout from an earth-laden central boulder, their uppermost green and orange leaves translucent against the sky. In the background more tree-covered bluffs loom over the landscape, the space between them infused with atmospheric haze. In the lower-right distance, a tiny, indistinct strip of silvery gray may represent a river flowing through a far-away valley below.

Bingham’s Indian figure is generally identified as a remembered vision of a mid-Missouri Osage (Wa-zha-zhe-I-e). Because the Osage were officially removed from the state in the 1830s, scholars have traditionally (and I think wrongly) assumed that the picture should be read as a nostalgic representation of Missouri as it existed during Bingham’s boyhood.36 While this may or may not be the case, it is a mistake to overestimate how aware or interested a nineteenth-century audience would be in an artist’s personal history. *The Concealed Enemy* is unsigned, and even if it had a signature, virtually no New Yorkers knew Bingham’s name in 1845. Authorial intentions were thus almost completely alienated from the “meaning” of the painting within the context of the Art-Union exhibition. To use Roland Barthes’ analogy, the artist/author was “dead” to most AA-U visitors.

New York viewers had every reason to associate *The Concealed Enemy* with the present. Throughout the 1840s, contemporary literature and newspaper reports described the Osage as a powerful and important nation in Indian Territory and beyond.37 Conceivably, Bingham may have even based his image on sketches made during an encounter with the Osage in 1844. In April of that year, a delegation of Boonville, Missouri, Whigs traveled to the national Whig Convention held in Baltimore with a party of Osage Indians and a small herd of buffalo. Significantly, a Fayette, Missouri, newspaper report suggested that mid-Missourians were accustomed to such sights, stating, “The

... Indians were no curiosity here, but doubtless will be in the section where they are going” (emphasis original). By the end of the month, the troupe had arrived in Baltimore. A report in the Rutland Herald described the scene:

On Wednesday last a deputation of nine Osage Indian chiefs from Missouri and [a] half-breed Mexican, accompanied by Judge Dade and a number of western gentlemen, arrived in the cars from Cumberland. The Indians are said to be of the noblest specimens of their tribe, some of them being over six feet in height. Twelve buffaloes [sic] from Missouri were brought on by the party and will be driven into Baltimore in a few days for exhibition. It is designed by the proprietors to get up a “buffalo hunt” during the Convention times.39

Bingham (a former Boonville resident) was living in Washington, D.C., at this time. His close friend, James S. Rollins, was a Missouri delegate at the Baltimore convention. It is hard to imagine that the artist would not have traveled the short distance from Washington, D.C., to Baltimore to see Rollins and witness this great Whig meeting that led to the nomination of Henry Clay for president.40

While it is possible that Bingham made drawings of Indians at the Baltimore convention, he may have also based his figure on secondary sources. The bare-chested brave with his scalp-lock ornamented with feathers resembles figures of Osage Indians pictured in George Catlin’s popular Letters and Notes on the Manners,
Both Catlin’s illustrations and the use of Osage Indians as political “emblems” reflect popular interest in Native Americans in 1840s culture. Indeed, the rhetoric discussed in the previous section evinces nineteenth-century awareness of their role in the cultural politics of “east” and “west.” Such awareness likely informed period readings of The Concealed Enemy. The Indian occupies the geographic “west” side of the painting, warily watching something in the “east.” This cartographic analogy links the composition to period maps, which often represented the political frontiers and boundaries of the United States on the right, juxtaposed with “unorganized territory” on the left. In the 1830s and 40s, the U.S., Mexico, Great Britain, France, and Russia claimed portions of the North American continent, and maps recognized these claims. Yet many cartographers (such as the authors of the aforementioned War Department map of 1837 and the David H. Burr map of the United States published in 1839) labeled large swatches of the “unorganized” territory with the names of the Indian nations that inhabited the regions. These labels reflected Euro-American “double think” that simultaneously understood the land as both occupied and empty. In Bingham’s painting, one can interpret the Indian as the visual embodiment of this concept.

If one accepts this cartographic interpretation of space in The Concealed Enemy, the sunshine illuminating the figure from the right depicts morning rather than evening light. Past scholars have suggested that the scene takes place at sunset, thus metaphorically picturing the decline of Indian power. If, on the other hand, one interprets the picture as a morning scene, it may represent a metaphorical dawn, visualizing “a new element of discord and distraction” (to use Henry Clay’s words) introduced into the U.S. by the policies of James K. Polk.

On a figural level, Bingham’s painting manifests the contradictory cultural messages of the aforementioned maps of Indian Territory. Some white viewers might view the wild, untamed landscape as uninhabited, yet the Indian is explicitly present. Entrepreneurial viewers might see the trees and rocks as “timber” and “minerals” ripe for exploitation, yet the figure interrupts imperialistic fantasies of easy and morally justified conquest. The Indian’s body visually “melds” with the giant boulder behind him, and the background bluffs echo his form like stony sentinels anticipating invasion from the “east.” A serpentine root attached to a shadowy stump in the foreground hints at the ancient origins of the Indian’s attachment to the land, while the stump itself may prefigure his future removal. One can see further environmental metaphors in the dark clouds amidst clear skies overhead, perhaps foreshadowing of a Philip Hone-esque “pestiferous cloud of war” that threatens to change the shape of the American landscape.

H. Bucholzer, Matty Meeting the Texas Question, lithographed by James S. Baillie, 1844. (Image: Library of Congress)
The ambiguity of Bingham’s title, *The Concealed Enemy*, might also have inspired audiences to contemplate the concept of expansionist wars.\(^45\) Some viewers might connect the title with contemporary politics, the armed Indian reminding spectators that wars with Mexico and in Oregon could spark confrontations with other “hidden” enemies within the nation’s indigenous communities. Moreover, while viewers would probably initially see the Indian as the “enemy,” he is not identified as such. Nineteenth-century associativists might be prompted to meditate on the image, asking themselves, “Who is the ‘concealed enemy’? Is he the Indian, or the expansionist who intrudes upon native lands? From whom is this ‘enemy’ concealed? From the Native American? From the object of his gaze?—or from the viewer?” Such questions encourage reflection on the complexities of colonialism, Indian relations, and the subjectivity of the term “enemy.”

Additionally, Art-Union visitors might have associated *The Concealed Enemy* with images in the popular culture that linked Native American resistance with potential expansionist conflicts, such as H. Bucholzer’s 1844 anti-Polk cartoon *Matty Meeting the Texas Question*. This cartoon depicts unsuccessful Democratic candidate Martin Van Buren (who opposed annexation) recoiling as Democratic senators carry a frightening, dark-skinned woman identified as “Texas” toward him. Behind the figure, Polk and his running mate, George Dallas, agree that “Texas” may not be pretty, but she brings with her the salary of the President of the United States.\(^46\)

The decision to personify Texas as a dark-skinned, seminude woman inserts a racial element into the cartoon. The figure carries the manacles of slavery, yet her physiognomy is not African American. Instead, her face recalls contemporary images of Native Americans, such as the portrait of a Winnebago squaw in James Otto Lewis’s 1835–1836 *North American Aboriginal Port-Folio*.\(^47\)

In the nineteenth century, popular images such as Bucholzer’s cartoon recalled other artworks that fueled fear and prejudice against Indians. Works such as John Vanderlyn’s 1804 *Death of Jane Mccrae* depicted violent Indian attacks, and several commissions for the U.S. Capitol in Washington encouraged European viewers to see Indians as menacing enemies. Although it was not yet on view in 1845, the Democratic Congress of 1837 had commissioned Horatio Greenough to create *The Rescue* for the steps of the east façade of the Capitol. This sculpture, installed in 1850, depicted a heroic frontiersman overcoming a bellicose Indian warrior while a pioneer mother and child cower beside them.\(^48\) A similar message was articulated in Enrico Causici’s 1827 relief, *Conflict of Daniel Boone and the Indians*, which decorated the interior rotunda of the Capitol. Causici’s stylized bas relief pictures Boone fighting one Indian, while another lays dead at his feet. Bingham and many members of his audience were doubtless familiar with this sculpture, which was engraved as the frontispiece of Uncle Philip’s *The Adventures of Daniel Boone, the Kentucky Rifleman* in 1844.\(^49\)

Bingham’s painting participates in the Causici tradition, but with a twist. The native warrior in *The Concealed Enemy* is not engaged in an aggressive act. Instead, Bingham’s armed Indian is alone in a quiet moment of anticipation. The viewer is left to determine whether he is a vigilant defender of his homeland or an aggressive predator intent on killing whites. Nineteenth-century Indian-haters would be predisposed to view the figure as the latter but, as the rhetoric quoted earlier evinces, not all Euro-Americans viewed Native Americans as evil beings with no land rights. The tendency of modern scholars to see Bingham’s figure as unsympathetic may reflect both a propensity to view 1840s politics as monolithic and a lack of up-close familiarity with the picture. The relatively remote modern location of the painting in the Stark Museum in Orange, Texas, has doubtless led many academics to base their understanding of it on reproductions alone.

When viewed in person, *The Concealed Enemy* reveals itself to be a very complex image. Close inspection of the Indian’s expression and pose suggests that he is experiencing feelings of anxiety rather than sadistic aggression, encouraging spectators to “read” his face and body language sympathetically. Viewers are apt to assume an attitude akin to the “third person-limited” viewpoint in literature. In other words, the audience is aware of the

psychological state of only one character (the Indian) in the pictorial narrative and thus is encouraged to connect with that character. The emphasis on the Indian’s anxious visage subverts the tendency to objectify or dehumanize him and encourages identification.

Nineteenth-century viewers may have associated the worried expression of Bingham’s Indian with similar countenances depicted in published diplomatic portraits of Native Americans made by James Otto Lewis in the 1820s and 1830s. These images were created at councils in which the U.S. negotiated for the removal of Indians from their native lands in the Midwest. The portraits were published a few years later as a collection of hand-colored lithographs in the *North American Aboriginal Port-Folio*. Unlike Catlin’s generally stoic portraits, many of Lewis’ figures look directly at their audiences with furrowed brows and anxious, uncomfortable stares. Their expressive visages may reflect the tensions between the Indians and white Americans in diplomatic colonial contexts. AA-U viewers who were aware of such portraits as *Shing-gaa-ba-w’osin* or *Ash-e-taa-na-quot* (both Chippewa chiefs) might have connected their expressions with Bingham’s Indian figure, making *The Concealed Enemy* seem more “real” and poignant.

The anxious and determined stare of Bingham’s figure also calls to mind the intense gaze and furrowed brow of

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*John Vanderlyn, Death of Jane McCrea, 1804. (Image: Wadsworth Atheneum)*
the canonical Florentine Renaissance sculpture *David* by Michelangelo. Many Art-Union visitors would be familiar with this celebrated artwork of the Italian Renaissance reproduced in casts and/or engravings (a profile view of *David* appeared, for example, in an internationally distributed 1704 engraving by Domenico Rossi). Like *David*, Bingham’s Indian is a young warrior preparing to combat a formidable foe. Sophisticated viewers who made associativist iconographic connections between *David* and *The Concealed Enemy* might wonder if the Goliath-like United States underestimated the capabilities of the nation’s Davidesque Indians.51

An ancient Roman allusion in the pose of Bingham’s Indian might also have conveyed a similar message. The figure assumes a reverse variant of the pose of the third-century Hellenistic/Roman statue *The Dying Gaul*.52

In Bingham’s picture, the thighs are elevated into a kneeling pose, and the head is erect, but the Indian exhibits an analogous contrapposto relationship of the limbs and a similar torsion of his body. In 1845, historically minded Whigs may have linked Democratic policies to ancient Roman imperialism, just as Angela Miller suggests they did in 1836. Most Americans believed the United States government would ultimately subjugate Native Americans, but in 1845, Indians were still resisting that fate. Just as native European peoples rebelled against Roman domination, American Indians fought back against their oppressors. Associativist-minded viewers who saw a classical allusion to Roman imperialism in *The Concealed Enemy* might have been encouraged to see the Indian as a foe who rivaled the Gauls in his pathos and tenacity.

### Bingham’s Fur Traders and the Oregon Question: River Networks at Risk

Like *The Concealed Enemy*, Bingham’s *Fur Traders Descending the Missouri* can be connected with Polk’s expansionist policies and the uncertainty that surrounded them in 1845. The picture represents a French fur trader and his half-Indian son transporting western goods to the eastern market in a dug-out canoe. The boat creates a strong horizontal element in the painting, which implies narrative action. Three vertical figures punctuate and balance the composition: a pointy-eared beast, a half-Indian youth, and an elderly man. Western viewers tend to...
read paintings from left to right, but such a reading goes against the downstream “flow” of the current in Bingham’s painting. This is one of many contradictory elements in the painting that adds to its ambiguity. The water seems placid, yet snags reflect danger. The boy smiles while the old man scowls.

The landscape is also ambiguous. A light-infused haze hangs over the scene, blurring the contours that distinguish one form from the next. Bingham articulates the transient qualities of crepuscular, light-infused humid air with oil glazes of pink and peach that overlay complementary tones of olive and gray (these tonal subtleties are impossible to capture in photomechanical reproductions). It is sometimes difficult to identify the colors and shapes in Bingham’s mist-covered environment. Reflections of land, bodies, and sky on the surface of the river confuse distinctions between earth, water, living beings, and air.

The most famously ambiguous element in the picture is the enigmatic animal that casts its shadowy reflection in the water (more about this later). Like the haze, the creature and its reflection act as symbols of the illusory nature of perception and reality. The viewer is not quite sure what she is seeing.

The contemporary political implications of *Fur Traders*
Descending the Missouri have often been overlooked because scholars have habitually accepted the traditional assertion that the picture represents a scene from the 1810s or 1820s. This idea depends on the decades-old scholarship of Bingham expert E. Maurice Bloch, who argued that the painting represented a nostalgic vision of Missouri’s past based on literary accounts and/or memories from the artist’s boyhood. However, primary source material from the 1840s calls this assumption into question. In addition, as already mentioned, AA-U visitors were completely unaware of Bingham’s personal history, and there is no reason to think that New Yorkers would have connected Fur Traders with the artist’s childhood.

The fur trade was in slow decline in the 1840s. However, to imagine that 1845 New Yorkers would already see Bingham’s painting as nostalgic reflects a lack of awareness of the media and consumer culture of the period. The clothing and character of Bingham’s figures are consistent with imagery circulating in the culture that represented the West of the 1840s, and some New York viewers would have seen similar figures in artworks by western “explorer” artists such as Alfred Jacob Miller, Charles Deas, and John Mix Stanley. The striped red and blue “trade shirts” worn by Bingham’s figures, for example, resemble shirts in John Mix Stanley’s 1843 painting, International Indian Council (Held at Tallequah, Indian Territory, in 1843), and similar shirts also appear in the paintings of Charles Deas.

Indeed, Charles Collins has suggested that an inspiration for the Fur Traders may have been Deas’ very similar painting, The Voyageurs (Boston Museum of Fine Art), which is unquestionably derived from studies made during Deas’ travels in the 1840s. While the mood of Deas’ pictures differs from that of the Fur Traders, Collins convincingly calls attention to similarities between the subject matter, form, and general composition in the two paintings (even the interest in the illusionary reflections of the figures in the water is analogous). Although Collins’ work is often cited in the literature, few Bingham scholars have taken the logical step of recognizing that viewers
who saw Deas’ pictures as contemporary were likely to view Bingham’s image in the same way.57

In the spring of 1845, Deas and Bingham had studios within walking distance from each other on Chestnut Street in St. Louis. In 1846, both would display paintings at George Wooll’s framing shop. The mid-Missouri artist was doubtless aware of the positive reception Deas’ western pictures were receiving in the press. The latter artist had impressed numerous New York journalists with Long Jakes, a dramatic painting of a western mountain man displayed at the Art-Union in 1844. This awareness, together with visits to Deas’ studio, may have inspired a competitive impulse in Bingham that prompted him to create and submit his own western painting to the American Art-Union in 1845.58

New Yorkers who viewed Bingham’s submission had access to numerous journalistic accounts that discussed the vibrancy of the American fur trade in the 1840s. A widely republished report from the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, for example, listed the fur trade as one of the city’s most lucrative enterprises in 1841, estimating its overall yearly value at around a half a million dollars. Likewise, a St. Louis directory of 1845 declared that the trade guaranteed the city “dimensions of prosperity and ultimate wealth,” listing six major businesses connected to it.59

French voyageurs and “half-breeds” were likewise still found in St. Louis during this period. The young English writer George Frederick Ruxton described seeing such “western types” in a city tavern in 1846: “Here over fiery ‘monaghahela’ Jean-Batiste, the sallow half-breed voyageur from the ‘North West’ (the Hudson’s Bay Company)—has come down the Mississippi from
the Falls to try the sweets and liberty of free trapping—
hobnobs with a stalwart leather-clad ‘boy,’ just returned
from trapping the waters of Grand River, on the western
side mountains, who interlards his mountain jargon with
Spanish words picked up in Taos and California.” 60
Ruxton observed an intermingling of cultures in these
characters that exemplified the evolving fur trade of the
mid-1840s.

Significantly, Bingham identified his figures as “traders,”
not trappers, reflecting changes in the industry during
a period when buffalo skins were replacing pelts as the
trade’s primary commodity and enterprising individuals
were trading not only at forts in the Northwest, but also
in the Southwest. Many traders relied primarily on Native
American hunters and their Indian families to obtain
pelts and hides. French voyageurs and their mixed-blood descendants were particularly adept at
negotiating between the worlds of the British Hudson’s
Bay Company, Indian nations, and U.S. fur companies.61
Some recent art historians have suggested that the Art-
Union’s decision to change the title of Bingham’s French
Trader and Half-breed Son to Fur Traders Descending the
Missouri disconnected the image from racial and ethnic
politics.62 Yet AA-U viewers would likely have been far
more sensitive than today’s audiences to the ethnic and
racial messages communicated by the nineteenth-century
language of clothing and physical attributes. Spectators
didn’t need a title to recognize the young trader’s black
hair, dark complexion, fringed leather leggings, Métis
sash, and beaded bag as attributes of a “half-breed.”
Likewise, the elder man’s tuque or knit hat associated him
with French voyageurs and habitants.63 In other words,
the new title could not remove these signs of ethnic diversity,
but it could focus attention on the economic importance of
the fur trade and the Missouri River.

Many members of Bingham’s AA-U audience had
direct experience with products associated with the fur
trade. As art historians Claire Perry and Angela Miller
have observed, New York viewers were likely to connect
Fur Traders Descending the Missouri with contemporary
consumer culture.64 Some Art-Union visitors wore beaver-
skin hats or owned muffs, collars, blankets, and coats
made from the hides and pelts of American fur-bearing
mammals. Fur Traders thus served as a reminder of the
complex mélange of cultural forces that produced the raw
materials in lucrative national and international economic
relationships.

President Polk’s expansionist politics affected these
relationships. Twenty-first-century viewers may not
initially connect the interests of the upper Missouri fur
trade with the disputed Oregon and Texas territories, but
nineteenth-century spectators would have been aware of

Reversed-mirror image of Dying Gaul (Dying Gladiator), first century BCE Roman marble copy of late third-century BCE
Hellenistic bronze original. (Image: Capitoline Museums, Rome; original photo: Jean-Pol Grandmont)
the intricate web of commercial networks that existed between native, European, Mexican, and U.S. traders throughout the northwest and Missouri River corridor.

Control of the fur trade was a factor in America’s desire to possess new territories. As already mentioned, in December 1845, many Americans believed a military confrontation with Great Britain over the Oregon Territory was a real possibility. The issue would eventually be resolved diplomatically, but as the year drew to a close, war seemed likely. On December 2, Polk surprised many Americans by indicating a willingness to compromise on the Oregon boundary line, but the president also reiterated his commitment to defend U.S. claims in the region militarily. In addition, Polk reasserted the imperialistic and economic aspects of his Oregon policies by calling attention to the Northwestern fur trade and the need for the U.S. to regulate and control commercial relations with Native Americans in the region.65

On December 9, an editorial in the New-York Daily Tribune reflected Whig apprehensions about the implications of Polk’s policies: “This Oregon question is complicated and its settlement dangerously protracted to subserve the purposes of gambling demagogues, who would sacrifice a hundred thousand lives to secure themselves three moves forward on the political chess board. . . . There is nothing to go to war about but pride, obstinacy, party intrigue, and criminal ambition.”66

On December 20, the Tribune reported rumors that Democrats in the Senate were working toward appropriating large sums to “meet the expenses of the war with Oregon.”67 It is not unreasonable to suppose that Whig-leaning visitors to the Art-Union might associate Fur Traders with the important social, political, and economic developments taking place in the northwest during the exhibition.

In 1983, art historian Henry Adams linked Fur

Charles Deas, The Voyageurs. (Image: American Museum of Western Art–The Anschutz Collection, Denver; photo Courtesy of the Author)
pictures. Since similar to that proposed by Adams for Bingham’s connected to each other by an oppositional relationship. Intemperance and Temperance paintings, including James G. Clonney’s Temperance the AA-U’s 1845 lottery. Eight lots consisted of paired sixteen pictures one another, a factor that would frustrate attempts to read viewers might have made such informal connections, artworks. I contend, however, that although some AA-U encouragers audiences to see relationships between the analogous poses of the Indian and “half-breed” representation of America’s native past and Fur Traders as a depiction of the civilizing force of European-Americans in the West. Adams related this idea to a political banner for Boone County Whigs that Bingham proposed in 1844. This banner visualized Boone County’s past with an image of Daniel Boone fighting an Indian on one side (probably envisioned as an eponymous reference to the county’s name based on the Causici relief), and a domesticated landscape with cattle on the reverse. It is worth noting that, contrary to the assertions of Adams and others, Bingham never executed this banner. Perhaps the artist decided that the simplistic dualism he initially proposed did not accord with his more nuanced understanding of colonialism in the American West.

Adams’s pendant theory is widely accepted as a “key” to understanding Fur Traders and The Concealed Enemy. Indeed the similarity between the sizes of the pictures and the analogous poses of the Indian and “half-breed” encourages audiences to see relationships between the artworks. I contend, however, that although some AA-U viewers might have made such informal connections, the Art-Union did not encourage them to do so. The nonsequential lot numbers of the two paintings (93 and 95) indicate that they probably were not hung next to one another, a factor that would frustrate attempts to read them as a pair. Moreover, the canvases were not among sixteen pictures identified as pairs in the 1845 exhibition. Some 123 paintings were distributed in 115 lots during the AA-U’s 1845 lottery. Eight lots consisted of paired paintings, including James G. Clonney’s Temperance and Intemperance (lot no. 13), which presented images connected to each other by an oppositional relationship similar to that proposed by Adams for Bingham’s pictures. Since The Concealed Enemy and Fur Traders were not paired when distributed, the supposition that most New York viewers would have understood them as pendants is questionable.

Nevertheless, Adams made an important contribution to Bingham scholarship by recognizing the sociopolitical content of the paintings. My study has its roots in this scholarship, although I posit that the contextual relationship between the two pictures comes from their similarly anxious mood rather than from oppositional content. Significantly, the two paintings employ different narrative modes to communicate. While the Indian in The Concealed Enemy seems unaware of an audience, the fur traders make visual contact with the spectator. The Frenchman, the Métis boy, and the animal look directly at the viewer, their gazes breaking the picture plane to interrupt the pictorial unity of time, space, and action. Social convention dictates that such gazes should elicit a response from the viewer, so this illusion of forced interaction encourages spectator engagement in the “now.”

If The Concealed Enemy presents a third-person-limited viewpoint to the spectator, the characters in Fur Traders might be said to address the audience in the second person. In other words, the outward gazes of each of the three figures imply that the viewer is a character in the narrative. Spectators are invited to acknowledge the fictive figures’ presence.

In 1846, a writer for the American Review explicitly complained about this disconcerting narrative mode in Art-Union pictures. His diatribe, “Hints for Art-Union Critics,” does not mention Bingham specifically, but it nevertheless reflects the potentially radical nature of the “second-person” viewpoint, which the author felt fictively interacted with viewers in inappropriate ways:

The Flemish artist [as opposed to the American painter] remembers that it is not a pleasure to be irreverently blinked at by three impudent fellows, or that if there is any satisfaction to be felt in such an accident, it is of a kind which even a coxcomb would take care to conceal. . . . The Flemish artist would make a scene of his picture as a good actor makes a scene of the play, disconnecting it from the spectator who should seem to look at it from without as one looks out upon a prospect; affected by it, but not affecting it. For the instant we begin to influence a scene by our presence and perceive this effect or seem to perceive it, the scenical pleasure which it is the business of true art to produce is replaced by one of a very different kind.

While the writer for the American Review found the narrative modes of certain Art-Union paintings disconcerting, his criticism reflects their power. By directly engaging the audience, pictures such as Fur Traders Descending the Missouri became more relevant, and the likelihood that viewers might associate their content with the contemporary world increased.

The Fur Traders presents mixed messages through its varied confrontational gazes. The “half-breed son” occupies the center of the composition, his smile and affable expression seemingly “greeting” viewers and establishing a friendly rapport with them. The stare of the scowling French trader, on the other hand, creates a
less comfortable dynamic. He addresses viewers with a
defensive, almost confrontational gaze. In December of
1845, his expression of anxious apprehension might have
been linked to anticipation of radical social, economic, and
political change that Polk’s policies threatened to bring to
the West.

Like the French trader and his mixed-race son, the black
creature at the end of the boat looks directly at the viewer.
The animal has been variously identified as a cat, a bear, a
dog, and a black fox. Past and present doubt over its nature
suggests a correlation between its ambiguous form and
nineteenth-century confusion over the nature and future
of the West. For some, the tension created by this mystery
may have added to the image’s poignancy and power.

If one accepts the consensus that the creature is a
black bear cub, it becomes a commodity, captured to be
consumed for its body, hide, and/or meat. Mercantile
forces have overpowered it, and it becomes a synecdoche
for the exploitation of Native American assets (human,
animal, and environmental), displaced, trapped, and
consumed by the forces of economic and political
imperialism.

The creature’s presence, however, may also reflect the
volatility of forces that might “fight back” against such
imperialistic exploitation. This creature could wreak havoc
on its captors if it matures. Its dark tethered form might
encourage viewers to connect it with dark-skinned peoples
enslaved and dominated by mercantile forces. While
such associations with enslaved African Americans were
certainly possible, and even likely, viewers recognizing the
creature as a native American black bear might be more
apt to connect it with the continent’s native people.

A heretofore-unnoticed visual source for Bingham’s
creature brings with it interesting sociopolitical
connotations in relation to Native American resistance
and the geopolitical situation of 1845. A Sioux chief in
George Catlin’s Bear Dance (published as a print in 1841
and 1844) wears an ursine mask with a catlike profile
that bears an uncanny resemblance to Bingham’s beast.
(Figs. 21, 22, and 23) Like the animal in Fur Traders, the
masked Indian looks directly at the spectator. The two
figures share a silhouette, and both present a mysterious,
discomforting, and slightly ominous presence.

A viewer familiar with Catlin’s Bear Dance may have
made conscious or unconscious connections between
Bingham’s creature and the mysterious costumed chief.
This relationship might encourage audiences to view
the enigmatic animal as a visual metaphor for Indian
resistance. Momentarily tethered, the creature embodies
a fragile equilibrium between native and colonial forces.
This exotic being reminds viewers that the western
wilderness should be handled with caution and care.

In conclusion, The Concealed Enemy and Fur Traders
Descending the Missouri have meant many things to
many audiences. This paper provides new insight into
both Bingham and his earliest audiences by considering
the transient political and social circumstances of the
only major public exhibition of the artworks in the
nineteenth century. I have argued that neither Bingham
nor his viewers likely viewed The Concealed Enemy or
Fur Traders as objective reportage of celebrations of
Manifest Destiny in 1845. Instead, they likely saw them as
emblematic representations of the evolving multicultural
constituencies of the West poised in quiet moments
of apprehension. The Indian embodies the nation’s
aboriginal inhabitants ready to defend their native lands;
the Frenchman personifies early colonial forces whose
legitimacy was jeopardized by Polkian expansion. The
mixed-race boy manifests the intermingling of bodies and
cultures within the mollified but dangerous region; and
the tethered beast embodies the potential for violence and
resistance that attended Polk’s quest to control the natural
and human resources of the North American West.
ENDNOTES

1 George Caleb Bingham had submitted both The Concealed Enemy (now in the Stark Museum, Orange, Texas) and Fur Traders Descending the Missouri (Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York) to the American Art-Union in New York by June of 1845. The Art-Union purchased the first for $40 and the second for $75 on December 8, 1845. The AA-U also bought two other Bingham’s pictures that year, Cottage Scenery (National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.) and Landscape (probably Rural Scenery; now in a private collection). It is unclear when the AA-U gallery put the paintings on display. The lottery numbers, 93 and 95 (out of 115), may indicate that Bingham’s pictures were late additions to the 1845 exhibition, perhaps only going on display after their purchase in December. See American Art-Union, Transactions of the American Art-Union 1845 (1846): 26–29, and “Minutes,” Art-Union meeting, December 8, 1845, American Art-Union Papers, coll. New-York Historical Society, cited in E. Maurice Bloch, The Paintings of George Caleb Bingham: A Catalogue Raisonné (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1987), 172 (hereafter cited as Bloch, Paintings). The American Art-Union, founded in 1839, advocated the creation of a “national” art for the United States and each year guaranteed its membership (more than 3,000 in 1845 and more than 18,000 in 1849) an engraving representing a picture purchased by the Art-Union during that year. The five-dollar yearly dues also allowed members to participate in an annual lottery to win one of the many artworks purchased by the organization every year. The works available in each year’s lottery were displayed at the AA-U’s free New York gallery, a fashionable destination for tourists and city dwellers. By 1849 the organization reported an annual attendance of 750,000 visitors. See Rachel N. Klein, “Art and Authority in Antebellum New York City: The Rise and Fall of the American Art-Union,” Journal of American History 81 (March 1995): 1534–62; Amanda Lett, Patricia Hills, Peter John Brownlee, Randy Ramer, and Duane H. King, Perfectly American: The Art-Union & Its Artists, exh. cat. (Tulsa: Gilcrease Museum, 2011); John Francis McDermott, “George Caleb Bingham and the American Art-Union,” New-York Historical Society Quarterly 42 (January 1958): 60–69; and Transactions of the American Art-Union 1845 (1846): 10; Transactions of the American Art-Union 1849 (1850): 166.


3 Fur Traders was awarded to Robert S. Bunker of Mobile, Alabama, and remained in his family until it was sold to a New York dealer in 1933 (who in turn sold it to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in that year). The Concealed Enemy was distributed to James A. Hutchinson of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and remained in private hands until 1946, when it was given to the Peabody Museum of Harvard University, which sold it through a dealer to the Stark Museum in Orange, Texas, in 1985. See Transactions of the American Art-Union 1845 (1846): 29; Bloch, Paintings, 172–73; and Harry B. Wehle, “An American Frontier Scene by George Caleb Bingham,” Bulletin of the Metropolitan Museum of Art 28 (July 1933): 120–22.


For history and bibliography related to the philosophical, social, and political development of American exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny, see Thomas R. Hietala, Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism and Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). As Hietala explains, the philosophy of American exceptionalism originated in the eighteenth century, and leaders of all political persuasions generally accepted some aspect of it. The rapacious nature of expansion justified as Manifest Destiny under Polk, however, was more extreme and controversial than earlier expression of the doctrines. For a study of reflections of this philosophy in art, see Matthew Baigell, “Territory, Race, Religion: Images of Manifest Destiny,” Smithsonian Studies in American Art 4, nos. 3-4 (Summer-Autumn, 1990): 3–21.


D.D.B., “Our Relations with Texas,” The American Review: A Whig Journal (July 1846): 14–15. Matthew Baigell cites a portion of this article out of context to support his assertion that virtually all Americans shared a “manifest destiny” attitude. In his notes, however, the author acknowledges the sarcasm of The American Review writer, but he neglects to recognize the sarcasm as a rejection of Polkian concepts of Manifest Destiny. See Baigell, “Territory, Race, Religion,” 8.

Cassius, “The Missouri Legislature,” Glasgow Weekly Times, February 8, 1849, cols. 3 and 4. Reportedly, Bingham offered a defense of “the great Whig Senator from Ohio,” almost certainly Whig senator Thomas Corwin, who was known for his anti-Mexican War positions. For the bill and debate, see the Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Missouri, Fifteenth General Assembly, First Session, 1848–1849 (Jefferson City: James Lusk, State Printer, 1849): 72–74. The House journal records Bingham’s opposition to the amendment, but it does not reproduce the comments mentioned in the Glasgow paper.


For the 1844 election results, see U.S Election Atlas, “1844 Presidential Election Results,” uselectionatlas.org/USPRESIDENT/GENERAL/pe1844.html. A few days after the election, the nationally circulated Whig...
newspaper, New-York Daily Tribune, declared, “Call it what specious names we may, the lust for Power, the lust for Dominion, the lust of Avarice, the lust of holding our fellow men in bondage are the real incitements for all this zeal for annexation.” For the quote, see “Annexation and its Consequences,” New-York Daily Tribune, 3 March, 1845, p. 2, col. 1.

The American Art-Union displayed and distributed 123 paintings in 1845 (eight of the 115 lots consisted of paired paintings). Of these, only three paintings, Fur Traders Descending the Missouri, The Concealed Enemy (nos. 93 and 95), and Charles Deas, The Indian Guide, One of the Shawnee Tribe (no. 19), can be confidently identified as subjects connected with American territory west of the Mississippi. Deas, like Bingham, was from Missouri, and the Art-Union was clearly proud of its trans-Mississippi artists and artworks. On December 19, 1845, AA-U President William Cullen Bryant announced in an address before the organization, “We have painters beyond the Mississippi; some of their works which any of us might be glad to possess, will be distributed this evening.” For Bryant’s remarks, see “Proceedings at the Annual Meeting,” Transactions of the American Art-Union 1845 (New York: American Art-Union, 1846), 4. For the list of paintings displayed and distributed, see pp. 26–29.


For discussion and bibliography related to Martin Van Buren and the Panic of 1837, see Alasdair Roberts, America’s First Great Depression: Economic Crisis and Political Disorder after the Panic of 1837 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). Bingham documented his own reaction to the panic in an 1837 letter blaming Democratic monetary policy for the collapse: “All this is attributed to the interference of the government with the established currency of the country, and to the Treasury circular.” Bingham to James Rollins from Naches, Mississippi, May 6, 1837, in George Caleb Bingham, But I Forget that I am a Painter and Not a Politician: The Letters of George Caleb Bingham, edited by Lynn Gentzler, introduction by Joan Stack (Columbia: The State Historical Society of Missouri Press and Friends of Arrow Rock, Inc., 2011), 43 (hereafter cited as Bingham, Letters).


William Henry Harrison’s “Log Cabin Campaign” has been called the first modern campaign. Imagery, slogans, and merchandise “packaged” the candidate and effectively marketed his political message. Harrison, an aristocratic and sophisticated man, was marketed as a “man of the people” who drank cider, plowed his own land, and lived in a log cabin. See Robert G. Gunderson, The Log Cabin Campaign (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1957) and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, The Packaging of the Presidency: A History and Criticism of Presidential Campaigns (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 8–12.

The details of Bingham’s four-sided procession banner supporting Harrison’s candidacy are documented in several newspaper accounts. Two pairs of men carried the banner at a campaign rally of more than 2,000 Whigs in Rocheport, Missouri, in June 1840. The banner’s imagery encouraged viewers to associate landscape and genre scenes with political concepts. One panel showed Harrison standing before archetypal landscapes that celebrated American agriculture and nautical commerce. Another upheld Harrison as a “man of the people,” depicting the rustic log cabin that had become the ubiquitous “logo” of the Whig nominee’s campaign. Yet another panel promoted the candidate as a champion of “the West,” presenting a view of a canoe on a western river inscribed with the words “Our Country.” Rash, Painting and Politics, 15–17; “Rocheport Convention,” St. Louis Daily Commercial Bulletin, June 22, 1840, p. 2, col. 1; “The Festival at Rocheport,” Fayette Boon’s Lick Times, July 4, 1840, p. 2, col. 4. While Rash suggests that the canoe in the “Our Country” banner might relate to that in Fur Traders, in the context of the Harrison campaign, the banner’s canoe was more likely a reference to Harrison’s famed “Battle of Tippecanoe.”
Canoes appear as a symbol of Harrison (known as Ol’ Tippecanoe) in campaign ephemera of the era; see for example the canoe in the background of John Taylor French’s 1840 campaign lithograph, *This log cabin was the first building erected on the North Bend . . .* See LOC, PPOC, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2008661360/.

23 For Whig politics during this era, see Oscar D. Lambert, *Presidential Politics in the United States, 1841–1844* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1936). For a recent biography of Tyler, which includes an updated bibliography and a critical review of the literature, see Edward P. Crapol, *John Tyler, the Accidental President* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

24 Bingham painted three two-sided banners for the Missouri Whig Convention held in Boonville on October 10, 1844: the *Boonville Juvenile Clay Club Banner*, the *Howard County Banner*, and the *Cooper County Ashland Club Banner*. For descriptions, see “The Convention,” *Boonville Observer*, October 15, 1844, p. 2, cols. 2 and 3. One panel of the two-sided *Juvenile Clay Club Banner, The Mill Boy*, survives in a private collection. Bloch, *Paintings*, 59, 166, and Rash, *Painting and Politics*, 24–26. Bloch reports that Curtis Rollins stated in a personal interview that the Howard County and Cooper County banners were displayed in the Alsop store in New Franklin, Missouri, where they burned in a fire sometime around 1920. Bloch, *Paintings*, 166–67. The *Boonville Juvenile Clay Club Banner or The Mill Boy* reflects the Whigs’ attempt to repeat the successful tactics of the 1840 Harrison campaign and appeal to the middle class by showing the young Henry Clay as a humble “mill boy.” Clay’s biographers claimed that the young Clay became known as “the mill boy of the slashes” because as a boy he regularly brought grain to the mill for his widowed mother in Virginia. Re-enactments of these boyhood activities were a regular part of Whig rallies in 1844. See Calvin Colton, *The Works of Henry Clay* (New York: A.S. Barnes & Burr, 1857), 19.

25 Philip Hone, *The Diary of Philip Hone* (Carlisle, Massachusetts: Applewood Books, 1989), vol. 2, entry for May 14, 1844, p. 222. The manuscript of Hone’s diary is held by the New-York Historical Society and was first published as *The Diary of Philip Hone, 1828 to 1851*, edited and with an introduction by Bayard Tuckerman, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd Mead and Co., 1889). Hone repeatedly served on the Committee of Management for the American Art-Union, and at his death he was eulogized in the organization’s 1851 bulletin with the following words, “[T]he American Art-Union has lost one of its best and most devoted friends, and the Committee of Management a valued and distinguished member in the death of Mr. Hone.” See “Philip Hone, Esq.,” *Bulletin of the American Art-Union* (June 1, 1851): 51. For Hone and his social importance, see Edward Pessen, “Philip Hone’s Set: The Social World of the New York City Elite in the Age of Egalitarianism,” *New-York Historical Society Quarterly* 56 (1972), 285–300. Hone’s association of the annexation of Texas with “the addition of four or five slave-holding states” may reflect early proposals to divide the annexed republic into several states. For a contemporary published discussion of this fear, see Waddy Thompson, Jr., “On Annexation,” *Niles Weekly Register* 66, no. 1711, (July 13, 1844): 319.


27 The nation’s leading Whig paper, *The New-York Daily Tribune*, encouraged Clay supporters to continue their support of Whig principles. In a November editorial titled “Honor the True,” the paper encouraged Clay supporters not to accept Polk’s victory as reflective of the true will of the people: “Mr. Clay is defeated—not the Principles of Mr. Clay, nor even the man fairly.” For the quote, see “Honor the True,” *New-York Daily Tribune* (November 9, 1846), p. 2, col. 2.

28 New York governor Silas Wright had been a supporter of former Democratic president Martin Van Buren, who lost his bid for the Democratic nomination in part because of his opposition to the annexation of Texas. For Silas Wright, see Ransom Hooker Gillet, *The Life and Times of Silas Wright*, vol. 2 (Albany, N.Y.: Argus Co., 1874), 1860–63. Gillet publishes an extract transcription of a Silas Wright speech on annexation made during his 1844 campaign for governor. The Fayette Boonsticke Times reported on New York Democrats’ ambivalence on the Texas question in the January 25, 1845, article, “Polk’s Election: What Did It Decide?” The paper asked, “But, what say the democracy [Democrats] of New York, and the north and east generally? They tell us that in voting for Polk, they did not consider they were voting for the annexation of Texas now, or ever! In New York, they say if they had not brought out and run an anti-annexation candidate for Governor, Polk would have lost the State, and, consequently, his election . . .” See Fayette Boon’s Lick Times, January 25, 1845, p. 2, col. 6.

29 Philip Hone served on the Committee of Management at the first meeting of the Apollo Association for the Promotion of Fine Arts in December 1839. See *Transactions of the Apollo Association for the Promotion of the Fine Arts in the United States* (1939), 2. Hone’s membership in the organization lapsed between 1840 and 1847, but one can assume he continued to frequent the Art-Union’s free gallery throughout this period. Unfortunately, he did not record such visits in his diary. Hone was named to the Committee of Management for the Art-Union in 1848, serving as chair of the committee in 1849 and as a member until his death in 1851. See *Transactions of the American Art-Union* (1848), 2;


See Washington Hood, Charles Gratiot, and John James Abert, Map Illustrating the plan of the defences of the Western & North Western Frontier, as proposed by Charles Gratiot, in his report of Oct.31, 1837 (Bowen and Co., 1837). The map was created in association with a bill to authorize President Martin Van Buren to occupy the Oregon Territory (in the upper right it is identified as 2nd session, 25th Congress, S. No. 1. Document 65). The map shows the territory occupied by Native Americans, as well as existing and proposed military forts and arsenals. A table shows distances and days’ marches between forts. For this map, see “A Collection of Digitized Kansas Maps, Wichita State University Libraries, Department of Special Collections,” call no. 1837-0002, specialcollections.wichita.edu/collections/maps/detailsframes.asp?userinput=&radiobutton=and&submitform=Submit&searchdes=&offset=18&var=1837-0002.

Bingham mentions the Taos revolt in a letter to James Rollins dated March 10, 1847: “Miller, an acquaintance of mine has just returned from Santeffe [Santa Fé], and brings news that the Mexicans are rising and sending to the devil our governmental functionaries there. They have killed Bent, Turley, and all the American traders at Tous [Taos]—and he apprehends that Donophan if he is not very careful will be surprised and cut to pieces. We can but hope for the best.” See Bingham, Letters, 65. Bingham may have had a special interest in Texas after his brother, Matthias Amend Bingham, emigrated there in 1835. Matthias served in the revolutionary army with Sam Houston and was living in the Republic of Texas in 1845. For Matthias Amend Bingham, see James Rollins Bingham, “The Bingham Family,” ca. 1905, published as “Appendix A” in Bloch, Evolution, 311.

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For the widely held opinion that Bingham’s Osage represents a remembered vision from Bingham’s home region of Arrow Rock, see, for example, Henry Adams, “Bingham and his Sources,” 515; Nancy Rash, Painting and Politics, 47; and Navigating the West, exh. cat., 52, 142–43.

In his seminal essay “The Death of the Author,” translated by Stephen Heath, in Image / Music / Text. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 142–47, Roland Barthes argues that modern scholars and critics habitually overemphasize authorial intentions as “keys,” to unlocking the inherent meaning of texts. Using semiotic methods, Barthes argues that audiences recreate texts as they read or experience them. For 1840s accounts describing the Osage consistent with Bingham’s image, see, for example, Victor Tixier’s Voyage aux prairies osages, Louisiane et Missouri, 1839–40, par Victor Tixier (Clermont-Ferrand: Perol, 1844), translated in John Francis McDermott, Tixier’s Travels on the Osage Prairies (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1940). For contemporary newspaper references to the Osage, see, for example, an account of an 1843 encounter between John C. Fremont’s expedition and a party of Osage “with gay red blankets and heads shaved to the scalp lock,” described in the article “Fremont’s Expedition,” Washington, D.C., Daily Union, August 29, 1845, p. 2, col. 3.

“Indian Dance,” Fayette Boonslick Times, April 27, 1844, p. 2, col. 5: “Messrs. J. and B. Garnett, of Boonville, passed through this place with a number of Buffaloes, twelve Warriors and two Squaws of the Osage Tribe which they design exhibiting through the Western and Southern States throughout the summer and winter.”

“Buffaloes and Indians,” Rutland Herald, May 2, 1844, p. 3, col. 3. The expedition of “Missouri” buffalo and Osage Indians had been covered earlier in the national press. On March 23, 1844, Washington, D.C.,’s The Whig Standard published an extract from a letter from Boonville (first published in the Baltimore Patriot) describing plans for the upcoming exhibit. The writer announced that Judge John Dade would “leave here for Baltimore in some short time with some ten or a dozen fine fat buffalos, attended by some Osage Indians, wending their way to the convention.” See “Prospects in Missouri—The Buffaloes Are Coming!” p. 2, col. 4.

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For James Rollins’s role as a delegate at the 1844 Whig Convention in Baltimore, see C.R. Barns, Alban Jaspur Conant, William F. Switzer, G.C. Swallow, R.A. Campbell, and William Torrey Harris, The Commonwealth of Missouri: A Centennial Record (St. Louis: Bryan, Brand & Co, 1877), 829. For Bingham’s residence in Washington, D.C., during this period, see the unpublished letter of Bingham’s wife dated...
The Magazine Landscape Painting and the Civil War,” Eleanor Jones Harvey to violent social upheaval and political change; see Consumers of nineteenth-century art and literature were Dorothy Mahon, “Technical Brilliance Revealed,” 142– the same volume, Elizabeth Mankin Kornhauser and London: Yale University Press, 2014), 108–9, and in exh. cat. (New Haven and the River Paintings,” in Navigating the West: George Caleb Bingham & the River, exh. cat. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014), 108–9, and in the same volume, Elizabeth Mann Kent Kohnhauser and Dorothy Mahon, “Technical Brilliance Revealed,” 142–43.

Consumers of nineteenth-century art and literature were frequently confronted with allegorical storms linked to violent social upheaval and political change; see Eleanor Jones Harvey, “The Coming Storm: American Landscape Painting and the Civil War,” The Magazine Antiques 179, no. 6 (November-December 2012): 80–89. Bingham himself used a storm as a rhetorical metaphor for war in a speech before the Missouri legislature in 1847, describing the War of 1812 as a “storm which beat with such relentless fury upon our land.” The artist returned to the metaphor in a letter written to James Rollins in 1854 expressing pessimism about the repercussions of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Bingham wrote, “a storm is now brewing in the north, which will sweep onward with a fury which no human force can withstand.” See Bingham, Letters, 80 and 142.

The Art-Union minutes recording the purchase of The Concealed Enemy identify the painting with the title “Concealed Enemy-Indian Figure.” This may or may not be the title submitted by the artist. The addition of the term “Indian Figure” may reflect the secretary’s attempt to identify the ambiguously titled picture more clearly for exhibit organizers. See “Minutes,” Art-Union meeting, December 8, 1845, American Art Union Papers, coll. New York Historical Society, cited in Blouch, Paintings, 172.

Matty Meeting the Texas Question was designed by H. Bucholzer and published by New York lithographer James S. Baillie in 1844. For discussion and bibliography related to the cartoon, see Matty Meeting the Texas Question, LOC, PPOC, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/200861437/.

See James Otto Lewis, A Winnebago Squaw / Wife of O’Check-Ka or Four Legs, lithographed by Lehman and Duval, ca. 1835, The North American Aboriginal Port-Folio (Philadelphia: J.O. Lewis, 1835–1836), Bucholzer’s image of “Texas” in Matty Meeting the Texas Question also recalls Renaissance and Baroque personifications of Envy, as well as traditional images of witches (see, for example, Zacharias Dolendo’s engraving after Jacques de Gheyn II, Envy, 1596–97, and Albrecht Dürer’s Witch Riding Backward on a Broom engraving of 1500). For a discussion of the gendered nature of American expansionism, see Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).


51 Images and reproductions of Michelangelo’s David were widely available in the nineteenth century. Profile views appear, for example, in Richard Duppa, The Life and Literary Works of Michel Angelo Buonarroti (London: Evans, 1806), appendix, unpagedinated, plate III, and Paulo Alessandro Maffei, Raccolta di statue antiche e modern . . . nella stamp a di Domenico de Rossi (Rome: Domenico de Rossi: 1704), plate XLIV.

52 While the similarity of pose between Bingham’s figure and The Dying Gaul has not been heretofore observed in the scholarly literature, art historians have noted visual references to The Dying Gaul in other nineteenth-century artworks representing Native Americans. See, for example, Thomas Cole’s 1843 drawing for the never-executed painting, The Fountain, which represents a wounded Indian in a landscape whose pose is a direct allusion to The Dying Gaul. See Thomas Cole, The Fountain, No. 1: The Wounded Indian Slaking His Death Thirst, 1843, in Kevin J. Avery, American Drawings and Watercolors in the Metropolitan Museum of Art (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2002), 163–64. See also the sculpture by Ferdinand Pettrich, Dying Tecumseh (modeled 1837–1846, carved 1857, now in the Smithsonian American Art Museum, Washington, D.C.) and Peter Stephenson’s Wounded Indian, marble, 1848–1850, in the Chrysler Museum of Art. For illustration, information, and bibliography related to these sculptures, see the entry in the Smithsonian American Art Museum, Washington, D.C, Online Catalogue, http://americanart.si.edu/collections/search/artwork/?id=19670, and Chrysler Museum of Art Online Catalogue, http://collection.chrysler.org/emuseum/view/objects/asitem/People$00406058/0/.

53 See Bloch, Evolution, 79–83 and 110–11. While literary works like Washington Irving’s Astoria would surely have affected some viewers’ reception of Fur Traders (as Bloch suggests), my research indicates that such connections would not have precluded most AA-U visitors from seeing Fur Traders as an image from the 1840s.

54 For a discussion of the scholarly “misreading” of Bingham’s paintings as nostalgic, see Nancy Rash, Painting and Politics, 67 and 243, n. 9. Though Rash’s studies provided much of the inspiration for my own, she questions only the nostalgic readings of Bingham’s boatmen pictures. She follows earlier scholars in interpreting The Concealed Enemy and Fur Traders Descending the Missouri as nostalgic (see pp. 45–54).


56 For Charles Deas’s The Voyagers as a source for Bingham’s 1845 Fur Traders, see Charles D. Collins, “A Source for Bingham’s Fur Traders Descending the Missouri,” Art Bulletin 66 (1984): 668–78. Collins identifies a watercolor study, The Trapper and His Family, in the Boston Museum of Fine Art as the potential source, but the oil painting in the American Museum of Western Art-The Anschutz Collection, Denver, is a more likely prototype.

57 Further support for Collins’s argument comes in recent infrared reflectograms of the Fur Traders that suggest that the picture may have originally resembled Deas’s The Voyagers more closely than it does today. Bingham initially filled his landscape with wild, Deas-like vegetation, snags, and debris, which were later painted out. For the infrared photos, see Claire Barry and Nancy Heugh, “‘Navigating the Path of the Brush,’” 107–8 and 144. Aside from the extra debris and vegetation, the underdrawings for Fur Traders also include a small animal on the cargo mound that the Metropolitan Museum of Art has identified as a tiny bear cub. I posit that formal and thematic connections between Fur Traders and Deas’s The Voyagers
suggest that the creature in this sketch might be more convincingly associated with an Indian puppy. In Deas’s *The Voyagers*, a tawny, pointy-eared Indian dog sits in the canoe. Similar small Indian dogs appear in the Deas paintings *Winnebagoes* (1843), *Figure Group of Sioux* (1845), and a second *Voyagers* (1846). For these paintings, see Clark, *Charles Deas and 1840s America*, 32–33, 105–13, 185, 197–98, 202. The identification of the never-painted creature is made more interesting by the fact that an infrared photo of Bingham’s 1850 variation on *Fur Traders, The Trappers Return*, includes an overpainted sketch of a dog peering over the side of the canoe in a position almost identical to that of Indian dogs in Deas’ 1845 *Voyagers*. Since Bingham no longer had access to *Fur Traders* in 1845, the composition of *The Trappers Return* must be based on a now-lost compositional drawing for the 1845 painting. The lost drawing feasibly could have contained a Deas-inspired dog traveling with the traders. For descriptions and illustrations of Indian dogs, see Glover Morrill Allen, *Dogs of the American Aborigines: Bulletin of the Museum of Comparative Zoology* 63, no. 9 (March 1920). Allen’s book discusses several kinds of Indian dogs, most of which are now extinct, including the short-legged dog (464–68), the small Indian dog (481–84), and the Hare Indian dog (491–93). See also “The Wonders of Nature: The Hare Indian Dog and the Dingo or Dog of New South Wales,” *The Guide to Knowledge* 1, no. 24 (November 1832), 191–92; John James Audubon, *The Viviparous Quadrupeds of North America*, vol. 3 (New-York: V.G. Audubon, 1849), 153–55; and J.H. Walsh, *The Dog in Health and Disease* (London: Longman, 1872), 39–40.

By June 18, 1845, Bingham had moved to an upper floor studio in the Platte building on Chestnut St. in St. Louis. See Bloch, *Paintings*, 272, and McDermott, *George Caleb Bingham, River Portraitist* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press), 49 n. 1. Charles Deas is listed as a portrait painter with a studio located on Chestnut St. at no. 97 in *Green’s St. Louis Directory* 1845 (Saint Louis: James Green, 1845), 47. Both Bingham and Deas evidently entertained visitors in their studios. A newspaper report on June 4, 1845, in the *Missouri Republican* describes a reporter’s visit to Bingham’s earlier St. Louis studio (above Forbes Mirror and Picture Frame Shop at no. 14 Main St), and the writer Charles Lanman mentions seeing the Deas paintings in the artist’s St. Louis studio during 1846. See Charles Lanman, *A Summer in the Wilderness Embracing a Canoe Voyage Up the Mississippi and Around Lake Superior* (New York: D. Appleton & Co, 1847), 15–17. A journalist also mentioned visiting Deas’s studio and viewing “bold and original works” in “Notices of New Works,” *The Southern and Western Literary Messenger and Review Devoted to Every Department of Literature and the Fine Arts* 12, no. 17 (March 1846): 192. The *St. Louis Weekly Reveille* mentioned exhibitions of paintings by Bingham at Wooly’s shop in March of 1846, and by Deas in August of the same year. See “Very Fine Paintings,” *St. Louis Weekly Reveille*, March 23, 1846, p. 798, and “A New Picture by Deas,” *St. Louis Weekly Reveille*, August 31, 1846, p. 980, cited in Clark, *Charles Deas and 1840s America*, 33 and 50 n. 74.

The fur-trade statistics cited above were widely published; see, for example, two articles published in New York: “The Progress of the West,” *American Railroad Journal* 17 (June 15, 1842): 378, and James H. Landon, “Commerce of the Mississippi,” *Merchants Magazine and Commercial Review* 9, no. 2 (August 1843): 158. For the listing of St. Louis businesses dealing in the fur trade, see *Green’s St. Louis Directory*, no. 1 (1845) xxi, 11, 66, 78, 126, 143, 150. The text of the directory states that the largest of these businesses, the American Fur Company, “employ a capital of over half a million of [sic] dollars, and give employment to several hundred persons” (p. xviii).

George Frederick Ruxton, *Life in the Far West* (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1849), 71. The text was first serialized in *Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine*, June to November, 1848. The book contains observations from Ruxton’s travels from St. Louis into the mountain regions of the Northwest in 1846. Though Ruxton gave characters fictional names and imposed a love story onto the narrative, the general tenor of the book is that of a nineteenth-century travel account, complete with Romantic embellishments and dramatizations. Today’s scholars value Ruxton’s book as an important (though romanticized) record of the language, habits and culture of fur traders during the mid-1840s. See Claude Hubbard, “The Language of Ruxton’s Mountain Men,” *American Speech* 43, no. 3 (October 1968): 216–21.

New, December 9, 1845, p.2, col. 2.

See James K. Polk, Inaugural Address, “Chronology of position in his inaugural address on March 4, 1845.

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boundary of U.S. territory in the Oregon country should

be contained in the Oregon country should

Polk had campaigned on the idea that the northern boundary of U.S. territory in the Oregon country should be at the 54˚ 40ꞌ parallel. The president reinforced that position in his inaugural address on March 4, 1845. See James K. Polk, Inaugural Address, “Chronology of Swearing-In Events: Fifteenth Inaugural Ceremonies,” http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-in/address/address-by-james-k-polk–1845. In his first address to Congress, December 2, 1845, Polk stated: “It is deemed important that our laws regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes east of the Rocky Mountains should be extended to such tribes as dwell beyond them. The increasing emigration to Oregon and the care and protection which is due from the Government to its citizens in that distant region make it our duty, as it is our interest, to cultivate amicable relations with the Indian tribes of that Territory.” See James K. Polk, “First Annual Message,” December 2, 1845, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29486. For a recent overview and bibliography related to Polk’s Oregon policy, see Thomas M. Leonard, James K. Polk: A Clear and Unquestionable Destiny (Wilmington, Del: SR Books, 2001), 87–115.


The Boonville Observer
Texas.’”

Aside from the Clonney paintings, six Italian scenes by

68 See Henry Adams, “A New Interpretation of George Caleb Bingham’s Fur Traders Descending the Missouri,” 675–80. Adams himself is less insistent that the pictures are true pendants than scholars following his lead. See Adams, “Bingham and his Sources,” 515. For scholars that accept Adams’s theory as an established fact, see, for example, David Lubin, Picturing a Nation: Art and Social Change in Nineteenth-Century America, 70, and Barbara Groseclose, The “Missouri Artist” as Historian, in George Caleb Bingham, exh. cat. (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1990), 57–58, and Ron Tyler, “George Caleb Bingham: The Native Talent,” in American Frontier Life: Early Western Painting and Prints (New York: Cross River Press, 1987), 27. Adams supports his supposition with important and relevant observations that indicate a relationship between the pictures, though not necessarily a formal pairing. These include the similarity between the pose of the Indian in The Concealed Enemy and the boy in Fur Traders. The paintings are also almost exactly the same size (approximately 29” x 36”), but so are Bingham’s other two Art-Union pictures of 1845 (Cottage Scenery and Landscape: Rural Scenery), a circumstance that may indicate that this was a standard working size for the artist in 1845. The fact that Bingham did not sign either The Concealed Enemy or The Fur Trader would also have hindered the likelihood that viewers would see the two paintings as a pair.

69 Adams was mistaken in stating that Bingham’s proposed Boone County banner showing Boone fighting an Indian was executed. The Boone County banner that appeared in the Whig procession at Boonville depicted “a large fat coon, rolling a ball over a cluster poke stalks” on the recto and on the verso “a wagon, driven by Polk, containing three individuals . . . and drawn by a poor old horse . . . over which is inscribed, ‘Bound for Texas.’” The Boonville Observer October 15, 1844, p. 2, col. 1, cited in Bloch, Evolution, 76–77. It is possible that Bingham painted this banner, but Bloch thinks it unlikely since the Boonville Observer did not credit Bingham as the artist. For Bingham’s letter discussing the Boone County banner, see Bingham, Letters, 65: “I would suggest for the design as peculiarly applicable to your County, old Daniel Boone himself engaged in one of his death struggles with an Indian, painted as large as life, it would make a picture that would take with the multitude, and also be in accordance with historical truth. It might be emblematical also of the early state of the west, while on the other side I might paint a landscape with ‘peaceful fields and lowing herds’ indicative of [her] present advancement in civilization.”

70 Aside from the Clonney paintings, six Italian scenes by T.B. Ashton were paired (nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11), as were two still-lives by T. Cummings, Jr. (no. 112). See American Art-Union, Transactions of the American Art-Union 1845 (New York: American Art-Union, 1846), 27 and 29. Although Bingham wrote that his proposed Boone banner would reflect “historical truth,” the fame of the Causici composition might have made it the most
effective way to create a picture that the “the multitude” would immediately associate with Daniel Boone.

71 See “Hints to Art Union Critics,” The American Review: A Whig Journal 4, no. 6 (December 1945): 600. In a phenomenological analysis of Fur Traders, Patricia Trutty-Coohill discussed the unusual participatory action in the painting: “By reducing activity to the zero point they dwell on what is most basic—existence and existence in the world. They share their experience of what is most real as they float by us—we who give them pause. We are the cause of their awareness. And their awareness will be the cause of ours. Thus Bingham has involved us absolutely in the ‘action’ of the work. Without us, the fur traders would not have paused.” See Patricia Trutty-Coohill, “Visualizing Tymieniecka’s Poetics,” in Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition 1, edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), 304.

72 The idea that tension and ambiguity are major subtexts of the painting has been advanced by several scholars, including Zesse Papanikolas, who sees the painting as emblematic of the “unpaintable west.” See Papanikolas, American Silence (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 2, 13–15. John Demos also suggested that Bingham may have intentionally left the identity of the creature ambiguous in “George Caleb Bingham: The Artist as Social Historian,” American Quarterly 17 (1965): 228. Demos writes that the ambiguity of the creature dramatizes “the feelings of wonder, of puzzlement, of both envy and suspicion with which Missouri townsfolk would regard these fur-traders.”

73 For the idea that the bear cub might be consumed for its meat, see Christopher Kent Wilson, “Bingham’s Bear Cub,” The Art Bulletin 67, no. 1 (March 1985): 154.

74 Susan Prendergast Schoelwer has also seen an allusion to Native American power in Bingham’s creature, although she specifically connects the beast with native women. Schoelwer writes, “[The creature] may be seen as encoding, in dreamlike fashion, the inescapable Absent Other—the wilderness bride who cannot be wholly forgotten even when her role is forcibly repressed.” See Schoelwer, “The Absent Other: Women in the Land and Art of Mountain Men,” in Discovered Lands, Invented Pasts: Transforming Visions of the American West, edited by Jules David Brown, et.al. (New Haven: Yale University Press), 135–66 (quote, p. 161).

“Our women and children cry for food, and we have no food to give them”:
The Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Shoshone Dispossession

BY ADAM R. HODGE
In the summer of 1855, Chief Washakie and other Eastern Shoshone leaders hosted a party of Mormon missionaries led by James S. Brown at one of their villages in the Wyoming Basin. Shoshone elders listened as Brown explained how the leader of his church and colony, Brigham Young, desired to convert Shoshones to the Mormon faith and teach them how to farm. Most of the tribal elders distrusted the missionaries, but Washakie advised them that cultivating a relationship with the Mormons might be to their benefit. Shoshones had fallen on hard times, for, in Washakie’s words, “this country was once covered with buffalo, elk, deer, and antelope, and we had plenty to eat, and also robes for bedding, and to make lodges. But now, since the white man has made a road across our land, and has killed off our game, we are hungry, and there is nothing left for us to eat. Our women and children cry for food, and we have no food to give them.”

Indeed, by the mid-1850s, a combination of developments had transformed Shoshone country, much to the detriment of its indigenous inhabitants. The erosion of the region’s resources began early in the nineteenth century, when the first European-American fur trappers and traders and their Indian contacts began to deplete the resources upon which Shoshones depended, particularly after the bison robe trade began to heat up during the 1830s. Then, the trickle of overland traffic through the heart of Shoshone country to the Far West that began during the 1830s swelled into a flood by midcentury. Even as the growing numbers of Anglo-American overland travelers and their livestock affected ecosystems along the trails, the travelers also killed countless wildlife for food and sport. Meanwhile, climate patterns—particularly the end of the Little Ice Age and the onset of a series of droughts during the 1840s–1860s—amplified the impact of this human activity on Shoshone lands and resources.

So, over the course of the nineteenth century, a confluence of human and environmental factors deprived the Shoshone people of vital resources and rendered them, especially their increasingly influential leader, Chief Washakie, more receptive to the idea of establishing a permanent reservation where they could farm and ranch. In fact, throughout the 1850s and 1860s, Washakie routinely informed Indian agents that his people were hungry and that he wanted a permanent reservation for them. The creation of the Wind River Reservation in 1868 and, with it, the dispossession of most of the vast stretch of Shoshone territory, was in large part made possible—and perhaps necessary—by Shoshone hunger.

Examining trappers’ journals, travelers’ narratives, government reports, and other historical documents alongside scientific data, particularly tree ring studies, enhances the historiography by emphasizing the oft-overlooked environmental dimensions of Indian dispossession. Existing scholarship on nineteenth-century Eastern Shoshone history effectively dissects the human elements of the story—such as the intercultural interactions that produced treaties and reservations—but devotes too little attention to the synergistic relationship between people and the physical environment. There are, however, notable studies of other Indian groups that highlight the utility of integrating environmental history into the narrative of Eastern Shoshone dispossession. Adopting this approach allows us to better understand why Washakie and other Shoshones increasingly viewed the creation of a permanent reservation as a necessary measure by the mid-nineteenth century.

**THE FUR TRADE**

Prior to the nineteenth century, European-Americans indirectly influenced Shoshone country. Inhabiting the remote interior of the North American West—such as the far western Great Plains, Wyoming Basin, and the northeastern corner of the Great Basin—Shoshones had little direct contact with the Spanish, English, French, and American colonizers who were active in adjacent areas prior to 1800. Yet, horses, reintroduced to the Americas during the early 1500s and thereafter diffused throughout the North American West by indigenous raiders and traders, had transformed Shoshone travel, subsistence practices, warfare, and commerce. And the great smallpox epidemic of 1780–1782 had visited Shoshone villages, killing untold hundreds if not thousands, when equestrian Indians unknowingly carried the *variola* virus through the West.

But in the wake of the Lewis and Clark expedition, American and British fur trappers and traders began to visit Shoshone country. Home to many beaver, bison, and other game, such areas as the Wind, Green, Bear, and Snake River valleys offered trappers, traders, and hunters an abundance of pelts, robes, and meat. During the period of 1807–1840, European-Americans and Indians alike relentlessly harvested beaver pelts as well as bison meat and hides and, in some cases, systematically and intentionally pushed some wildlife populations toward extinction. The fur trade was, as scholars have observed, largely compatible with Indian lifeways, and it therefore did not produce immediate dispossession. Still, it is worthwhile to examine how it significantly reduced the resources found in Shoshone country and thereby affected, in the long term, Shoshone subsistence and economics.

The extent of the fur trade’s impact on the environment during the first quarter of the nineteenth century cannot be known, but the historical record indicates that there was significant activity during that time. The visitations of American fur trappers began...
in 1807, when John Colter, recently released from his employment as part of the Lewis and Clark expedition, explored the upper reaches of the Yellowstone and Snake River watersheds. Colter worked for Manuel Lisa, who sent other expeditions into the Rocky Mountains from his fort at the mouth of the Bighorn River to trap as well as encourage the Indians to bring in furs to trade. Lisa abandoned his post in 1808, but during the following years Colter and other trappers returned to the upper Missouri River region. In 1810, Andrew Henry established a post on the upper Snake River, which was the first American post west of the Continental Divide as well as the first in Shoshone territory. Then, in 1811, trappers and traders employed with John Jacob Astor’s Pacific Fur Company visited multiple Shoshone camps during their westward overland journey to Oregon and harangued them to “procure a quantity of beaver skins for future traffic.”

Meanwhile, agents of the Hudson Bay Company and North West Company extended the British fur trade into Shoshone country from the north. This was quite a process, for the Blackfeet vigorously opposed the extension of the fur trade that they benefited from in the Saskatchewan River basin to their enemies beyond, including the Shoshone. But in 1818, the North West Company launched the first of a series of annual expeditions that passed through Shoshone country west of the Continental Divide. Thereafter, Shoshones who inhabited lands watered by the Snake River and its tributaries began to encounter fur-trapping brigades comprised of several dozen men who “trapped out” stretches of water and visited Native camps to trade. Those expeditions continued for another decade after the Hudson Bay Company absorbed the North West Company in 1821. The so-called Snake Country Expeditions exacted a heavy toll on the region’s beaver populations, as the Hudson Bay Company officially reported collecting 35,000 furs during the entire course of those operations.

This depletion, however, was not a product of mere economic exploitation. Aware that American fur trappers approached the Oregon country from the east, Hudson Bay Company authorities in 1823 adopted what is called the “fur desert policy.” As George Simpson, the director of the Northern Department which implemented the policy, wrote, “[i]f properly managed no question exists that it [the Snake River region] would yield handsome profits as we have convincing proof that the country is a rich preserve of Beaver and which for political reasons we should endeavor to destroy it as fast as possible.” So, in an effort to protect the British Empire’s interests in the Pacific Northwest by limiting American intrusions into the Oregon country, Hudson Bay Company brigades endeavored to exterminate every beaver in the region, and they encouraged Shoshones and other Indians to help them do so. Peter Skene Ogden’s 1824–1830 Snake Country Expeditions executed this policy so effectively that the final brigades of 1830–1831 and 1831–1832 found few beaver left to trap.

Even as Hudson Bay Company trappers created their “fur desert,” company officials’ concerns about encroaching American trappers became a reality. In 1824, trappers and traders employed by William H. Ashley, who inaugurated the age of the Rocky Mountain trapping system in the heart of Shoshone country, ranged from the upper Missouri to the Snake River, working extensively in the watersheds of the Bear, Green, and Wind Rivers. This system revolved around the annual rendezvous, which was based on the precedent of the Shoshone trade fair. Each summer, after trapping through the winter and spring months, fur company employees, independent trappers, and Indians gathered at a location designated during the previous year’s meeting to exchange their furs for goods that arrived by wagon from St. Louis. Every rendezvous held between 1825 and 1840 occurred in Shoshone country, in what is now western Wyoming, southeastern
Idaho, or northern Utah. The Rocky Mountain trapping system lasted until 1840, at which point the depletion of beaver populations made that summer’s rendezvous the last of its kind.  

Shoshones played major roles in the Rocky Mountain trapping system. Those who lived in the Wyoming Basin had previously had little contact with traders, and since they were beleaguered by Blackfeet warriors and other enemies who had long reaped the benefits of such commerce, many eagerly established friendly relations with the Americans and engaged in the fur trade. Their annual trade fair and the rendezvous transpired concurrently, providing Shoshones and their indigenous allies with direct access to vital commercial and social activities. Many Anglo-American trappers traveled with and lived in Shoshone villages, and some Shoshone women married trappers, thereby forging valuable economic connections as well as providing trappers with protection from other Indians. Shoshone men, who had previously hunted few beaver, integrated trapping for commercial purposes into their daily lives by devoting some of their time during the winter and spring months to trapping. Shoshones had much incentive to participate in the fur trade to begin with, since they desired guns, ammunition, and other goods, but competition between the Rocky Mountain Fur Company and the American Fur Company intensified after the inception of the latter in 1828 as those outfits fought for the loyalty of Shoshones and other natives, thereby driving up the prices they paid for furs.  

It did not take long for European-American and Indian trappers to deplete the Shoshone country’s beaver populations. While reporting on his 1839 journey through the Wyoming Basin and Snake River country, German visitor F.A. Wislizenus remarked that “[h]undreds of [beaver] have been trapped here in the last decades, and a war of extermination has been waged against the race.” That statement was especially true regarding the Snake River region, as the Hudson Bay Company’s “fur desert policy” had been so ruthlessly executed from 1824 to 1830 that the company discontinued its annual brigade expeditions after that of 1831–1832. But further east, where the American fur outfits and their Indian contacts, including Shoshones, did not endeavor to wipe out beaver populations, the result was nevertheless much the same. In 1843, writer Matthew C. Field met Shoshones east of the Continental Divide and remarked that “the trappers have so thinned their country of beaver that they are now in an impoverished condition.” So, by participating in the fur trade, Shoshones had briefly enhanced their material wealth and military power by acquiring firearms and other trade goods, but they ultimately contributed to the beaver’s demise and, with it, the collapse of the Rocky Mountain trapping system.  

The fur trade also affected Shoshone subsistence for the worse. Although European-American fur trappers and their Indian contacts largely focused on harvesting beaver pelts, other wildlife populations also suffered. European-Americans killed some big game themselves, but Shoshones and other Indians killed many of the bison, elk, and other animals to provide the many trappers who visited the Rockies during the 1820s and 1830s with hides, fresh meat, and pemmican. Bison were numerous in the Portneuf River area when Shoshones began trading at Fort Hall in 1834, but Field observed in 1843 that the game “in the Snake country ha[s] been thinned off and nearly killed up by the hunting of the whites.” That same year, American explorer John C. Frémont noted that bison could once be found in the Green and Bear River valleys, “but so rapidly have they disappeared within a few years that now, as we journeyed along, an occasional buffalo skull and a few wild antelope were all that remained of the abundance which had covered the country with animal life.” Indians and fur trappers alike had, in his words, “slaughter[ed] them with a thoughtless and abominable extravagance” to sustain themselves and to trade surplus meat and hides.  

And like that of the beaver, a mere shadow of a once considerable population remained when the zenith of the fur trade had passed.  

In response to this destruction in the Snake, Bear, and Green River areas, Shoshones began to establish a stronger presence in lands east of the Continental Divide that remained rich in game. Although visiting such places as the Wind River valley and Bighorn Basin carried great risk because their Blackfeet and (sometime) Crow enemies frequented those areas, Shoshones were drawn to their abundance. Fur trader Edwin Thompson Denig reported in his manuscript composed during the mid-1850s that this region was “perhaps the best game country of the world,” as bison, elk, pronghorn, and other game species were numerous. It was therefore little surprise that Washakie and other Shoshones claimed the Wind River country as part of their homeland when reservation talks began after midcentury.
OVERLAND TRAVELERS
AND SETTLERS

Before the final Rocky Mountain fur-trade rendezvous occurred in 1840, the next great wave of change began to sweep through Shoshone country. During the 1830s, Americans began migrating along the famed Oregon Trail and other routes to the Far West. Since Shoshone country offered one of the most convenient routes through the Rocky Mountains—South Pass—a trickle of American emigrants trekked through such areas as the southern Wyoming Basin and the Snake River Plain. Following routes established by Indians as well as European-American fur trappers and traders, their travels portended an eventual tidal wave of emigrants that devastated the Shoshone world and compelled them to seek refuge on reservations. Meanwhile, the founding of the first major non-Indian settlements in Shoshone country further altered ecosystems and reduced Shoshone territory, thereby contributing to Shoshone dispossession.

Although overland travel through Shoshone country was relatively light during the 1830s and most of the 1840s, the emigrants nevertheless affected the land and its inhabitants. Perhaps the greatest stimulus of travel to the Far West prior to the late 1840s was the missionary impulse that drew hundreds of Christian missionaries to the Oregon country, although some also ventured westward to find adventure, riches, better health, or to escape some trouble in the East. Shoshone territory was an important part of their journey westward, for, in addition to the vital South Pass, emigrants resupplied and rested at Fort Bridger in the Green River country and/or Fort Hall on the Portneuf River while depending upon the Sweetwater, Green, Bear, Snake, and their tributaries for freshwater during their passage through that arid region. By the early 1840s, their travel was leaving an impression on the landscape, for in 1843 Frémont, upon picking up the trail along the Sweetwater, remarked that “the numerous heavy wagons of the emigrants had entirely beaten and crushed the Artemisia [the genus of plants that includes sagebrush].”

As the 1840s drew to a close, the slow but steady stream of travelers through Shoshone territory swelled into a flood. This was in large part due to the discovery of gold in California, which drew thousands of “forty-niners” westward, although the Mormon emigration to Utah contributed to the flow of traffic. Between 1840 and 1848, some 18,850 Americans traveled west through South Pass, but the period of 1849–1860 saw approximately 277,400 emigrants make that journey through Shoshone country. When the original trails became overburdened with emigrant trains that depleted grass and timber resources, enterprising individuals blazed new “cut-offs” that exposed more of the land to the travelers’ destruction. In 1857, for example, Frederick W. Lander surveyed the first federally funded road project located west of the Mississippi River, a trail that ran north of the main Oregon Trail “through a pass used by the Shoshonee [sic] tribe of Indians, in returning from the ‘buffalo’ during the winter season.” In its first year of operation, more than 10,000 travelers used the Lander Cut-off.

This traffic through Shoshone country detrimentally affected the physical environment. By the early 1850s, travelers killed or drove off most of the game that had once frequented trail areas. The fur trade had already reduced the bison and other game populations that inhabited the river valleys and plains west of the Continental Divide, but the era of overland travel completed their destruction as emigrants killed wildlife for food or sport. Meanwhile, their livestock overgrazed areas that were once rich in forage; overland travelers could consequently count on finding very little game along the trails by the 1850s. As Granville Stuart noted in 1858 while preparing to trek from southwestern Montana to Fort Bridger, “[w]e knew that as soon as we crossed the Rocky mountain divide into the sagebrush plains of the Snake river, there would be no game of any kind and also none from there to Fort Bridger.” Similar conditions prevailed further east, for in 1843 Matthew Field noted that his party “[t]ravelled from 7 a.m. till 6 p.m. today without stopping, for want of water, through this ‘South Pass’ seeing no game, and tramping through sage brushes all day.” Riverine areas were also devastated, for many travelers visited the same stretches of waterways to gather wood and water, and the wagon trains and livestock that forded streams and rivers eroded river banks while kicking up untold tons of sediment that the waterways then carried far downstream.

Shoshones suffered as overland travel affected ecosystems for the worse. The first Utah Superintendency of Indian Affairs report, produced in 1850, observed that game was scarce in Shoshone country and that those Natives therefore needed government relief. Four years later, another report documented Washakie’s blunt statement that “my people are starving.” Shoshones compensated for the depletion of game in their homelands by relying more on women’s foraging efforts and by traveling to the western Great Plains to hunt bison each fall. However, such activities apparently failed to provide adequate sustenance. When, in the mid-1850s, the United States government began helping the Mormons (who ran the Utah Indian Agency until the early 1860s) support the Shoshone, Washakie lamented that the agents frequently gave his people blankets when they really needed food.

The arrival of the first permanent settlers in Shoshone country exacerbated matters. Thwarted in their attempts to establish a series of colonies further east because many Americans did not approve of their doctrine and practices, Mormons turned their attention to “unsettled” tracts of land in the West during the 1840s, particularly Utah. In 1847, Shoshones first encountered Mormons entering their country and, of the nearly 300,000 Americans who traveled westward through South Pass between 1840 and 1860, some 43,000 of those ended their journey in Utah or Wyoming. The Mormon colony in Utah grew rapidly, as about 4,600 had settled in the Great Salt Lake area by the end of 1848. Within a few years, their settlements...
sprawled northward into the Bear River area, east into the corridor between the Salt Lake and Fort Bridger, and into the Green River valley.24

The Mormon colonization of northern Utah and southwestern Wyoming further taxed the resources upon which Shoshones depended. The growth of settlements deprived Shoshones of lands and resources by reducing their access to key grazing and hunting areas. Consequently, almost as soon as Brigham Young began managing Indian affairs in Shoshone country in 1850, he heard Washakie’s concerns about emigrants depleting resources and settlers taking Shoshone lands. Young, in turn, called for the federal government to create Indian reservations and provide the natives with instruction in farming even as Mormon missionaries worked to “civilize” the Shoshone and other Indians through religious conversion. Meanwhile, Mormons pioneered cattle ranching in southwestern Wyoming, as their colony at Camp Supply near Fort Bridger had a cattle herd by 1853. By the late 1850s, wildlife as well as Shoshone horses lost access to more forage as additional cattle herds had been established in the Bear River, Black’s Fork, and Ham’s Fork areas.25

The invasion of Shoshone lands and the depletion of the resources they depended upon precipitated conflict that, in turn, produced their dispossession. During the late 1850s and early 1860s, Shoshone raids on wagon trains and settlements intensified as conditions in Shoshone country deteriorated. The opening of mining areas such as the Comstock Lode in Nevada and Virginia City in Montana drew additional travelers through Shoshone lands and led to the founding of new trails, both of which added pressure to the region’s already diminished resources. An Indian agent based at Fort Bridger in 1862 reported that the Shoshones in the area were “in a destitute condition,” for there was “very little game in this territory,” and while Washakie lamented how emigrants and settlers affected his people’s land, he maintained that war was not the answer. However, he was in the minority, as other Shoshone leaders, such as Pocatello, reportedly called Washakie an “old woman” because he refused to fight. Pocatello and other Shoshone chiefs led raids on settlements as well as on travelers along the trails to California, Oregon, and Montana, taking lives and property, including livestock that helped to alleviate their hunger. Their armed resistance culminated in a combined Shoshone-Bannock assault in 1862 that struck emigrants scattered along the trail from the North Platte to the Bear River.26

This warfare, which was at least in part an expression of Shoshone hunger, culminated in the Bear River Massacre. In the wake of the 1862 Shoshone-Bannock raids, Colonel Patrick Connor led a detachment of California volunteers in an attack on a Shoshone Camp situated along the Bear River on January 29, 1863. What began as a battle quickly became a route as the Indians ran out of ammunition. By the time the fight ended, the toll included over 200 Shoshones killed, 160 women and children taken captive, 175 horses captured, and 70 lodges destroyed. At the camp, soldiers found items taken during raids on American settlements and emigrant trains, but that hardly justified the harsh treatment of Shoshone women and children after the “battle” ended; the solders reportedly raped multiple women and brutally killed infants.27

TOWARD A RESERVATION

In the aftermath of the Bear River Massacre, the push to create a reservation for the Shoshone began in earnest. For nearly a decade, Washakie as well as some government officials had expressed interest in setting aside a permanent reservation for the Shoshone, but it was the brutal Bear River Massacre, a product of the ongoing deterioration of Shoshone country’s resources and the related raiding of the late 1850s and early 1860s, that drove home the need for a Shoshone reservation. Yet, even as representatives of the United States government and the Shoshone people began to hold meetings to discuss such a reserve, further developments exacerbated the detrimental environmental effects of the fur trade and overland travel.

The emergence and growth of commercial bison hunting also contributed to Shoshone dispossession. Bison were once a peripheral source of skins for the market (although invaluable locally as food and attire for trappers and traders), for their bulky hides were hardly worth transporting over long distances. However, as beaver supplies diminished and Americans used improved methods of transportation in the West (such as the steamboat), bison hides became a viable commodity for exportation to eastern markets. Natives—including Shoshones—were integral to this commerce, for the American fur outfits acquired most bison robes from Indian hunters. During the period of 1833 to 1843, the American Fur Company alone reportedly dealt some seventy thousand robes annually. Much of the early activity was centralized along the Missouri itself, but by the 1850s Indians more intensively exploited the bison herds found in such areas as the Wyoming Basin. Shoshones played a significant role in this destruction of the bison herds, as evidenced by an 1866 report of the Indian agent at Fort Bridger, which observed that Shoshones brought about a thousand robes to trade after their recent fall and winter hunts.28

Changing climate conditions paralleled this human activity. The onset of the Little Ice Age in the 1300s had brought greater annual precipitation and lower temperatures to the Great Plains and Rocky Mountains, which enhanced forage growth, much to the benefit of bison, other large game, and the Indians who hunted those animals. The Little Ice Age came to an end in the mid-1800s as warmer temperatures and decreased rainfall prevailed across much of North America. Historical drought severity indices based on tree-ring studies reveal that the area encompassing southwestern Wyoming, northern Utah, and southeastern Idaho emerged from a seven-year stretch of relatively wet conditions in 1840, with the period of 1842–1848 constituting the driest timespan since the 1820s. Between 1842 and 1872, the
region experienced nineteen dry years and twelve wet years, in contrast to the period 1806–1841, which featured twenty wet years, thirteen dry years, and four in which the region was divided into parts that experienced different conditions.29

Those who visited Shoshone country during the mid-1800s occasionally commented on the environmental conditions that made food scarce. When Frémont, for example, trekked through the southern Wyoming Basin in 1842, he noted that “the present year has been one of unparalleled drought, and throughout the country the water had been almost dried up.” He discussed the drought’s impact on the region’s forage supplies, writing, “I was informed that the roving villages of Indians and travelers had never met with difficulty in finding an abundance of grass for their horses; now it was after great search that we were able to find a scanty patch of grass.” He learned from some Lakotas that drought and grasshoppers had combined to destroy forage and drive bison out of the general area, remarking that “[t]his was bad news. No grass, no buffalo—food for neither horse nor man.” Droughts also occurred in 1851–1852, 1855–1857, and 1861–1865.30

Following in the wake of a long period of climate conditions that had supported an abundance of flora and fauna upon which Indians subsisted, the trends of the mid-1800s contributed to Shoshone hunger, thereby hastening
Shoshone dispossession. Washakie and other Shoshones came around to the idea of a reservation during the 1850s, as did various government officials. Repeatedly during the 1850s, Washakie informed government agents that he wanted a reservation for his people where they would be protected from Americans and other Indians alike as they learned how to farm and hunt while continuing to hunt. An 1862 report of the Indian agent at Fort Bridger that noted the lack of game in Shoshone country went on to identify the Wind River valley as a candidate for the site of a Shoshone reservation. He contended that creating a reservation there would remove Shoshones from existing trail and settlement areas while securing them with a homeland that had agricultural potential.\textsuperscript{31}

But progress toward a reservation was slow prior to the Bear River Massacre. Shoshones had been invited to the 1851 council at Fort Laramie, but only as guests, not participants, since government officials did not think they could claim lands east of the Continental Divide. So, as Washakie awaited his turn to speak (which never came), government agents divided up the western Plains and much of the Wyoming Basin among other Indian groups. After the meeting, Washakie expressed his displeasure at being unable to voice his concerns about the effects of American emigrants and settlers on Shoshone lands. He was also frustrated that the government officials did not consult him before determining that the Wind River valley belonged to Crows.\textsuperscript{32}

It was only after the Shoshone-Bannock raids of 1862 and the subsequent Bear River Massacre that the United States government concluded a treaty with the Shoshone in which it recognized their territorial claims. On July 2, 1863, Washakie and other Shoshone chiefs signed the first Fort Bridger Treaty, in which they promised not to trouble overland travelers and agreed to allow the construction of railroads and telegraph lines through their lands. Government officials agreed to give Shoshones annuities as compensation for the depletion of resources in their homelands. The treaty also identified a large Shoshone territory comprised of some 44,672,000 acres in the Intermountain West, which included land in southeastern Idaho, northern Utah, northwestern Colorado, and western and southern Wyoming. This left the Shoshone with a vast “reservation” that included existing overland trails and settlements within its boundaries, but few lands that remained rich in game. In effect, the treaty defined Shoshone territory for the purposes of Indian management while making no effort to protect it or ensure that the Shoshone had access to quality hunting grounds. Washakie recognized as much, for he expressed disappointment that the 1863 Fort Bridger Treaty did not create a permanent reservation for his people and that the Wind River valley was not included within the Shoshone “reservation.”\textsuperscript{33}

In 1868, Shoshone leaders again met with government officials to negotiate treaties. The discovery of gold at South Pass and the construction of the Union Pacific railroad through the southern portion of the newly formed Wyoming Territory led the federal government to confine the Shoshone to a smaller, more isolated reservation. One of the results of the second Fort Bridger Treaty, signed on July 3, 1868, was the creation of the 3,054,182-acre Wind River Reservation in the Wyoming Territory. Although the

Astoria, at the mouth of the Columbia River, was a primary base of operations in the Pacific Northwest for John Jacob Astor’s Pacific Fur Company (which was part of the American Fur Company). It was part of Astor’s plan to organize a fur trade operation that would have global economic implications. After the War of 1812 ended, Astoria was increasingly in competition with the British North West Company. (Image: Library of Congress)
treaty also reserved the right of the Shoshone to hunt in adjacent unoccupied lands, the government agents warned Washakie and others that “[i]n a few years the game will become scarce and you will not find sufficient to support your people. You will then have to live in some other way than by hunting and fishing.” The document therefore also included various “civilizing” provisions, such as for the eventual parceling out of farmlands and the construction of schools and other buildings.34

Washakie lauded the 1868 Fort Bridger Treaty, especially the creation of the Wind River Reservation. After the meeting concluded, he reportedly said:

I am laughing because I am happy. Because my heart is good. As I said two days ago, I like the country you mentioned, then, for us, the Wind River valley. . . . When we want to grow something to eat and hunt I want the Wind River Country. . . . We may not for one, two or three years be able to till the ground. The Sioux may trouble us. But when the Sioux are taken care of, we can do well. Will the whites be allowed to build houses on our reservation? I do not object to traders coming among us, and care nothing about the miners and mining company where they are getting out gold. I may bye and bye get Some of that myself. I want for my home the valley of Wind River and lands on its tributaries as far east as the Popo-Agie, and I want the privilege of going over the mountains to hunt were [sic] I please.35

Although Washakie voiced some concerns about the future, particularly regarding the extent of American encroachment on the new reservation and the looming Lakota threat to his people, he was pleased to have the Wind River reservation as a home. And, after years of informing Indian agents that his people were hungry, Washakie, for the moment at least, was optimistic that the Shoshone would do well at the Wind River Reservation.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, a confluence of human and environmental developments transformed Shoshone country, much to the detriment of the region’s indigenous inhabitants. By eroding the resources upon which Shoshones depended and leaving them hungry, the events of the 1800s contributed to the dispossession of the Eastern Shoshone. The American Rocky Mountain trapping system and the execution of the Hudson Bay Company’s “fur desert policy” enmeshed Shoshones in a global market economy while depleting the very resources upon which that economy depended. Meanwhile, game populations that were then peripheral to the beaver pelt trade—such as the bison—declined because of their utility as local supplies of food and clothing. Then, the rush of overland travel to the Far West that began by midcentury as well as the growth of non-Native settlements further eroded the resources that Shoshones needed. This was compounded by the end of the Little Ice Age and the onset of generally warmer, drier climate conditions as well as a series of droughts. The growth of commercial bison hunting further exacerbated matters.

This intersection of human activity and environmental change left the Eastern Shoshone hungry. Washakie therefore wanted a permanent reservation for his people, a land set aside for them that would be protected and where they could continue to hunt, fish, and forage. One might question Washakie’s sincerity when he stated his willingness to take up farming, but a reservation would provide for that possibility. And the resource-rich Wind River Reservation held much promise as a refuge from the hardship and hunger that the Eastern Shoshone had endured throughout the mid-1800s.
5 For example, see J.R. Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
10 Ott, “‘Ruining’ the Rivers,” 166–79.
14 Beavers have notoriously low rates of reproduction, a fact that contributed to their rapid decline. After the heyday of the Rocky Mountain trapping system, though, beaver populations gradually rebounded in many areas that had once been “trapped out.” Wishart, *Fur Trade of the American West*, 31–33, 212–13.
21 Field, *Mountain and Prairie Sketches*, 133.
26 1862 Letter to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Box 60, Folder 3, Grace Raymond Hebard Papers, 1829–1947, Collection Number 400008, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming; Trenholm and Carley, *Shoshonis*, 156, 165–68, 176, 178; Murphy and Murphy, “Shoshone-Bannock Subsistence and Society,” 305,


31 Box 60, Folder 3, Grace Raymond Hebard Papers, 1829–1947, Collection Number 400008, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming; Stamm, *People of the Wind River*, 35–40.


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Consequences of Peaceful Actions:

Political Decisions of the Illinois Indians, 1778–1832

BY GERALD ROGERS
As the Virginia governor, Thomas Jefferson, sat down to meet with Jean Baptiste Ducoigne in 1781, he did not know what to expect from the chief of the Kaskaskia who traveled to Virginia from the Illinois Country. The Americans had limited but peaceful contact with Illinois Indians. Ducoigne approached this meeting as many of his ancestors had when they first encountered Frenchmen in the Great Lakes region over 100 years before.

He began the meeting with an exchange of gifts and the smoking of the calumet. Jefferson gave Ducoigne a medal as a gift, while Ducoigne offered painted buffalo skins. These were not simply diplomatic procedures for the Kaskaskia chief, but instead the gifts and rituals symbolized the opportunistic nature of the Illinois Indians as well as their longstanding policy of forming alliances with European powers. The painted buffalo skins exemplified how proficient the Illinois Indians had become at not only hunting the buffalo but also transforming it into art.

From an American perspective, Jefferson was trying to extend his friendship by showing that his people were not like the British; they were willing to work with the Kaskaskia, much like the French did. Jefferson left this meeting with a sense of how a successful alliance with the Illinois could later open up inroads into the Illinois Country or at least quell fighting among other Native Americans in the region. Jean Baptiste Ducoigne left this meeting with a very different mindset. Much like his ancestors, Ducoigne hoped to forge a mutual alliance with the Americans to promote trade and strengthen his people’s position in the Illinois Country.

The Illinois Indians were an opportunistic group, and the Illinois experience in the eighteenth century must be coupled with their experience with the Americans to explain why the Illinois felt an alliance with the United States was their best option. This article will not only show why the Illinois Indians chose to side with the Americans, but also the consequences of their actions. The decision to align with the United States caused both internal and external problems for the Illinois Indians. Internally, it led to the splitting of the Peoria from the Illinois, while externally it resulted in constant attacks from other Native American groups. Together, these problems made it increasingly difficult for the Illinois to negotiate favorable treaties with the United States.

To understand the Illinois Indians’ decisions, it is crucial to recognize their motives. The very nature of the Illinois’ coming to the Illinois Country illustrates their resourcefulness and adaptability when faced with unstable conditions. The Illinois were relative newcomers to the region and were not descendants of the large city-state of Cahokia. Instead, they were an Algonquian speaking people who moved west into the Illinois Country from the Ohio Valley during the 1600s. The Illinois left the Ohio Valley as it was suffering from climate change that made agriculture difficult. The struggle for resources caused a period of violence and warfare that made it quite difficult for these Algonquian groups to survive.1 Small settlements survived by trading with the Oneota people who moved into the Cahokia region after the city-state’s demise. In the 1500s, the Algonquian groups of the Ohio Valley and the Oneota people in the Illinois Country began to trade prestige items and other goods across a trade network that spanned modern-day Indiana.2 It is here where we can see small pieces of a distinctive Illinois culture coming together. For example, the calumet pipe, a diplomatic tool used by many of the western Siouan-speakers, came into the Algonquian culture through this trade. The Illinois Indians used the calumet extensively, and they were able to blend several aspects of Algonquian and Oneota culture to form an Illinois culture that differed from many other Great Lakes people the French would encounter.3

The Illinois also took advantage of a large-scale movement of bison into the Midwestern grasslands from...
Between 1500 and 1800, an influx of bison brought tremendous change to native life in the Illinois Country, and the Illinois took full advantage of this situation. The bison transformed the grasses of the prairie from a farming nuisance into a productive source of calories. Bison changed the Illinois into the only bison-based Algonquian group, which emphasized the Illinois’ ability to adapt and take advantage of their surroundings. A shift from an agricultural source of calories quickly shifted to a hunting- and animal-based diet. One archeological study suggests that when Europeans began to enter the Illinois Country, the majority of meat in the Illinois diet was from bison.

Bison hunting began to shape the Illinois way of life and demanded a communal form of hunting that varied drastically from the solitary style of deer hunting. Robert Michael Morrissey argues that this style of hunting helped to form a more unified and cohesive society, a way of life that required larger villages which stayed together throughout the year. Instead of breaking into small villages to chase deer and bears like many Algonquian groups, the Illinois came together in large villages, especially during the summer and winter months, to hunt bison. Bison hunting helped make the Illinois prosperous by allowing them to have an abundance of food and engage in other artistic endeavors. For instance, hide painting became an important medium that the Illinois employed well into the nineteenth century. Even upon contact, Jesuit explorer Father Jacques Marquette (1637–1675), noticed how the Illinois “use the hides for making fine Robes, which they paint in various Colors.”

By 1832, the combined population of the Kaskaskia and Peoria was reduced to a single village of 300. (Figures from Emily J. Blassingham, “The Depopulation of the Illinois Indians Part 2,” Ethnohistory 3, 4 (Autumn 1956): 362–72.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Kaskaskia Total Population</th>
<th>Peoria Total Population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1675–1677</td>
<td>5,950-6,250</td>
<td>8,000 in 3 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1707</td>
<td>2,200 includes Tamaroa</td>
<td>1707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>900 includes Michigamea and Cahokia</td>
<td>1750</td>
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<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>100</td>
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The Illinois Indians opportunistically settled the Illinois Country and strategically positioned themselves as middlemen between the Algonquian- and Siouan-speaking people. Their mixed cultural traits and positioning between these two worlds helped them thrive in one very large aspect of their culture: the slave trade. Like many other Algonquian groups, kinship played a prominent role in the Illinois culture and was a crucial factor in the Illinois slave trade. Establishing a broad kinship network often meant gaining status or power in trade, warfare, and politics. The centrality of kinship networks to the Illinois and other Algonquian groups
explains how slave raids helped to replace the deceased members of these kinship networks. Captives could be adopted into the family to replace the dead. A Jesuit in the Illinois Country explained this practice as “resuscitating the dead.” He stated, “When there is any man to be resuscitated, that is to say, if any one of their warriors has been killed . . . they give to this cabin one of the prisoners, who takes the places of the deceased; and this is what they call ‘resuscitating the dead.’” However, only true strangers could take the place of the dead. Algonquian-speaking captives were often useless because they would have to be adopted into a kinship network where they already had ties. For the Algonquian people of the Great Lakes, the Siouan-speaking groups from the west made excellent candidates for slaves because they had no kinship ties to the Algonquian world. Since strangers were needed to replace the kinship networks, the Illinois had a strategic advantage when it came to the slave trade.

Situated between the Great Lakes and the Siouan-speaking tribes of the west, the Illinois displayed their opportunistic nature by becoming middlemen along this slave-trade route. Throughout the 1600s, the Illinois were engaged in wars with several groups in the Missouri Valley to obtain slaves. The Pawnee, Osage, Missouri, and other smaller groups to the south and west bore the brunt of Illinois slaving raids. The Illinois viewed these groups as a convenient and vulnerable source of slaves for the Indian slave trade that thrived in the Great Lakes region. The Illinois even engaged in war with both the Iroquois to the east and Siouan tribes to the west at the same time. While the Jesuit priest Claude Allouez (1622–1689) saw this as a reckless act, it was actually an example of the Illinois being opportunistic in the slave trade. The Illinois were resourceful enough to realize that their position in the Illinois Country was an advantage.

When Marquette first arrived at an Illinois village in 1673, he was greeted by a dance featuring the calumet pipe, treated to a feast of bison meat, offered belts and garters from Illinois Indians wearing buffalo skins, and even presented with a slave. This routine is strikingly similar to the gifts and procedures of Ducoigne’s visit with Thomas Jefferson. There is a sense of continuity and similarity of mindset between the two visits that cannot be overlooked. These offerings highlight the fact that the Illinois took advantage of their proximity to and the resources of the Illinois Country to forge a unique culture that blended both Algonquian and Siouan cultures. By using the bison and optimizing the slave trade, the Illinois positioned themselves favorably in the Illinois Country and were often feared by their Native American neighbors. The Menominee warned Marquette before he arrived with the Illinois not to travel any further south than the Fox River. Beyond the river lived the Illinois, who were “ferocious people.” The Illinois colonized the Illinois Country through aggression, fear, and trade. They continued to employ these same techniques well after contact and into negotiations with the United States. The political structure of the Illinois before European contact has been debated by historians, but the word “confederacy” is useful when examining Illinois political decisions. Each village within the confederacy was equal and relatively autonomous, but they met together regularly to reach important political decisions as a cohesive unit. The Illinois had strong
The relative autonomy of various bands within the Illinois confederacy provided them the flexibility to adapt to Europeans in divergent ways. As the eighteenth century progressed, the localized autonomy of some bands strengthened, eventually fracturing the Illinois confederacy. The political and cultural differences among the bands allowed divisions to occur that weakened and eventually supplanted the larger Illinois confederacy. The individual bands chose to dissolve their confederacy as a way to protect their way of life. From the late eighteenth and into the nineteenth century, the bands among the Illinois confederacy prioritized local decisions over the goals of the larger confederacy. Factions within the larger Illinois confederacy formed and gained autonomy from the confederacy to create separate political and cultural entities. The local autonomy allowed for some bands to alter their culture and political structure much more drastically than other bands, while the internal policies of the Illinois confederacy shifted to adjust to, align with, or reject the various incoming European nations.

For the Illinois confederacy the eighteenth century was a major turning point because some bands were simultaneously coming together while others began to fragment. This dual process of coalescence and fragmentation occurred differently for each band. Some smaller factions of the Illinois confederacy became absorbed into larger groups, but at the same time there was a pivotal split occurring between the Kaskaskia and Peoria that pulled the Illinois confederacy in different directions. The smaller bands slowly gravitated toward either the Kaskaskia or Peoria and eventually combined with them. The Cahokia, Michigamea, and parts of the Tamaroa followed the Kaskaskia strategy of aligning themselves with a European nation to promote trade, seek protection, gain material goods, or disseminate the Christian religion. The Peoria, on the other hand, chose to use a strategy that often distanced them from Europeans while outright rejecting the Christian religion.

By the end of the eighteenth century, it is clear that the bands had become autonomous entities, and the Illinois confederacy collapsed. Instead of uniting to preserve the culture of the Illinois, the local autonomy of the bands allowed the different groups to diverge in order to preserve their respective vision of an Illinois culture. The localized structure of the Illinois confederacy gave them a mechanism to survive in a way quite different from most groups. Instead of coming together to preserve the larger group, the Illinois endured by separating into smaller, localized groups.

In addition, the geographical distance between the Kaskaskia and Peoria often strained the limits of the confederacy and helped to promote local decisions. Before the eighteenth century, the Peoria and Kaskaskia lived relatively close to each other in the Starved Rock region on the Illinois River in present-day northern Illinois. In the fall of 1700, the Illinois faced a split with the Kaskaskia, moving southward to the west bank of the Mississippi River. Three years later the Kaskaskia moved again, 50 miles further south near the mouth of the Kaskaskia.

George Catlin, Pah-me-cow-ee-tah, or Man Who Tracks, a Peoria Illinois Chief, 1830. (Image: Illinois State Museum)
River. With a heavy reliance on European goods, the Kaskaskia moved southward to be close to the Louisiana Territory. Father Jacques Gravier (1651–1708) believed that the only thing that stopped the Kaskaskia from entering the Louisiana Territory was their strong Catholic ties to the mission. This left the two main areas of Illinois concentration near Lake Peoria and the mouth of the Kaskaskia River.

The Peoria protested this move by the Kaskaskia, but ultimately they could not force the Kaskaskia to stay. The geographical distance was over 100 miles and helped to ensure that these two bands would continue to develop in separate ways. The French established forts and towns in close proximity to the Kaskaskia, and the Kaskaskia began to adopt many of the European ways of life. For instance, the Kaskaskia established two mills for the production of wheat. By 1763, there were also “two hundred acres of cultivated land, a very good stock of cattle, and a brewery.” The structure of the confederacy allowed for strong localized bands with the ability to make many political choices on their own, and the Peoria were left to the north with a completely separate set of enemies from the Kaskaskia.

The Illinois confederacy allowed for individual bands to make a vast array of political decisions without the approval or consent of the other bands. One of the main reasons for the confederacy was to protect the similar culture of the Illinois bands. However, the bands were not obliged to protect the other bands during warfare, and no village could force another village into conflict. For instance, if the Peoria felt threatened by the Sioux, they could meet with the other villages and ask for their warriors’ help. However, if the elders of the other villages did not or could not provide help to the Peoria, then the Peoria fought the Sioux alone. There were several instances when all of the bands would provide warriors to fight off the Iroquois in the seventeenth century or the Fox during the early part of the eighteenth century. However, as time progressed the bands often began to favor more localized reasons for going to war. Instead of protecting a common culture or Illinois confederacy, they often chose to fight battles more relevant to their respective local politics.

The close alliance between the Kaskaskia and French often left the Kaskaskia making the decision to side with the French militarily, with the Kaskaskia joining them on several raids and battles against French enemies. For instance, in 1733 and 1736, the Kaskaskia participated in French-led expeditions against the Chickasaw. In the latter trip, more than 100 warriors from the Mississippi River villages took part in the expedition. During the 1740s, Cherokee towns were even raided by French forces with the help of the Kaskaskia. The Chickasaw and Cherokee were not local enemies for the Kaskaskia, but the Kaskaskia used their warrior population to help build a strong alliance with the French. While these decisions did strengthen this alliance, it often left the Peoria more than a hundred miles to the north to defend their territory by themselves.

The location of the Peoria also made them more susceptible to attacks from the Sioux. While the Peoria fought valiantly against these outside groups, they were beginning to waver in the 1750s after being attacked several years in a row. When the Peoria asked for help from the Kaskaskia or even for a French officer to be stationed among them, their request was not granted in time. The Peoria then lobbied the Cahokia and Tamaroa bands of the Illinois to join them at Lake Peoria, but to no avail. The Peoria were truly left to defend their land for themselves.

The Peoria’s isolation did not mean that they were isolated from conflict and difficult decisions. After surviving numerous enemy attacks without much support from the other Illinois bands, the Peoria made the conscious choice to move west of the Mississippi River into Spanish Territory after the British began to enter the Illinois Country.

The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was not an ideal time for the Illinois Indians. Throughout their history, the Illinois resourcefully took advantage of everything from the buffalo of the prairie to their Native American neighbors they used for slaves. However, the tides began to change when the Illinois bands began to separate and elect for a peaceful relationship with the United States. Renewed violence with the Foxes in the
1770s helped to reduce the warrior population of the Illinois down to a mere 300 warriors. While the Peoria sought refuge across the Mississippi River in Spanish Territory, the Kaskaskia stayed east of the Mississippi, either near Kaskaskia or further south with the Quapaw. The Fox, Kickapoos, and Potawatomis continued to harass the Kaskaskia throughout the eighteenth century; with a decreasing population, Kaskaskia chiefs had to take this threat very seriously.

Ducoigne, the Kaskaskia chief, decided to support the United States over his Native American enemies who aligned themselves with the British. Much like previous chiefs, Ducoigne chose to go against his traditional Native American enemies, and the Kaskaskia even joined in the Revolutionary War on the side of the Americans. While most of their Native American enemies sided with the British, the Kaskaskia aided the rebels by hunting, scouting, and carrying correspondence. Forming an alliance with the Americans may seem like a reckless decision, but it was actually consistent with the Kaskaskia’s longstanding policy to align themselves with a powerful foreign nation. For the opportunistic Kaskaskia, they sought a foreign ally who could help them regain their prominence in the region over their Native American neighbors. Ducoigne became a staunch ally of George Rogers Clark when he took over the Illinois Country, and he even served as an American emissary to promote peace among the Wabash tribes and later to the Chickasaws.

By positioning the Kaskaskia in an alliance with the Americans, Ducoigne made a calculated risk that the Americans would prove themselves to be more useful allies than their Native American enemies and that the United States could tip the balance of power back to the Kaskaskia. The same reasoning had been used to validate a French alliance in the beginning of the eighteenth century. However, this decision also made the Kaskaskia susceptible to Native Americans who openly opposed the United States. For example, in 1790 the Kaskaskia suffered heavy losses in battle with the Potawatomi, and in 1802 they were attacked by a series of Shawnee war parties. The Kaskaskia continued to suffer attacks by other tribes for their alliance with the United States. In 1804 and 1805, the Potawatomi raided the Kaskaskia and took several prisoners. The Kaskaskia survived these attacks, but their weakened warrior population led Ducoigne to use a more diplomatic approach toward his enemies.

Ducoigne knew that with his declining warriors he could not oppose the Potawatomi in an open war. Instead, he tried to persuade them to join the Kaskaskia and oppose the Osage, against whom the Potawatomi often went to war. Ducoigne invited the Potawatomi chief Saugeenawk and his Kaskaskia wife to a friendly visit. It was here that Ducoigne most likely unveiled his plan that the Potawatomi join Ducoigne and form a partnership against the Osage. In March of 1805, he threatened that 3,000 warriors were marching from the Ohio Valley to punish the Osage for their raids and either destroy them or push them off their lands. Ducoigne figured that if he could channel aggression away from his people and onto the Osage, he would be in a better position in the long run. The war with the Osage never materialized, but small-scale raids against the Osage did increase dramatically. A short-lived peace treaty among the Osage, Delaware, Miami, Potawatomi, Kickapoo, Sac, Fox, Sioux, and Kaskaskia was eventually signed in October of 1805. The increased pressure by Native American enemies forced Ducoigne to rely on foreign alliances, a trusted Kaskaskia tactic.

Ducoigne was a shrewd negotiator on behalf of his Kaskaskia people. At a meeting where Ducoigne led a delegation of western Indians, he addressed Washington on the encroachment of Kentuckians onto their land. Ducoigne stated at the meeting, “I am a Kaskaskia, and have always been a good American from my youth upwards.” Ducoigne stressed the fact that his people never once shed the blood of an American and maintained a strong alliance with the American people. After the United States’ victory at Fallen Timbers in August of 1794, negotiations were held in Greenville, Ohio, the following year to settle the peace. While Ducoigne and his Kaskaskia people did not participate in the battle in the Revolutionary War, they continued to support the United States in various conflicts.
any way, they were still included in the Greenville treaty. They received a $500 annuity and did not have to cede any land. The Kaskaskia were being rewarded for their alliance with the United States.

This sense of elevated status would come back to haunt Ducoigne and his Kaskaskia people. The other Native Americans surrounding the Kaskaskia became increasingly hostile, especially after Ducoigne signed away thousands of acres of disputed land in an 1803 treaty. The land that Ducoigne ceded to the United States was an area that the Kaskaskia had used for hunting in previous decades, but by 1803 the Kickapoo were firmly established on this land. This action caused Ducoigne strife with the Kickapoos, but he avoided ceding the land where the Kaskaskia lived. Despite giving up hunting ground, Ducoigne retained enough land near the Mississippi River to sustain the Kaskaskia. Thus, instead of giving up his own land, Ducoigne sold out his enemies to strengthen his alliance with the United States. The signing of this treaty sparked some hostile exchanges between the Kickapoo and the Kaskaskia, and Ducoigne sought the protection of the United States. Governor Harrison wrote to the Kickapoo to say that the United States would not tolerate a war against the Kaskaskia. Harrison then told Ducoigne and his people to seek protection in the American village. These were minimal measures compared to what the Kaskaskia were used to from the French.

The splitting of the Illinois Confederacy occurred during the second half of the eighteenth century, but we can begin to see the effects of this split in the treaties of the nineteenth century. The Illinois never had a formal treaty with the French, but it was an alliance based on mutual assistance. The French provided trade goods and formed kinship bonds to strengthen this relationship. However, with the Illinois separating into smaller bands, we can see a move toward a more local concern in treaties. For instance, in the 1803 treaty the Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Michigamea sought money for a priest in the region as well as funds to build a church. The Peoria never fully accepted the ideas of Christianity, so it is obvious they were not involved in this treaty-making process. The Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Michigamea received land, monetary compensation, and, most importantly, a promise of protection from the United States against hostile incursions by other Native American groups. This protection was needed for the Illinois, who had been living in a “barbarous” region that had been plagued with violence since the French left. The Illinois Indians faced constant attacks during this period, and they desperately sought the protection that this treaty offered. However, article two of the treaty not only allowed for protection by the United States, but also implied a dominion by the United States over these Illinois bands. This is strikingly similar to article three of the treaties signed at Portage des Sioux in 1815. Those Native Americans agreed “to be under the protection of the United States, and of no other nation, power, or sovereign, whatsoever.” These treaties helped open the door for American expansion, as well as American authority over western tribes.

The Peoria signed a separate treaty with the United States in 1818 that confirmed their split with Kaskaskia. The Peoria, also decimated by a declining population, sought the protection of the other Illinois bands. Since the mid-eighteenth century, the Peoria had largely settled separately from the other bands, but years of warfare had taken their toll on them. This treaty stated that the Peoria lived apart from the other tribes and were not part of the previous treaty in 1803, so they did not reap any of the benefits of the annuities paid to the other bands. In this treaty, the Peoria signed away the remaining lands south and east of the Illinois River that was not ceded by the Kaskaskia. In return, the Peoria received annuities from the United States in addition to the “immediate care and patronage” as well as the “protection” of the United States against other Indian tribes. This language of care and protection runs through many of the Native American treaties of this region. However, the governmental reach of the United States often did little to protect the Illinois. This might be one reason why the Peoria amalgamated themselves back into the Illinois confederacy.
though the Illinois confederacy was a shell of its former prominence, there was still more protection to be offered from the kinship between bands rather than the distant United States government.

The Illinois began the eighteenth century as dominant players in the region by making strategic alliances with European nations. Over the course of a century, these two groups made decisions that would benefit local bands rather than the larger political entity. This emphasis on local autonomy ultimately led to the fracturing of the Illinois bands that would not be resolved until they were forced to unite in the nineteenth century to survive hostile incursions. Peaceful overtures to the United States did not guarantee peace in the region for the Illinois, who suffered attacks from enemies who despised their decision to side with the Americans. The American treaties weakened the position of the Illinois and opened this region for later expansion. The peaceful action of negotiating with the United States opened up the Illinois to many unforeseen consequences that included violent outside attacks from rival Native Americans and the fracturing of the Illinois Confederacy.

ENDNOTES

4 Ibid., 16-21, 257 n. 125.
6 Morrissey, Empire by Collaboration, 23.
7 Reuben Gold Thwaites, “Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610–1791,” in The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, vols. 51–70 (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers, 1899), 59:111. All other references to this group of sources will be referred to as JR.
12 Ibid., 59:111, 123.
14 For example, Raymond E. Hauser and Margaret Kimball Brown argue that the Illinois bands comprised a tribe rather than a confederacy and were held together by cultural similarities. Hauser and Brown view the Illinois as a tribe with a “social-cultural-ethnic entity” and claim that the use of the word “tribe” did not mean the Illinois were a political organization. Hauser argues that the Illinois subgroups did not exhibit cultural, linguistic, or territorial differences associated with a true confederacy. By using the word tribe, it is easy to gloss over the political organization of the Illinois. While there were cultural similarities and kinship ties between the Illinois groups, the term tribe does not illustrate the political connections that bound the various groups together.
15 John Gilmary Shea, Discovery and Exploration of the Mississippi Valley: with the original narratives of Marquette, Allouez, Membre, Hennepin, and Anastase Douay (New York: Redfield, 1852), xxx.
19 Ibid., 70: 230-47.
21 Ibid., 204.
23 Ibid., 527.
25 Another band of the Illinois Indians, the Michigamea, previously left the Illinois Country and were adopted and absorbed by the Quapaw. It is possible that these kinship and trade networks also connected the Kaskasia to the Quapaw. Stanley Faye, “Illinois Indians on the Lower Mississippi, 1771–1782,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 35, no. 1 (March 1942): 57-72.
26 Owens, Jean Baptiste Ducoigne, 113.
30 Owens, Jean Baptiste Ducoigne, 128.
33 Moses Dawson, A Historical Narrative of the Civil and Military Service of Major General William H. Harrison and a Vindication of his Character and Conduct as a Statesman, a Citizen, and a Soldier with a Detail of his Negotiations and Wars with the Indians until the Final Overthrow of the Celebrated Chief Tecumseh and his brother the Prophet (Cincinnati: M. Dawson at the Advertiser Office, 1824), 11.
38 Ibid.
John Ross (1790–1866) served as principal chief of the Cherokee from 1828 until his death. Ross was a talented negotiator who promoted the cause of the Cherokee in Washington in the late 1810s and 1820s. Although opposed to Indian Removal, Ross was compelled to comply with the terms of the Treaty of New Echota in 1835, which led to Cherokee removal later in the decade. (Image: Library of Congress)
With the return of peace signified by the treaties of Ghent and Portage des Sioux in 1815, the General Missionary Convention of the Baptist Denomination in the United States for Foreign Missions turned its attention to the so-called benighted Indians of America’s western frontier. This convention had been organized the year before in Philadelphia to support Christian missionaries throughout the world. Because it only met every three years (hence Triennial), it entrusted its day-to-day operations to the hands of a Board of Foreign Missions. Led by this Board, the Baptist denomination committed itself to reform—that is, to “civilize” and Christianize—American Indian tribes, which ultimately embroiled it in the national controversy over removal in the 1820s and 1830s. This controversy thrust the fledgling denomination onto the national stage even as it threatened the denomination’s fragile unity. By sending out missionaries, the Baptists hoped to transform the Indians, but as the denomination debated public policy, the Indians transformed the Baptists. Baptists rejected the humanitarian vision of its chief missionary to the Indians, Isaac McCoy, thereby missing perhaps their greatest opportunity to be of help to the tribes.

It is appropriate that historians have studied missionary Isaac McCoy’s side of this story, as he was the chief Baptist actor on the national stage during the Indian removal crisis, but the Baptist Board of Foreign Missions often became the antagonist—or at least the annoying background noise—in such a telling. This article attempts to put the Board and Convention at the center of the narrative. To do so contributes to historians’ understanding of how Christian denominations interacted with the issue of Indian removal at an institutional level. Historians have thoroughly studied the Indian removal crisis of Andrew Jackson’s administration, including the opposition of numerous religious societies to his policies, but they have seldom focused on one denomination. Behind the official pronouncements, the issue of removal divided Baptists as deeply as it did the rest of the nation. Within the Baptist Triennial Convention, one can not only see two sides of the social reform movement in one denomination but also regional divisions that the debates over slavery and abolition would later exacerbate into a final schism.

Isaac McCoy later recounted that the idea for Indian colonization first came to him in June 1823 as he was returning from an early visit to the Ottawa tribe. He saw that the presence of white men had a devastating influence on the tribes and concluded that they would never survive in their traditional homelands. Settlers disregarded treaties and moved into tribal areas. Traders sold alcohol to natives regardless of the law. The fur trade had dried up. Traditional hunting grounds had diminished. Stories of starving and impoverished natives filled McCoy’s printed letters and journals. McCoy’s plan was not simply one of removal—that is, only to get the Indians out of the way of white settlers. He wanted to colonize them in territory west of the Mississippi. His plan called for giving each native who came to the territory a tract of land where he and his family could settle down and learn agriculture—a key component of becoming “civilized” in the eyes of white Americans. Naturally, there would also be missionaries in the territory to teach the Indians about Christianity. The plan eventually called for the establishment of a centralized government in the territory with a constitution, written legal system, and a representative legislature on par with the other states in the union.

McCoy wrote letters seeking support for the plan. In fact, the first mention of McCoy’s plan for Indian colonization in the Board of Foreign Missions’ records is a passing reference to “an Asylum for educated Indians” in August 1823, only two months after McCoy says he first had the idea. The Board mulled over the issue until its annual meeting in late April and early May 1824, when it voiced its consent to McCoy’s plan. In its defense of colonization, the Board essentially echoed McCoy:

That it is the opinion of brother M’Coy, and of the Board, it is expedient to make application...
to Congress, to obtain some section of the West, where civilized and converted Indians may find a home, alike remote from the neglect and prejudices of white persons, and from the necessity of obtaining a precarious subsistence from hunting; where agriculture and the arts may be cultivated, and the great truths of the gospel made known. 

For McCoy and those on the Board who sided with him, removing the Indians out of the way of white settlers and colonizing them in the West would be for the Indians’ own good. In their minds, this would be a continuation—one might say even the fulfillment—of their efforts to Christianize and civilize the tribes, lest they perish. Baptists had availed themselves of federal funds for schools, blacksmiths, and agriculture under the Indian Civilization Fund. Colonization would be an even better means to the same end of reform, as the natives would then be free from white interference in their own land.

In October 1824, the Board appointed three of its members to a committee to research the subject and prepare a memorial that it could present to Congress “as early as practicable.” It was November 1827, however, before it finally authorized the corresponding secretary to go to Washington with such a memorial to the president. The secretary was also to help McCoy procure a government agency to visit the site of the proposed Indian colony, and it gave McCoy, who was present at that meeting, the authorization to publish his manuscript, “Remarks on the Practicability of Indian Reform.” After four years of on-and-off discussion on the subject, the Board read a letter from McCoy on January 2, 1828, that said he had presented its memorial to Congress and it had been referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs.

In all likelihood, internal problems within the Convention and the Board were a significant factor in this delay between the initial decision to lobby for removal and the final presentation of the memorial to Congress. A former missionary associate accused McCoy...
of misconduct at the 1823 Convention, a charge that the Board investigated in early 1824 and of which he was officially exonerated at the 1826 Convention.10 During the mid-1820s, the Board struggled with a precarious financial situation at McCoy’s Carey Station, which relied largely on government funds instead of mission funds. The station was finally criticized by the 1826 Convention (and even more so by McCoy) for its poor management.11 In January 1826, McCoy traveled east to enroll seven of his former Indian students into Columbian College. The Board denied them entry “for a variety of reasons,” which were never printed in the records. It took nearly two months to work out the embarrassing situation, which was probably exacerbated by a lack of communication on McCoy’s part. Finally, the Indians were accepted to Hamilton Institute in New York on the promise that they would be funded by the government.12 All of these incidents may well have contributed to the delay in presenting the memorial.

It also seems likely that differences of opinion between Board members on the subject of removal may have held up the memorial. Such differences certainly caused problems for McCoy’s plan later, so it is not unreasonable to assume they did so in the early stages as well. McCoy recollected in his History of Baptist Indian Missions that it was Rev. Spencer H. Cone of New York City who was “warmly in favour” of colonization in late 1827 and promoted the plan to the Board. At that time, McCoy said, some Board members questioned whether colonization would work.13

The national political situation deserves some comment here as well. In May 1824, the American Baptist Magazine and Missionary Intelligencer reprinted a letter from President James Monroe to Congress on Georgia’s claims to Cherokee lands. Monroe was not willing to force removal at that time, deeming it inhumane to the Indians and unnecessary under the federal government’s compact with Georgia, but he did express the hope that the Indians could be convinced to remove to a new homeland for their own good in many of the same terms that McCoy used. As this was published under the Board’s auspices around the same time as its members were initially considering McCoy’s colonization proposals, they may have been hoping to defend whatever decisions they made about colonization to their Baptist brethren on the grounds that the federal government was thinking in similar terms. They could also shape federal policy and benefit from the funds it dedicated to that end.14 In late 1824 and early 1825, Monroe made Indian removal a definite federal policy, but he did not advocate coerced removal. John Quincy Adams continued in the same vein, although not enthusiastically.15 By presenting a memorial in 1828, the Board, under McCoy’s influence, was hoping to push the Adams administration further on the issue. They also certainly knew that the Indians would be a question in the upcoming election. Indeed, Andrew Jackson would push the matter further when he became president in 1829, and the Baptists, represented largely by McCoy, would be on the forefront of that push.

The 1829 Convention authorized another memorial in favor of colonization.16 On November 16, the Board considered a proposal from McCoy as well as one from its own committee and gave that committee the authority to prepare yet another one—a rather lengthy process that perhaps suggests some significant differences of opinion.17 The treasurer of the Board, Heman Lincoln, met McCoy in Washington in December 1829 to present to Congress...
the memorial the Board had finally approved. McCoy, however, found this one too cautious, as it “did not present a prayer in favour of settling the Indians in the West, but merely asked the Government, in event of Indian removal, to provide for them in the future.” Given this statement and the evangelical push against removal that was largely centered in Boston where the Board met, it would not be surprising that some members of the Board had expressed reservations about removal and had insisted upon such a watered-down resolution. McCoy nearly presented his own memorial instead of the Board’s, but a strongly worded warning from the Board threatened his dismissal if he did, preventing him from doing so.

As extra insurance against the large numbers of antiremoval memorials flooding Congress, McCoy consulted with his Baptist brethren in Philadelphia, who authored another resolution in favor of colonization, and he notes in his History that he also received favorable resolutions from other places. Although the Board’s records give precious few details, they indicate “a diversity of sentiment” among members on how best to proceed with Indian missions in light of removal—and probably even on whether it should take place at all. The official Baptist records give the dissenters to McCoy’s proposals a presence but not a voice; that is, one knows they are there, but not what they said. While such a silence of specifics is not unusual in Baptist records, one cannot help but wonder whether or not in this instance it is, in fact, a loud silence. Some may have opposed removal, arguing as Jeremiah Evarts of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions did, that if missionaries and the government could civilize the tribes, whites would accept them and they would not have to leave their homelands. Some may have doubted whether the Indians could survive at all and may not have cared either way.

The 1832 Convention may have been the moment when the storm that had broken out in the nation over removal struck the denomination with the most fury. That year’s report of the Committee on Indian Missions was the subject for Monday morning, April 30, and it was discussed until the hour of adjournment. The discussion continued that afternoon until “[t]he embarrassments of the subject seeming to multiply, an interval of devotion was agreed upon,” where they prayed for wisdom. The report was then returned to an enlarged committee. The next morning, it was finally read and adopted. McCoy included a copy of the unedited report in the appendix of History of Baptist Indian Missions. A comparison of this initial report with the final version printed in the Convention report reveals a telling removal of some key details of McCoy’s plan. The Convention erased a description of the territory to which the Indians were moving as well as a statement about the land, “where their title to the soil is to be secured by the same tenure that gives security to the possessions of white citizens of the United States, and where no collision will exist between State and national claims.” Also stricken from record was “the fond expectation . . . of their being consolidated into one friendly community, and ultimately becoming a representative part of our great Republic.” The final report retained the same sense of urgency—that the removal crisis was the greatest and perhaps the final
opportunity to help the Indians—but it spoke largely in
spiritual terms. It was, after all, the election year of 1832,
and Jackson’s Indian policies were a crucial, divisive
issue in the election. The Board and Convention, which
had in the past made numerous political statements in
favor of Indian removal, were now trying to back away
and disavow political statements—or at least that is how
McCoy presented the issue.

In fact, the Convention’s refusal to present the
prospect of the Indians obtaining land rights and becoming
a part of the republic was a political statement. The Board
had already put its weight (although perhaps not its entire
weight) behind the political issue of removal as advocated
by McCoy. The Convention likewise bowed to the political
reality of removal, despite the protests and influence of at
least some of its delegates. It did not, however, put its
weight behind the political steps necessary in McCoy’s
estimation to ensure that the Indians could survive and
thrive once they were removed. The veteran missionary
later lamented that Baptists even missed opportunities
to expand their spiritual missions after removal because
the Board had only half-heartedly supported colonization
and never pushed it within the denomination in the first
place. It is difficult to say with clarity whether or not the
denomination chose the path of least resistance, but by
rejecting a key element of McCoy’s vision, Baptists did
indeed miss an opportunity.

The Monroe, Adams, and Jackson administrations and
the events of those years cast serious doubt on the idea of
a separate Indian polity. McCoy’s colonization plan would
have brought it to fruition. Jackson, in particular, could
hardly be taken seriously when he spoke of Indian land
rights. McCoy was serious, writing about them at length
and advocating for them. There is much that could be
legitimately criticized in his colonization plan, but it was
far more humane and befitting of this nation’s high ideals
than what eventually came to be in the long run. The 1832
Convention thus seems to have been a moment of truth
for Baptists, the moment when they could have chosen to
implement this plan. One can only wonder how the course
of Native American history may have been different had
Baptists pushed religiously for Indian land rights and
statehood west of the Mississippi.

ENDNOTES

1 Earl Eugene Eminhizer, _The Rise and Fall of the
Triennial Convention_ (Master’s thesis, Crozier
Theological Seminary, 1956), 58.
2 See George A. Schultz, _An Indian Canaan: Isaac McCoy
and the Vision of an Indian State_ (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1972), and George Melvin Ella,
_Isaac McCoy: Apostle of the Western Trail_ (Springfield,
3 Isaac McCoy, _History of Baptist Indian Missions_
(Washington, D.C.: William M. Morrison, 1840), 96–
97; Schultz, _Indian Canaan_, 22.
4 Schultz, _Indian Canaan_, 67–70, 181.
5 Baptist Board of Foreign Missions Records, pp. 130[?],
135, typewritten MS, American Baptist Historical
Society (Atlanta).
6 Baptist Board of Foreign Missions, _Report_ (1824), 423.
The Annual Report was published in the September
1824 issue of the _American Baptist Magazine and
Missionary Intelligencer_ 4, no. 11.
7 Board of Foreign Missions Records, 184.
8 Ibid., 272.
9 Ibid., 277.
10 Ibid., 113, 125, 140–45, 153; General Missionary
Convention of the Baptist Denomination in the United
States for Foreign Missions, _Report_ (1826), 17. McCoy
discusses these charges in his _History of Baptist Indian
Missions_, 165–69.
11 Board of Foreign Missions Records (1826), 24–27.
12 Board of Foreign Missions Records, (1826), 222–26;
Schultz, _Indian Canaan_, 81–82.
13 McCoy, _Baptist Indian Missions_, 322–23.
14 James Monroe, “Indian Reservations in Georgia,”
_American Baptist Magazine and Missionary
Intelligencer_ (May 1824), 341–43.
15 Schultz, _Indian Canaan_, 78, 85.
16 Triennial Convention, _Report_ (1829), 32.
17 Board of Foreign Missions Records, (1829), 318–19.
18 McCoy, _Baptist Indian Missions_, 395–96.
19 Board of Foreign Missions Records, (1829), 322.
20 McCoy, _Baptist Indian Missions_, 397.
21 Board of Foreign Missions Records, 330.
22 John A. Andrews, _Revivals to Removal; Jeremiah
Evarts, The Cherokee Nation, and The Search for Soul
in America_ (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992),
120.
23 Triennial Convention, _Report_ (1832), 12–13.
24 McCoy, _Baptist Indian Missions_, 596–97.
25 McCoy did not mention the names of those who
opposed the committee’s report in _History_, but he was
explicit that opposition came mainly from Massachusetts
and Rhode Island. In his journal, he named Francis
Wayland, a minister in Boston, as the instigator of the
opposition (Schultz, _Indian Canaan_, 137).
26 McCoy, _Baptist Indian Missions_, 422–23.
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